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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The end of the Cold War was followed by an increase in the influence of ethno-
national conflicts in the world politics. International Relations theories have 
contributed to the study of inter-state war. The question raised in this 
dissertation is whether the same logic can be used to study ethno-national 
conflict. To answer the question this dissertation evaluates the contribution of 
traditional International Relations theories, post-Cold War approaches and 
Constructivism to our understanding of ethno-national conflict. It points to their 
strengths and weaknesses in explaining this conflict. The Kosovo/a conflict is 
used as a case study to illustrate to what extent different International Relations 
approaches help us to understand it. 
 
This dissertation asserts that traditional theories and post-Cold War approaches 
help us to examine the context that would encourage conflict. Pointing to the 
limits of these approaches, this dissertation emphasizes the contribution of 
Constructivist approaches, which assist us to understand the constructive and 
relational processes which make the conflict and shape the participants. At the 
same time, this dissertation shows awareness of Constructivism weaknesses. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
 
Soğuk Savaş sonrasında dünya politikasında etnik-milliyetçi anlaşmazlıkların 
sayısında bir artış görülmüştür. Uluslararası İlişkiler teorileri devletlerarası 
savaşların çalışılmasına katkıda bulunmuştur. Bu tezde sorgulanan etnik-
milliyetçi anlaşmazlıkların çalışılmasında da aynı mantığın kullanılıp 
kullanılamayacağıdır. Bu sorunun cevabını verebilmek için bu tez, geleneksel 
Uluslararası İlişkiler teorilerinin, Soğuk Savaş sonrası yaklaşımların ve İnşacı 
yaklaşımın etnik-milliyetçi sorunları anlamamıza olan katkılarını 
değerlendirmektedir. Bu tez onların ihtilafların açıklanmasındaki katkılarına ve 
eksikliklerine işaret etmektedir. Kosova anlaşmazlığı farklı Uluslararası İlişkiler 
yaklaşımlarının ihtilafı anlamamızda bizlere nasıl yardımcı olduğunu göstermek 
için örnek olarak kullanılmıştır. 
 
Geleneksel teoriler ve Soğuk Savaş sonrası yaklaşımlar ihtilafların oluşması için 
gerekli şartları incelememize mümkün kılarlar. Bu yaklaşımların sınırlarına işaret 
ederek, bu tez bir ihtilafı yaratan ve iştirakçilerini şekillendiren yapıcı ve bağıntılı 
süreçleri anlamamızı sağlayan İnşacı yaklaşımların katkılarını vurgulamaktadır. 
Aynı zamanda, bu tez İnşacı yaklaşımların eksikliklerinin de farkında olduğunu 
göstermektedir. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Since the end of World War II (WWII) and particularly in the post-Cold War era, 
ethno-national conflict has increasingly made an impact on world politics. Ethno-
national conflict stands for the clash of national groups and their demand for 
nationhood. Yosef Lapid observes that “[t]he trend toward expanding levels of 
ethnic conflict was, for instance, solidly occurrence established by late 1960s” 
(1996: 4; see, also, Gurr, 1994; Gurr, 2001). As the occurrence of ethno-national 
conflict has proceeded at a rapid pace, so have the scholarly endeavours to 
explain them. Since the late 1960s, what has emerged is a plethora of 
explanations, which treats ethno-national conflict within the approaches that 
focus on the historical processes of fragmentation and globalisation in world 
politics (Gaddis, 1992), de-colonisation (Fearon and Laitin, 2001; Gurr, 1994) 
and modernisation (Rejai and Enloe, 1960; Holsti, 1975; Horowitz, 1985). Yet, 
what is lacking in these explanations is a comprehensive understanding of the 
implications of ethno-national conflict on international relations. International 
 2 
Relations (IR)1 theories promise to offer such explanations. However, before the 
end of Cold War the explanations about ethno-national conflict has been found 
wanting in IR. 
 
Ethno-national conflict defines a specific condition of war. The parties 
involved in an ethno-national conflict are the ethnic communities or “ethnies” 
(Smith, 1993: 49). In this dissertation the definition provided by Anthony Smith 
(1993) for ethnic communities is taken into consideration. Thus, ethnic 
community is to be understood as “a named human population with a myth of 
common ancestry, shared memories and cultural elements, a link with an 
historic territory or homeland and a measure of solidarity” (Smith, 1993: 47).2 
 
For the purpose of this dissertation ethno-national conflict is 
understood as a dispute about important political, economic, social, cultural 
and/or territorial issues between two or three ethnic communities. Hence, ethno-
national conflict is to be seen as “the product of demands for political 
                                                                                             
 
1
 Capital letters are used to indicate ‘International Relations’ as a discipline, to distinguish from 
‘international relations’ (world politics) as the subject of this field. 
2
 Smith (1993; see, also, Anderson, 1991) defines six criteria that the group should met before it 
can be called an ethnic community. They are summarised shortly in what follows. First, the 
community should have a defined name for itself. Second, the people in a group should believe 
in a common ancestry to be considered as an established ethnic community. Third, the 
members of the group should share historical memories to be viewed as consolidated ethnic 
groups. Fourth, the group must have a shared culture, generally based on a combination of 
language, religion, laws, customs, institutions, dress, music, crafts, architecture even food. Fifth, 
the group must feel an “attachment to a specific territory…what is crucial for ethnicity is not the 
possession of the home land, but the sense of mutual belonging, even from afar” (Smith, 1993: 
51). Sixth, the members of the group must “feel an equal sense of belonging to the community.” 
 3 
recognition” (Smith, 1993: 48). This conflict represents according to Stathis 
Kalyvas:  
[P]rocesses of competition over sovereignty. At least two political actors exercise 
variable sovereignty over parts of a state. Control, as we may call the exercise of 
sovereignty, is strong in some places and weak in other places. Sovereignty is 
divided in some areas meaning that both actors claim control over the same 
territory. In this context…the role of civilians is crucial (2000: 15). 
 
The main characteristic of ethno-national conflict is the breaking of domestic 
order and use of coercion in dealing with irreconcilable difference of interests 
over the sharing of the state. According to Alexis Heraclides (1991, 1997), 
ethno-national conflict is internationalised in four cases. First, conflict is 
transformed into a politico-military struggle when an ethnic group aims to 
separate one part of the communal state, posing, in turn, a credible threat to the 
state in question. Second, there is legitimacy and collective support for self-
determination. Third, there is a strong opposition from the state to the bid for 
independence, culminating with acts of punishment and extermination towards 
the regionally based movement. Fourth, there is a military mobilization and the 
state is in a status of war, facing mobilisation of state armed forces (including 
para-military and security forces) to face the activity of separatist guerrilla forces.  
 
Ethno-national conflict does not always involve the use of violence. 
However, potentially it represents threats to state dismemberment and have the 
possibility of turning into violent conflict and being internationalised and, in turn, 
becoming a concern for International Relations. However, ethno-national conflict 
and nationalism “were not simply absent in the sense that classical studies did 
not care; they were radically absent because they could not be represented in 
 4 
the classical state-centric theory” of International Relations (Buzan and Wæver, 
1997: 242). War in International Relations is considered as “somatic violence 
between states actors” (Evans and Newnham, 1998: 565). The reason for this 
outlook of war in International Relations is explained by the fact that: 
[t]he potential for organized violence has been highly concentrated in the hands of 
states for some time, a fact which states have helped bringing about by recognizing 
each other as the sole legitimate bearers of organized violence potential, in effect 
colluding to sustain an oligopoly (Wendt, 1999: 9).  
 
Thus, the state in International Relations is treated as the primary units of 
analysis for “thinking about the global regulation of violence” (Wendt, 1999: 9). 
According to Hedley Bull, war is an inter-state practice “qualified by a sense of 
the overriding need to contain war within tolerable bounds” in the society of 
states (Bull, 1977: 198). Consequently, in traditional International Relations 
theories, state-centrism is the locus for understanding war and peace in world 
politics. The state-centric outlook in International Relations neglects the 
importance of non-state actors in the understanding of war (Aron, 1981). 
Consequently, it can be concluded that ethno-national conflict is not dealt in its 
own right in International Relations. 
 
 With the end of Cold War, International Relations scholars began to 
increasingly deal with this conflict. There are two plausible explanations for this 
growing interest. According to Lapid (1996), two developments–one in the realm 
of contemporary world politics and the other in the realm of the discipline itself–
would justify the emergence of such interest. Starting with the context of 
contemporary politics, expanding levels of ethno-national conflict is to be seen 
 5 
as a development that encouraged International Relations scholars to turn 
toward studying ethno-national conflict. Thus, International Relations scholarship 
could be seen as reacting to a broader view shared by IR scholars that there is a 
shift in the causes, nature and impact of war in world politics (Creveld, 1991; 
Huntington, 1993, 1996; Kaplan, 1994, 1997; Franck, 1995; Holsti, 1996; Kaldor, 
1999; Duffield, 2001; Jung, 2003; Guzzini and Jung, 2004). The main 
assumptions about the increasing role and impact of the ethno-national conflict 
in contemporary politics can be summarised in four main points.  
 
 First, ethno-national conflict in number compare to other forms of 
violence in international relations constitutes the majority (Gurr, 1994; Gurr and 
Harff, 1994; SIPRI, 1998).3 An analysis of the empirical evidence suggests that 
war in its classical form (as an inter-state phenomenon) has declined in number 
(Small and Singer, 1982: 129-131). The data gathered by the Study Group on 
the Causes of War at Hamburg University (the Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
Kriegsursachenforschung, AKUF), shows that in the period between 1945-1992, 
of the 196 wars fought only 43 were inter-state wars in the classical sense.4  
 
                                                                                             
 
3
 Different sources show a decline in number of civil wars, particularly after 1992 (HIICR, 1999; 
Gurr at al. 2001; PPU, 2003; HU, 2004; Newman, 2004). However, what is important is the fact 
that intra-state conflicts constitute the predominant form of violence in international relations.  
According to Melvin Small and David Singer, in the period between 1816-1897 the number of 
wars per nation was 1.69; it declined to 0.75 in the years 1898-1980. Within the period that 
followed WWII until 1980, the number of war for nation declined to 0.23 (Small and Singer, 1982: 
129-131). 
4
 The data are taken form the database of AKUF as published in Jung and Schlichte (1999: 37-
38).  
 6 
Second, ethno-national issues encourage states to go to war with one 
another. The intervention of third parties to stop the conflict for humanitarian5 or 
security reasons could potentially transform an ethno-national conflict into an 
inter-state war.6  In such a situation, ethno-national conflict could become an 
independent source of threat to security at the regional and international level, 
since it can trigger larger conflicts involving other states, destabilising regions 
and challenging the stability of well-established states (Ikenberry, 2000; Gelb, 
1994).  
 
Third, ethno-national conflict creates material and human 
consequences that can be compared with the ones produced by inter-state war. 
The case of the Kosovo/a7 conflict is a good example to illustrate this 
phenomenon. The practical intents and purposes of humanitarian intervention in 
the case of the Kosovo/a conflict were to compel a state (Serbia) to change its 
behaviour. According to NATO sources the length of the campaign was 78 days, 
including over 38,000 combat and 10,484 strike sorties. The number of 
                                                                                             
 
5
 In a common sense, international humanitarian intervention is understood as the exercise of 
“collective capacity [by the society of states] for enforcing minimum standards of humanity” 
(Wheeler, 2000: 12). International interventions are gaining prominence in international relations 
if we consider the increase in the number of civilian casualties as compared to military ones. The 
rate of civilian casualties compared to military ones is estimated to have increased from 0.8 in 
the 1950s to 8.1 in the 1990s (Kaldor and Vashee, 1997). This change is mainly due to the 
continuous increase in number of ethno-national conflicts.  
6
 For an account of international humanitarian interventions in different cases of intra-state 
conflicts, see Nicholas Wheeler (2000). The author observes that humanitarian interventions 
have secured a new legitimacy after the end of Cold War. During Cold War the normal response 
of states to humanitarian outrages was non-intervention. In the post-Cold War period 
interventions in the case of “supreme humanitarian emergencies” are treated as a moral duty 
(Wheeler, 2000: 13). 
7
 Kosovo is the Serbian name for the region. Kosova is the Albanian name for the region. 
Kosovo/a is used throughout the text as a way of representing both names.  
 7 
casualties according to NATO sources was estimated to be between 488 and 
527, while the Yugoslav sources claim 1,200-5,700 civilian deaths. The number 
of refugees and displaced persons was estimated by the UNCHR in Geneva to 
be approximately 1 million people. From the analyses of these facts and figures 
it can be concluded that the Kosovo/a case, although in theoretical terms an 
ethno-national conflict, in terms of its material impact, it was destructive as an 
inter-state war.8  
 
Fourth, ethno-national conflict is increasingly affecting international 
relations because it leads to the fragmentation of states. Ethno-national conflict 
involves national groups and their demand for nationhood. The requests for self-
determination and state-formation are quite often the cause of fragmentation in 
world politics. To cite Ted Gurr et al.: 
Sixty-eight territorially-concentrated ethnic groups have waged armed conflicts for 
autonomy or independence at some time since the 1950s, not counting the peoples 
of former European colonies. More than a third of them continue to fight for greater 
self-determination at the beginning of 2001 including some Somalis and Oromo in 
Ethiopia, Tamils in Sri Lanka, and Chechens in Russia…[There are also] another 
54 territorially-concentrated groups that currently are seeking greater self-
determination by political means. Their tactics may include isolated acts of violence 
but thus far they have stopped short of serious armed conflicts (2001: 14).  
 
Furthermore, there are several de facto states or political entities established by 
separatist ethno-national movements, which are not yet recognised by the 
international community. Many observers fear that contemporary ethno-national 
conflict (involving self-determination) might continue the process of state 
                                                                                             
 
8
 War in International Relations is also defined in terms of casualties. According to Steven David 
(1998), a conflict that causes more than 1000 casualties can be considered an international war 
(see, also, Small and Singer, 1982; Holsti, 1991). 
 8 
breakdown as signalled by the break-up of Soviet Union and Yugoslav 
Federation in the beginning of the 1990s (Mearsheimer, 1990, 1990a; Hassner, 
1991; Wæver et al., 1993; Lapid, 1996; Buzan et al., 1998; Kaldor, 1999). 
International Relations have traditionally dealt with relations between states. 
Yet, ethno-national conflict increasingly raises concerns that the discipline 
should take into consideration.  
 
 These four points indicate the growing importance of ethno-national 
conflict both as a force shaping world politics and as a threat to security. 
Accordingly, this kind of conflict can no longer be neglected by International 
Relations scholarship. Although war has been at the centre of IR, the discipline 
has so far failed to account for the ethno-national conflict in a comprehensive 
manner. This conflict has “rendered apparent IR’s inability to encompass vastly 
accelerated…dynamics of disintegration…at the sub-state level” (Lapid, 1996: 
10).  
 
 Such dissatisfaction with Cold War scholarly work on intra-state 
conflict in general and ethno-national conflict in particular is reflected in the 
current wave of theoretical analyses that try to address them. In 1990-1991, the 
journals International Security and Foreign Affairs were packed with scholarly 
work about the spread of ethno-national conflict following the end of Cold War, 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the implications of these developments for 
international relations (see, for example, Mearsheimer, 1990; Larrabee, 
 9 
1990/91; Van Evera, 1990/91). Later in 1993, Survival dedicated a whole issue 
to the causes of ethno-national conflict, the conditions under which conflict is 
more likely to happen and the problems it poses for international relations 
(Posen, 1993; Hassner, 1993; Snyder, 1993; Smith, 1993; Welsh, 1993). These 
scholarly works looked at nationalism and non-state actors to explain ethno-
national conflict. In the same year Millennium: Journal of International Studies 
(1993) in a special issue: “Culture in International Relations” discussed the role 
of identity and culture in understanding world politics and ethno-national conflict. 
In the same journal (1999), the issue of nationality and self-determination and 
their implications in international relations were paid special attention (see, for 
example, Castellino, 1999; Agnew, 1999; Conversi, 1999). 
 
The ensuing debate has been among the most interesting and 
stimulating in International Relations scholarship. According to Yosef Lapid, the 
discussion stimulated by the issues of ethno-national conflict and globalisation 
have both “directly and inescapably forced the IR scholarly community” (1996: 4) 
to reconsider “the ‘re-’moment in the very idea of social (re)search” (1996: 5; 
see, also, Ferguson and Mansbach, 1994; Kaldor, 1999). Some of the major 
theoretical debates focused on rethinking, reclaiming, reorienting, and returning 
moments of “IR’s…social scientific sensibilities” (Lapid, 1996) brought to the fore 
refinements or reconstruction of the main assumptions of the discipline, which 
now seems to be better equipped to study ethno-national conflict. In turn, these 
“re” moments in the realm of the discipline, according to Lapid (1996), represent 
 10 
the other development that justifies the increasing of interest in International 
Relations toward ethno-national conflict. This dissertation also looks at ethno-
national conflict in International Relations. 
 
The main aim of this dissertation is to evaluate the contribution of 
various International Relations approaches to our understanding of ethno-
national conflict. International Relations approaches have contributed to the 
study of inter-state war in world politics. The question is whether the same logic 
can be used to study ethno-national conflict? In answering this question, this 
dissertation evaluates the contribution of different International Relations 
approaches accounts on explaining ethno-national conflict. Three perspectives, 
traditional International Relations theory (namely, Realism, Rationalism9 and 
Revolutionism),10 the post-Cold War approaches (neo-Realism11 and “New 
Wars”) and Constructivism12 (Alexander Wendt’s and the Copenhagen School’s 
approaches) are discussed.  
 
 The reason behind choosing to examine traditional International 
Relations, the post-Cold War approaches and Constructivism is as follows. First,  
                                                                                             
 
 
9
 Rationalism is also referred to as the English School. 
10
 Capital letters are used to indicate Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism as schools of 
thought. Martin Wight (1991) was the first to name the traditional International Relations theories 
as Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism. 
11
 Neo-Realism in not a post-Cold War theory, but was revamped in the post-Cold War era by 
Posen to account for ethno-national conflict. 
12
 Constructivism is not a homogenous body of thought (Reus-Smit, 2002: 488). This dissertation 
only looks at what Wendt’s and the Copenhagen School’s approaches have to say about war 
and the Kosovo/a conflict. 
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traditional International Relations, the post-Cold War approaches and 
Constructivism have dealt extensively with the question of war and peace in 
International Relations. Thus, they have intrinsic merits. Second, all theories 
provide a combined understanding of war and peace in international relations, in  
a set of rich and diversified ideas that in Charles W. Kegley terms “overlap and 
reinforce each other by speaking to common concerns and issues” (1995:2).13 
The last but not the list, the organising principles of different International 
Relations theories can be used to examine ethno-national conflict. So it would 
be of interest to look what can they offer to our understanding of ethno-national 
conflict.  
 
Furthermore, this dissertation looks at all these theories because most 
of International Relations approaches do not address directly the issue of ethno-
national conflict. Moreover, the literature that directly addresses the changing of 
political practices after the end of Cold War is of little help because very few 
works are concerned with ethno-national conflict per se. Instead, the study of 
ethno-national conflict occurs mostly within the context of humanitarian 
intervention (Wheeler, 2000; Mayall, 2000), globalisation (Snow, 1996; Kaldor, 
1999; Duffield, 2001), culture and identity (Lapid and Kratochwil, 1996; Wendt,  
                                                                                             
 
13
 See, also, Harvey Starr (1995), who believes that “realism and neo-liberalism can be brought 
together by viewing them as different positions on a continuum rather than as exclusively rival 
approaches” (1995: 313). Joel H. Rosenthal (1995) argues as well that the point of convergence 
between Realism and Liberalism far exceed the points of divergence, particularly with respect to 
the attention both perspectives give to the importance of an international consensus about moral 
norms for the maintenance of order. See, also, Ray (1995), Rosenberg (1990).  
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1999), security (Wæver, et al., 1993; Buzan, et al., 1998) and legal aspects of 
self-determination (Falk, 1999; Castellino, 1999; Agnew, 1999; Conversi, 1999). 
Yet, they have implications for our understanding of ethno-national conflict. 
 
 To organise the evaluation of these approaches contribution to our 
understanding of ethno-national conflict the model proposed by Nicholas 
Wheeler and Ken Booth that consider the main organising principles of 
traditional approaches namely, power, order and emancipation to look at 
security, is followed. I have added to their model, identity as the organising 
principle of Constructivism. In this dissertation these principles are used to 
organise and arrange the chapters.  
 
This focus is deemed necessary taking into account the vast and 
heterogeneous body of work in International Relations. Furthermore, focusing on 
these organising principles is done for three main reasons. First, each 
scholarship’s literature on war does not yet offer a unified body of thought. 
However, in all cases there is agreement about what the organising principle is. 
Second, reducing the set of arguments of each perspective to the organising 
principle facilitates and broadens the possibility for generalisations. Therefore, 
concepts germane to the study of inter-state war in International Relations can 
be utilised to examine ethno-national conflict. Third, this simplification is 
necessary to avoid entanglement in the internal debates of each scholarship, 
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which could, potentially draw the attention away from the main purpose of this 
dissertation.  
 
 To evaluate the contribution of these approaches to our understanding 
of ethno-national conflict this dissertation points to their strengths and 
weaknesses in explaining ethno-national conflict. Pointing to the limits of 
traditional theories and post-Cold War approaches, this dissertation emphasizes 
the contribution of Constructivism, which assist us to understand the 
constructive and relational processes which make the conflict and shape the 
participants. The implications of different International Relations approaches for 
our understanding of ethno-national conflict are considered in a single study in a 
novel manner. 
 
Following the theoretical discussion in Part I, the aim of this 
dissertation is fulfilled by applying these approaches to the case of the Kosovo/a 
conflict. Although there is a voluminous literature on the Kosovo/a conflict 
(Maliqi, 1998; Vickers, 1998; Veremis and Kofos, 1998; Mertus, 1999; Ramet, 
1999; Daalder and O’Hanlon, 2000; Clark, 2000; Judah, 2002), most of it does 
not approach the case from a theoretical perspective. These accounts are in the 
form of historical and journalistic narratives. In other scholarly accounts, the 
Kosovo/a conflict is discussed in the framework of humanitarian interventions 
(Wheeler, 2000; Thakur and Schnabel, 2000; Ignatieff, 2000; Bellamy, 2002; 
Chandler, 2002), international diplomacy and law (Caplan, 1999; Falk, 1999; 
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Weller, 1999; Roberts, 1999), human rights (Booth, 2001), security (Spillmann 
and Krause, 2000; Bacevich and Cohen, 2001; Lambeth, 2001; Van Ham and 
Mendvedev, 2002) and strategy  (Posen, 2000; Clark, 2001). These works 
discuss implications of the Kosovo/a conflict for different aspects of international 
relations. Different from these works, the aim of this dissertation is to examine 
what existing International Relations approaches can tell us about the Kosovo/a 
conflict.  
 
Considering the scope of this dissertation, a diachronic account of the 
Albanian-Serbian relationship is avoided. The reason for this escape rests in the 
fact that this dissertation is neither an historical account nor a study of the 
processes of self-identification and self-designation of the Serbian or the 
Albanian communities. This is also why this dissertation does not either deal 
with the issue of nationalism or provide an exhaustive historical account of the 
emergence of the conflict.  
 
This dissertation is a qualitative research. As such, it involves the use 
of different written sources, such as books, scholarly and newspapers articles, 
working papers, documents issued by different institutions and Internet 
resources. Secondary sources in the form of scholarly books, articles, working 
papers, and conference papers written on the causes of war and ethno-national 
conflict are used when evaluating the contribution of different International 
 15 
Relations to our understanding of ethno-national conflict. The insights are 
advanced based on the contributions of certain key thinkers in the discipline.  
 
When looking at the case of the Kosovo/a conflict, other informative 
sources, such as historical documents and documentary books and articles are 
used. In this part primary sources are also used to support the explanations. 
Primary source materials in the form of official documents issued by 
international institutions like the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the EU, NATO 
and the UN agencies are evaluated. Information from news services and press 
reports such as Agence Europe, Radio Free for Europe/Radio Liberty Reports, 
Facts on File, Keessing’s Contemporary Archives, the BBC World report, 
Reuters and Open Media Dissertation Institute (OMRI) are considered as 
additional primary sources. The Internet has also been used to acquire current 
information. Materials for this dissertation are drawn from sources in different 
languages (namely, Albanian, French, Italian and English) and from a variety of 
disciplines (including history, sociology, religion, political theory, economics and 
statistics).  
 
The dissertation is organised as follows. Part I looks at different 
International Relations approaches to war and tries to assess what they have to 
say about ethno-national conflict. Part II focuses on the case study, and 
evaluates their contribution to our understanding of the Kosovo/a conflict. Part I, 
“International Relations Theories and War” evaluate the explanatory capacity of 
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three major International Relations scholarships, namely, traditional International 
Relations Theory (Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism), the post-Cold War 
approaches (neo-Realism and “New Wars”) and Constructivism (Wendt’s and 
the Copenhagen School’s approaches). These scholarships adopt competing 
principles when looking at war. Their main organising principles, namely, power, 
order and emancipation for traditionalism; power and cosmopolitanism for the 
post-Cold War approaches; and identity for Constructivism arrange the chapters.  
 
After having assessed the explanatory capacity of three main 
International Relations scholarships to ethno-national conflict, Part II, 
“International Relations Theories and Kosovo/a Conflict,” seeks to do that for the 
Kosovo/a conflict. Here, the organising principles of presented International 
Relations perspectives are used to assess the Kosovo/a conflict. The aim of Part 
II is not to provide an exhaustive overview of the dynamics of the Kosovo/a 
conflict. Rather, its purpose is to find out to what extent International Relations 
accounts for this case. Thus, in this dissertation only the events and facts from 
the case study that International Relations approaches allow us to see are 
presented.  
 
More specifically Chapter 1, “War and Peace in Traditional 
International Relations Theories,” looks at three traditional International 
Relations approaches, namely, Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism and 
points to their organising principles, namely, power, order and emancipation to 
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assess their contribution to our understanding of ethno-national conflict.  
Chapter 1 also points to the weaknesses in the theoretical underpinnings of 
these traditional approaches to ethno-national conflict. 
 
Chapter 2, “The Post-Cold War Approaches and Ethno-National 
Conflict,” focuses on the post-Cold War approaches to ethno-national conflict. 
The explanatory capacity of two post-Cold War approaches to ethno-national 
conflict is assessed, namely, post-Cold War neo-Realism and the “New Wars.” 
They point respectively to power and cosmopolitanism to organise the 
explanation of ethno-national conflict. Furthermore, both approaches look at 
non-state actors and use identity to explain ethno-national conflict. This chapter 
also discusses these approaches’ main weaknesses in explaining ethno-national 
conflict. 
 
Chapter 3 “Constructivism and War,” focuses upon the constructivist 
approaches of Alexander Wendt and the Copenhagen School.  In contrast to the 
approaches looked in previous chapters, these approaches study the social 
aspects of war. In these approaches, the concept of identity is used to study the 
dynamics of world politics. The chapter concludes with an assessment of both 
approaches relevance in explaining ethno-national conflict, while assessing their 
weaknesses as well. 
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In Part II, the insights gleaned from Part I, are used to scrutinize the 
Kosovo/a conflict. Chapter 4, “Traditional International Relations Theories and 
the Kosovo/a Conflict,” is organised around Realism, Rationalism and 
Revolutionism and their accounts of the Kosovo/a conflict. This chapter ends by 
discussing what these approaches allow us to see in the Kosovo/a case.  
 
In Chapter 5, “The post-Cold War Approaches and the Kosovo/a 
Conflict,” the insights of the two post-Cold War approaches outlined in Chapter 2 
are used to study the Kosovo/a conflict. These approaches analyse power (post-
Cold War neo-Realism) and cosmopolitanism (the “New Wars” approach) to 
explain the conflict between Serbs and Albanians, which are viewed as unitary 
and reified ethnic groups.  
 
In Chapter 6, “Constructivism and the Kosovo/a Conflict,” Wendt’s and 
the Copenhagen School’s approaches are used to examine the Kosovo/a 
conflict. Both constructivist approaches focus on identity and the collective 
shared memories of the actors to present the social aspects of the Kosovo/a 
conflict.  Different from Wendt’s approach, the Copenhagen School’s approach 
points to the process of “securitisation” to explain the emergence of conflict. 
 
The concluding chapter evaluates what different International 
Relations theories allow us to see when looking at ethno-national conflict in 
general and the Kosovo/a conflict in particular. It is argued that Constructivism, 
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in comparison to the other approaches offers a more comprehensive 
understanding of ethno-national conflict while showing awareness of its 
weaknesses.  
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CHAPTER 1 
  
 
War and Peace in Traditional International Relations Theories 
 
 
 
This chapter examines war and how it is treated in traditional International 
Relations theories by referring to the theoretical positions of three schools of 
thoughts namely, Realism, Rationalism, and Revolutionism (Wight, 1991; see, 
also, Wheeler and Booth, 1992). A special emphasis is given to the evaluation of 
these theories’ contribution to our understanding of ethno-national conflict. The 
contribution of the three theories is discussed by considering their respective 
organising principle, namely, power, order and emancipation as defined by Ken 
Booth and Nicholas Wheeler (Wheeler and Booth, 1992; Linklater, 1990).  
 
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section looks 
at Realism and what it can tell us about war in general and ethno-national 
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conflict in particular. Realism attributes the causes of war mainly to the evil 
nature of human beings and the lack of world government in the condition of 
which the struggle of power can turn into conflict (Carr, 1994; Morgenthau, 1985; 
Waltz, 1979). Section 2 discusses Rationalism and its approach to war. 
Rationalism views the causes of war as a product of reason (or lack of it) (Bull, 
1977; Jervis, 1978; 1982; Ruggie, 1986). The third section examines what 
Revolutionism can tell us about war. Revolutionism sees the causes of war as a 
product of man’s society (Wight, 1991; Booth, 1991, 1991a; Linklater 1990; 
Doyle, 1986, 1997; Fukuyama, 1989, 1992; Deutsch, 1957). The three 
scholarships approach war from contending perspectives (Keohane, 1986; 
Kegley, 1995; Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner, 1999), offering at the same 
time alternative insights to scrutinize ethno-national conflict.  
 
They all share a state-centric outlook of war in international relations 
and offer a metaphysical understanding of war. Their understanding of war is 
metaphysical, because it does not reflect upon the dynamics, intensity and the 
context in which war develops. Furthermore, none of these traditional theories 
approach to war pays sufficient attention to the study of particular wars. These 
common weaknesses are responsible for an incomplete understanding of war in 
International Relations, which, in turn, are also reflected in what traditional 
International Relations scholarship can tell us about ethno-national conflict. The 
insights of this chapter are used in Chapter 4, to see what traditional 
International Relations can tell us about the Kosovo/a conflict.  
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1.1. Realism and War  
 
 
1.1.1. Classical Realism: Human Nature, States and War 
 
Drawing from Thomas Hobbes’s ideas,14 a realist view about international 
relations can be summarised as follows:   
Primacy of states as international actors, the separation of domestic and 
international politics, and describe the latter in terms of anarchy and a concomitant 
ubiquitous struggle for power and security (Griffiths 1992: 217). 
 
The realist perspective views the state as the primary source and cause of war. 
Furthermore, the main concern of state in an hostile self-seeking environment 
(anarchy) is considered to be survival. In this environment, the military 
instrument and power are expected to gain importance, because the “ultimo 
ratio” of power in international relations is considered to be war (Carr, 1994: 78). 
Therefore, for realists the main concern of the state is about power. Hence, in 
the realist scholarship, war is viewed to be fought in order to make one’s state 
militarily stronger or, more often, to prevent another state from becoming 
militarily stronger. In this assumption, there is much justification for Edward H. 
Carr’s epigram that “the principal cause of war is war itself” (1994: 78).  
 
                                                                                             
 
14
 In Hobbesian tradition, war is seen as being caused by human nature’s instinctive lust for 
power and desire to dominate others, which, in turn, drives human beings motivations and 
behaviour. Accordingly, human beings live in a continuous “state of nature” that leads to 
insecurity and fear. Making analogy with the human beings life, states interrelations are seen to 
be in a “state of nature,” which is anarchy. Human life characteristics in the absence of 
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Realists regard state as a rational actor. Rationality for Hans 
Morgenthau assumes cautious foreign policies, which in some respect minimise 
the negative effects of the conflictual relations among the states. It also offers an 
explanation for the “patches” of peace in international relations. However, 
Morgenthau suggests that states are guided in their foreign policies and 
behaviour by the logic of national “interest defined in terms of power” (1985: 14).  
All states are regarded as sharing the same concern of maximising power for 
the sake of their own security. Therefore, international politics, indeed all politics 
including war15 are to be defined as “struggle for power.” As Morgenthau argues, 
the concept of interest defined in terms of power induces prudence in 
international relations. Prudence, according to him results from “a rational, 
discriminating understanding of the hierarchy of national interests and the power 
available for their support” (1965: 14).16 However, war is considered always 
possible since: 
[T]he desire to attain a maximum of power is universal, all nations must always be 
afraid that their own miscalculations and the power increases of other nations might 
add up to an inferiority for themselves which they must at all costs try to avoid 
(Morgenthau, 1985: 208). 
 
Consequently, state’s hunger for power and miscalculations of it in a “state of 
nature” situation (anarchy) are to be understood as the underlying causes of war 
in international relations. By this logic “the characteristics and the interactions of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
hierarchical order are extended to the relations among states. Hobbesian approach to war and 
international relations is treated fully by Hedley Bull (1977: 46-51, see, also, 1966). 
15
 According to Carl Von Clausewitz (1984) war is to be understood as the rational continuation 
of policy by other means.  
16
 As cited by Robinson (1967: 142). 
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behavioural units are taken to be the direct cause of the political events 
[including war]” (Waltz, 1990: 33). 
 
The realist approach as developed by Carr and Morgenthau, views 
war as the outcome of quest for power and miscalculation of it. Thus, state and 
power are the core tenets of classical Realism upon which the understanding of 
war in international relations develops. It is worth noting that the state-centric 
outlook of war in the classical realist approach does not help our understanding 
of the ethno-national conflict. However, the principle of power can be used to 
study ethno-national conflict. Thus, ethno-national conflict can be explained in 
the framework of state’s efforts to maximise its power. The realist approach’s 
contribution to our understanding of ethno-national conflict is further discussed 
while looking at the case of the Kosovo/a conflict in Chapter 4. The weaknesses 
of realist approach to ethno-national conflict are further detailed at the end of 
this section. 
 
 
1.1.2. Neo-Realism: The International System and War 
 
Kenneth Waltz in his books Man, the State and War (1959) and Theory of 
International Politics (1979) views war as an effect of the structure of 
international system. Thus, in the international system, wars are to be expected 
“because there is nothing to prevent them” (Waltz, 1979: 113). The absence of 
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an international government, thus, international anarchy is considered to be “the 
underlying” and “the permissive” cause of war in international relations (Waltz, 
1959: 232-233). 
 
Waltz’s understanding of the international state system depends on 
the characteristics of its structure, which, in turn, define war and peace 
scenarios in world politics. For him, the structure of international system have 
three main characteristics: the ordering principle of the system that is considered 
to be anarchical; the character of the units (states) that are viewed as being 
functionally not differentiated, since all seek security; and the distribution of 
power capabilities (either military or economic, or both) among the units in the 
international system (Waltz, 1979: 88-97). 
 
According to Waltz, all states seek to maximise their power for the 
sake of their own security. Thus, the main concern of states in the international 
system is about security.17 This is the case because the anarchical international 
system is seen as homogenising the foreign policy and behaviour of states, so 
they all have the task of providing for their own security. Hence, the anarchical 
nature of the international system is expected to impose on states the burden of 
power accumulation as a means to provide for security. That is why states are 
seen in the neo-realist scholarship as alike units in the international structure.  
                                                                                             
 
17
 In difference with Realism, Neo-Realism would see as the ultimate concern of state security 
not power (Waltz, 1995). 
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In Waltz’s understanding, it is structure that “shapes and shoves the 
units” (1990: 34). As for the position of a state in the international system, it is to 
be understood as defined in function of the distribution of capabilities measured 
in terms of military power. According to this assumption, the best position in the 
system would be for the strongest military power(s), which, in turn, have a 
saying in world politics. This would also explain why states are concerned for 
their “relative gains” (Grieco, 1988; see, also, Wohlforth, 1993). Hence, power 
change even in relative terms would affect state’s position in the system and 
today’s friend can become tomorrow’s foe and, eventually, a threat to its 
security. 
 
For Waltz, stability in the anarchical environment results exclusively 
from the maintenance of the balance of power in the system. Therefore, peace 
is to be viewed as lasting, as long as the established balance of power among 
states remains unchanged. Yet, the mechanism of balance of power cannot 
always be successful. That is why war is to be expected to occur every time this 
balance is undermined. This situation, for Waltz, results from the situation of 
“security dilemma”18 that encourages changes in the distribution of power in the 
international system (bipolarity or multipolarity). The “security dilemma” 
presumes,  in neo-realist accounts, a situation in  which states, while  looking to  
                                                                                             
 
18 John H. Herz introduced the concept and the definition of the “security dilemma” in his article 
Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma (1950). Later Jervis (1976, 1978) developed 
the concept in the format of “game theory” where the “security dilemma” is analysed under 
conflict and cooperation strategies. 
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increase their security by enhancing their military capabilities unintentionally 
create insecurities to others. As a result of such behaviour, which is to be 
understood as imposed on states by the anarchical international system, a 
vicious circle of security-insecurity situations would explain state’s behaviour. 
The “security dilemma” as such, is to be assessed as an attribute of the 
structure rather than a psychological property.   
 
The “security dilemma” is viewed as being experienced by all the 
states regardless of their domestic regimes. In Waltz’s words: 
Whatever the weaponry and however many states in the system, states have to live 
with their security dilemma, which is produced not by their wills but by their 
situations. A dilemma cannot be solved; it can more or less readily be dealt with 
(1979: 187). 
 
In the process of mutual interaction, states, while trying to cope with their 
“security dilemma” end up, according to Waltz, perpetuating the characteristics 
of the structure of international system. Consequently, the characteristics of the 
structure are to be seen as the cause for the production and reproduction of the 
potential for organised violence. On the other hand, Waltz (1979) suggests that 
in the condition of anarchy the distribution of power in the international system 
(being either bipolar or multipolar) explains war frequency. Hence, multipolarity 
in comparison to bipolarity is seen as bring more insecurity and increasing the 
possibility of recurrence of war in international relations (Waltz, 1979: 161-193; 
see, also, Mearsheimer, 1990, 1990a). 
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To sum up, in the neo-realist approach collective actions among alike 
units (states) defined in terms of power and resolved in terms of “rational 
choice,” significantly preclude cooperation. Therefore, the state of war is to be 
understood as a permanent condition of international politics defined by the 
structural distribution of power and states quest for security. The state-centric 
outlook of the neo-realist approach leaves out explanations about the causes of 
ethno-national conflict. However, neo-realist approach allows us to examine 
ethno-national conflict in the context of increasing or decreasing insecurities of 
the state in the condition of multipolar or bipolar distribution of power in the 
international system (Mearsheimer, 1990, 1992). Further fine points about the 
contribution of the neo-realist approach to our understanding of ethno-national 
conflict are discussed, while looking at the case of the Kosovo/a conflict in 
Chapter 4. The main weaknesses of the neo-realist approach to war in general 
and ethno-national conflict in particular are discussed at the end of this section.   
 
 
1.1.3. Other Structural Accounts of War 
 
Following Waltz’s structural account on the causes of war, Robert Gilpin in his 
book War and Change in World Politics (1981), provided a more dynamic 
approach to the understanding of war and presented the concept of the 
“hegemonic war.” For Gilpin, war is caused by the disequilibrium of the 
distribution of power in the international system. Tensions, uncertainties and 
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crises are thought to accompany this disequilibrium. The accumulating 
discontent of rising powers facing the existing power distribution in the 
international system ends for Gilpin by a “hegemonic war.”  
 
War is called “hegemonic” because it is viewed to be the ultimate 
mean that changes the distribution of power and consequently the economic, 
territorial and diplomatic realignment, which has been established in the existing 
international system by the hegemonic power. Using the same logic, WWI and 
WWII are presented by Gilpin, as not only the decay of the European 
hegemony, but also as the impairment of the European political liberalism and 
economic laissez-faire ideologies. Hence, the triumph of the American power in 
these wars meant not only American power hegemony over the international 
system, but also the establishment of a liberal world order. In short, according to 
Gilpin (1981), “hegemonic war” is a functional and integral part of the 
international system that defines the distribution of power on it. 
 
In Gilpin’s structural framework, “hegemony” is the central concept 
that is used to explain the prospects for war and peace in the international 
system. Unlike Waltz, who sees states as alike units, Gilpin “focuses on the 
dynamics of the system change” (Holsti, 1995: 41). Gilpin’s understanding of 
world politics remains in line with the power arguments of the classical realist 
approach where the distribution of power among states (either military, or 
economic or both) define the conditions for stability and disorder, thus, war and 
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peace in international relations. As in the case of the neo-realist approach, 
ethno-national conflict is to be treated in the context of instability or stability in 
international relations.  
 
Fred Halliday (1994, 1999) is another scholar who explains 
revolutionary war by pointing to the characteristics of the structure of the system. 
Different from Waltz (1979), who defines the structure of the international 
system in terms of power, Halliday defines it essentially in terms of the social 
relations that reflect class stratification. The revolutionary war, according to 
Halliday, is the culmination of accumulated changes in classes’ socio-economic 
practices that at the last stage would lead to a qualitative change of the existing 
political order. The effect of the mode of production over the structure of society 
(capitalist, feudal or slave) fashioned from an historical and dialectical materialist 
perspective is to be seen as the main underlying cause of conflicts in 
international relations.  
 
Halliday sees in the present capitalist mode of production two main 
classes: the proletariat and the capitalists (as conceptualised in Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels’s work The Communist Manifesto, 1848). The proletariat looks 
to change its position of subordination, if necessary through the use of force.  
The capitalist’s class aims to preserve the dominant and exploitive position. In 
this class context, revolutionary war is to be understood as a systemic struggle 
with classes as the main actors. Halliday drawing from Marx and Engels 
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considers this war as the final act that will end the current domination and 
exploitation of the working class by the capitalist class. Marx prophesied the 
class struggle as a form of revolutionary war that would change the existing 
capitalist and state based order.  
 
While addressing war in the international system as a class struggle, 
Marx, Engels and Halliday neglect other forms of estrangement and alienation, 
which can cause conflict (Linklater, 1995). Dependence theorists in an attempt 
to broaden the vision of Marxist theories took under examination Third World 
countries’ problems resulting from uneven economic development. Fernando H. 
Cardoso and Enzo Faletto (1979), Johan Galtung (1971) and Immanuel 
Wallerstein (1979), sought to explain Third World countries’ dependency in the 
world economic system and the challenges it brings to international relations.  
 
The common theme of these authors is the examination of the 
exploitation of the “periphery” by the “core.” States are classified as core, semi-
periphery and periphery according to their scale of the economic development in 
the global economic system. Cardoso, Faletto, Galtung and Wallerstein, by 
according primacy to state economic development, saw the international system 
as hierarchically organised and based on asymmetric economic power 
distribution. This structure, at the same time, is to be considered as the one that 
defines the nature of social relations at the world system level and the 
possibilities for war and peace in international relations.  The economic 
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exchange relations between a developed “core” and an underdeveloped 
“periphery” are seen as being exploitative and the source of insecurities at the 
international level (Wallerstein, 1979).  
 
Dependency theorists present a conflicting and exploitive picture of 
international relations. Thus, the advantages of the economic development are 
viewed in this scholarship as enabling the dominant “core” to determine the 
parameters of the relations between the dominant and dominated actors. The 
inter-state relations (defined by patterns of dominance) remain perpetually 
loaded with conflict. However, dependency scholarship do not envisage war at 
the system level since vested interests of the elites in both the “centre” and the 
“periphery” look for the preservation of the dependency structure as a means 
that will guarantee the preservation of their ruling position (Hills, 1994). The 
dependency approach tries to reflect upon the role of domestic classes’ 
differentiation to trace the interest of the political class in power.  
 
These structuralist approaches are either state or class focused. 
Other non-state actors are neglected. In these scholarships “hegemonic” or 
“revolutionary” war, although recognised as social phenomena, are seen as 
occurring either to strengthen their respective states’ power or change the 
international order, which thereby cause a redistribution of power in the system. 
Therefore, the ethno-national conflict, which claims the distribution of territory, is 
to be seen in function of the preservation of equilibrium between great powers or 
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the change of the hegemonic power. Thus, the structure of the system (of states 
or classes) is to be understood as the underlying cause of conflict. So, these 
approaches are subject to the same weaknesses as Waltz’s approach to ethno-
national conflict. These weaknesses are discussed in what follows. 
 
 
1.1.4. Realism and War: A Critique  
 
All forms of Realism share as their assumptions the importance of the state and 
power as two key concepts to explain world politics in general and the causes of 
war in particular. In the words of Scott Burchill: 
Realists…argue that power is rooted in the nature of the humankind, neo-
realists…point to the anarchical condition of the international realm, which 
imposes the accumulation of power as a systemic requirement on states. The 
former account relies on a particular understanding of human nature to explain 
conflict in international politics, always a difficult approach to substantiate. The 
latter abandons such a reliance on reductionism, preferring to treat the 
international system as a separate domain, which conditions the behavior of all 
states within it (1996: 86). 
 
Based on these assumptions, Realism has substantially contributed to the 
understanding of world politics and war by offering “the most venerable and 
persisting model of the international relations” (Holsti, 1995: 36), and being 
“simple and elegant” (Rothstein, 1993: 410).  
 
Nevertheless, Realism in all its variants remains highly criticised, 
especially for its lack of relevance in explaining contemporary international 
relations and practices of war in particular. The relevance of this scholarship in 
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explaining international relations is questioned since “[a] theory of international 
relations needs to perform four principal tasks. It should describe, explain, 
predict and prescribe. On each of these tasks, critics complain that realism is 
deficient and scientifically unsophisticated” (Kegley, 1995: 8).  
 
In all forms of Realism, statism remains central to realist scholars 
understanding of war. In the words of Richard Wyn Jones:  
Statism is a view of the world that regards states-conceived in unitary and often 
anthropomorphized terms-as the only significant actor in world politics. Statism also 
involves a normative claim-and herein lies the justification for referring to ‘statism’ 
rather than ‘state-centrism’-that in political terms, states should be accorded a high, 
if not the highest, value in themselves (1999: 95). 
 
Under this logic, war is considered to be a “rational choice,” since states are 
qualified to be both the judgers of their own interests and the holders of the 
means (power) that would defend and attain them (Art and Jervis, 1985). 
Realism’s intrinsic propensity for legitimising statism does not help our 
understanding of ethno-national conflict. There are serious weaknesses of this 
approach, which does not help our understanding of ethno-national conflict. 
Three of them will be discussed here.  
 
The weaknesses of the realist approach to ethno-national conflict 
reflect upon its basic foundations. All variants of Realism share the assumptions 
of: states being unitary actors and at the centre of world politics, power and 
military force being of principal importance in shaping international behaviour; 
and the objectivist conception of theory (Bilgin, 1999; Wyn Jones. 1999). In the 
first assumption war is examined from a statist perspective. Power is viewed as 
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the solution to state’s security problems in the second assumption. In the latter 
case, war is considered as a fixed and given concept that is not supposed to 
assume important changes. A detailed discussion of these assumptions 
implications in our understanding of ethno-national conflict follows. 
 
First, statism offers a state-centred outlook of war in international 
relations, which makes a state (conceived as a unitary actor), the exclusive 
focus of understanding war. State-centrism has implications for our 
understanding of contemporary war practices considering the increasing 
importance of “non-state actors” and other agent’s role in the causes of war, 
which are neglected by the realist approaches. It is also important to recognise 
that, transnational links between non-state actors and their external patrons, 
who offer support of different kinds to those actors, may be helping in 
accounting for the explanation of the internationalisation of contemporary 
conflicts (Kaldor, 1999; Duffields, 2001; Jung, 2003). 
 
Furthermore, as Kaldor (1999) observes, contemporary conflict does 
not fit within the Clausewitzian definition of war. Clausewitz conceived war as a 
rational instrument of state policy. Therefore, the fragmenting effects of 
contemporary warfare in the world and especially in South-Eastern Europe 
cannot be properly understood by focusing on inter-state interactions to the 
neglect of other actors. Thus, once the unitary image of the state is faced with 
the contemporary practices of war, Realism seems problematic and, as J. Ann 
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Tickner emphasises, “the realist assumptions about boundaries between 
anarchy and order is turned on its head” (1995: 181). So, it can be concluded 
that war cannot be seen only as a state to state practice. Domestic politics and 
sub-state actors need to be considered in the understanding of contemporary 
practices of war (Campbell, 1992). 
 
Kalevi Holsti argues that traditional understanding of states as unitary 
and functionally the same “may overlook some important discontinuities that 
have significant effects on [actors] behaviour” (1991: 330). He observes that in 
the definition of state security priorities there is a great difference between the 
states of Third World and the ones of the European state system. So, the 
causes of war in Third World countries are seen as mostly related with internal 
insecurities such as gross disparities of wealth, environmental degradation, 
class and ethnic disparities.19 However, accounts of Third World security 
consider the state as a provider of security inside the country and focus on 
threats directed to the state from the outside (Ayoob, 1995).  
 
The problem with these assumptions is two-fold. First, state cannot be 
seen as a source of insecurity and an underlying cause of conflict. Second, the 
role of other non-state actors as referent objects of analysis is neglected. 
According to Linklater (1995) this .perspective serves as an ideology function to  
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 See, Bilgin (2003) for a more detailed account of Third World security literature.  
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discipline those within the state who aim to challenge the authority of the state. 
Thus, state-centrism of the realist approaches does not allow us to understand 
the sources of insecurity at the societal level that remain the cause of most 
ethno-national conflicts. This, in turn, would underdetermine our understanding 
of the causes of ethno-national conflict. 
 
Second, in many respects Realism in all its variants treats war as a 
fixed concept. As Pinar Bilgin argues, International Relations traditions “have 
embedded normative concerns such as the maintenance of the status quo or the 
promotion of state sovereignty even to the detriment of individual and groups 
rights” (1999: 33). While for Holsti, the traditional approaches to war reflect 
“explicitly or implicitly on the patterns of Cold War history” and “activities of great 
powers over approximately the last 350 years” (1992: 38-39). This, in turn, is a 
selective approach, which offer a Euro-centric understanding of war, which 
leaves unexplained the wars that take place in Third World countries.  
 
The majority of the contemporary wars take place in Third World 
countries; they reflect “processes and structures of other ages and locations,” 
while their “etiologies are far removed from the major security concerns of 
[great] powers” (Holsti, 1992: 38-39). In a similar logic, Mary Kaldor (1999; see, 
also, Holsti, 1996; Duffield, 1998, 2001; Laqueur, 1998; Jung, 2003; Guzzin and 
Jung, 2004) observes that contemporary wars, which she prefers to call “new 
wars,” are not waged for borders or territorial integrity that represent only the 
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material aspects of the war. “New wars,” which she understands as reflecting 
the socio-economic effects of globalisation, are seen as being waged for political 
influence and control of resources beyond the borders of the state. 
Consequently, the “new wars” seem not fitting within the fixed classical 
Clausewitzian definition of war that conceives it as a rational instrument of state 
policy.  
 
Third, realist approaches would point to power and the distribution of 
power to study ethno-national conflict. The explanations based on these two 
concepts are too general. Different scholars would argue that war is shaped not 
only by the struggle for power and wealth, but also by cultural factors, 
commonalities, differences and norms (Wæver et al., 1993; Lapid and 
Kratochwil, 1996; Buzan et al., 1998; Wendt, 1999). The struggle for power and 
its distribution among states in the international system can be a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition to explain the recurrence of war. John Vasquez argues, 
“the great mistake of realism has been to assume that a struggle for power is a 
constant verite of history” (1993: 148) and an everlasting underlying cause of 
war. Consequently, it can be concluded that by pointing to power the realist 
approaches leave out of consideration other sources of conflict that seem at play 
in the case of ethno-national conflict. 
 
Furthermore, realist structuralist approaches over-exaggerate the 
effects of structure (anarchy) in the interpretation of the causes of war. In Hidemi 
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Suganami’s words international anarchy “is no more than one of the trivial 
permissive causes of war” (1996: 27). This is because: 
although international anarchy…is a constant factor, its constancy does not in fact 
explain war’s recurrence as such. It shows only part of the reason why the 
recurrence of war is possible. Clearly, ‘possibility of recurrence’ and ‘actual 
recurrence’ are not of the same order (Suganami, 1996: 27).  
 
The arguments that: international system is normatively regulated (Bull, 1977; 
Suganami, 1989); cooperation is possible under anarchy (Jervis, 1978; Keohane 
and Nye, 1987; Keohane, 1989); “logic of anarchy” is overcome among 
democratic states (Doyle, 1986; Talbot, 2000)20 and in the case of “pluralistic 
security communities” (Deutsch, 1957; Holsti, 1995) challenge Waltz’s thesis 
that anarchy is “the most profound cause of war as such” (Waltz, 1959: 229). 
Different scholars suggest that anarchy does not necessarily entail only disorder 
among states, since it is what states make of it (Wendt, 1992). Therefore, by 
pointing to anarchy, neo-realists enable us to look at the general context, which 
favour the occurrence of conflict without being able to account for its 
materialisation. 
 
To sum up, there are serious weaknesses in the theoretical 
underpinning of realist approaches to ethno-national conflict. As it was explained 
above, statism of traditional realist approaches is an hindrance to our 
understanding of ethno-national conflict. Different scholars such as Posen 
(1993), Kaufman (1996a, 1996, 2001), Ramet (1992, 1996), David (1998), Roe 
(1999) have tried to make refinement to neo-realist approach to war in order to 
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better accommodate ethno-national conflict in International Relations. Chapter 2 
examines these theoretical endeavours.  
 
 
1.2. Rationalism (English School) and War  
 
The principle that organise the rationalist’s explanations of international relations 
is order. In Hedley Bull’s definition, international order “means a pattern of 
activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states, or 
international society” (1977: 8).21 Different from the realist approach that 
underestimates progress and leaves little room for ethics in international 
relations, this tradition posits that “the regulatory rules and instruments of a 
system usually, and perhaps inexorably, develop to the point where the 
members [states] become conscious of common values” (Watson, 1987: 151). 
Thus, for rationalists “[o]rder…can be achieved not only simply through the 
manipulation of power but through the growth of the society of states” as well 
(Wheeler and Booth, 1992: 7).  
 
For Bull (1977), states seeking order create norm and rules, which are 
internationally recognised. These norms and rules embedded in international 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
20
 Waltz (1991) recently has admitted to ground hopes on the “democratic peace” thesis.  
21
 In Bull’s definition, the society of states or international society “exists when a group of states, 
conscious of certain interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they 
conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another 
and share in the making of common institutions” (1977: 13). 
 42 
law are expected to facilitate and satisfy states’ needs through their 
communicative and managerial functions. By clarifying rights, responsibilities 
and competencies, they also assist the state in its cooperation activities, fulfilling 
both the state and collective interests within an anarchical system. In return, the 
commitment of states to norms, principles and international law increases the 
degree of certainty that they will be obeyed, which, in turn, reduces 
unpredictability in the international system and limits the occurrence of war 
(Starr, 195: 299-315). 
 
As with Realism, Rationalism also takes the existence of states or 
“independent political communities” to use Bull’s (1977) words, as the point of 
departure in its analysis of international relations.  The state, in this approach, is 
defined in terms of sovereignty and territoriality, recognising “the 
institutionalisation of public authority within mutually exclusive jurisdictional 
domain” (Ruggie, 1986: 143). International society, in turn, is seen as preserving 
the state by recognising and sanctioning the primacy of sovereignty and 
territoriality. A recognition that is viewed as being anchored deeply in a society 
of commonly shared interests and values.  
 
In Bull’s understanding, war is considered to be a separate and 
present institution of international order, a state-to-state practice that 
international society itself uses so as to achieve its own purposes such as 
“enforcing international law, …preserving the balance of power, and arguably, 
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…promoting changes in the law generally regarded as just” (Bull, 1977: 188; 
see, also, Suganami, 2002: 307). Thus, Rationalism offers a state-centric 
outlook of war. As Kenneth Watkin words: 
Traditional view of armed conflicts is perhaps more clearly represented, in the 
narrow de jure concept of ‘war’ as a conflict between the states. Since World War II, 
the term international armed conflict has been used to describe those interstate 
struggles. Its use reflects the increasingly limited scope that has been assigned to 
the de jure concept of ‘war’ (2004: 3). 
 
There are two main insights that can be drawn from this rationalist’ 
understanding of war.  First, not every kind of violence can be considered as 
war. That is, only war waged by sovereign states (inter-state war) is legitimised 
within the society of states.  
 
Second, war is viewed as being limited and controlled rather than 
prohibited in the society of states. Bull sees the regulating agreements between 
states as limiting the right to go to war. These agreements are seen as 
legitimising a set of principles such as, states and only states have the right to 
wage war; war’s worst excesses are circumscribed by agreed frameworks; “the 
reasons or causes for which a state can legitimately resort to war” are restricted 
(Bull, 1977: 188). To cite Barkin and Cronin, “diplomatic procedures, treaties, 
international laws, wars, and all other institutions that provide for 
communications and interaction among the states” founded “on the mutual 
recognition among government leaders that they each represent a specific 
society within an exclusive jurisdictional domain” (1994: 110) serve the purpose 
of keeping war under control.  
 
 44 
Accordingly, in a sovereignty based international society, many 
threats (interventions, annexation, secession and self-determination) that were 
previously seen as part of the natural behaviour of the states in an anarchical 
system are de-legitimised unless they are justified (James, 1992). In Buzan’s 
(1993) understanding, this framework constitutes a step forward from an 
international system that recognises only the balance of power as an 
unintentional mechanism in controlling war recurrence. However, rationalist 
framework is in many respects restrictive in understanding changing practices of 
international relations and war since it does not take into consideration non-state 
actors.  
 
However, in Nicholas Wheeler’s understanding, the complex relation 
between human rights and state sovereignty in the case of ethno-national 
conflict has exposed “the conflict between order and justice at its starkest” 
(Wheeler, 2000: 11). From the rationalist scholarship about humanitarian 
interventions can be drawn some interesting insights that can be used to 
examine ethno-national conflict. In Wheeler’s understanding there are two 
rationalist approaches to humanitarian interventions, namely, pluralist and 
solidarist perspectives. According to him, scholars that generally “focus on how 
the rules of international society provide for an international order among states 
sharing different conceptions of justice” are defined as pluralists (2000: 11; see, 
also, Bull, 1977; Nardin, 1983, 1992). The scholars that “look to strengthen the 
legitimacy of international society by deepening its commitment to justice” are 
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identified as solidarists (Wheeler, 2000: 11; see, also, Vincent, 1978; Vincent 
and Miller, 1990; Walzer, 1992). These perspectives differ in the understanding 
of the role of order and justice in the strengthening of legitimacy in the society of 
states. These two rationalist perspectives can offer useful insights to scrutinize 
ethno-national conflict. 
 
In the pluralist approach, “states and not individuals are the principle 
bearers of rights and duties in international law, and pluralists are sceptical that 
states can develop agreement beyond a minimum ethic of coexistence” 
(Wheeler, 2000: 11). This is the case, because, as Terry Nardin argues: 
The common good of this inclusive community [of states] resides not in the ends 
that some, or at times even most, of its members may wish collectively to pursue, 
but in the values of justice, peace, security, and co-existence, which can only be 
enjoyed through participation in a common body of authoritative practices (1983: 6). 
 
In the pluralist perspective, the integrity and sovereignty of the state are 
understood as primordial and important for the preservation of order and 
legitimacy in the society of states. This interpretation precludes international 
intervention. Consequently, ethno-national conflict as an internal conflict is 
neglected in this perspective.  
 
 In the solidarist perspective the protection of human rights is 
understood as important for the preservation of order and legitimacy in the 
society of states. In Michael Walzer’s words: 
The right of states rest on the consent of their members. But this is consent of a 
special sort. State rights are not constituted through a series of transfers from 
individual men and women to the sovereign…what actually happens…[is that] 
over a long period of time, shared experiences and cooperative activity of many 
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different kinds shape a common life…most states do stand guard over the 
community of their citizens, at least to some degree: that is why we assume the 
justice of their defensive wars (1992: 53-54). 
 
So, the violation of human rights in the case of ethno-national conflict is to be 
seen as a concern of international society. The issue of human rights is treated 
in this perspective under international humanitarian law. As Watkin argues: 
Attacks by nonstate actors challenge the view of a neat division of armed conflict 
into the two spheres of international and noninternational. Identification of the 
boundaries of noninternational-armed conflict has never been easy. While 
international humanitarian law is generally interpreted to have limited impact in 
situations that do not reach a level above ‘internal disturbances and tensions, such 
as riots, isolated as sporadic acts of violence, the dividing line between the 
operation of that law and human rights law is not always clear or absolute (2004: 5).  
 
In this perspective, governments are held responsible internationally for their 
behaviour towards their own citizens. At the same time, humanitarian 
intervention is justified on the grounds that “the society of states is the one in 
which states accept not only a moral responsibility to protect the security of their 
own citizens, but also the wider one of ‘guardianship of human rights 
everywhere’” (Wheeler, 2000: 12; see, also, Bull, 1966).  
 
However, again as Wheeler argues “[t]his conception of international 
society recognises that individuals have rights and duties in international law, 
but it also acknowledges that individuals can have these rights enforced only by 
states” (2000: 11; see, also, Walzer, 1992).22 In this interpretation is made clear 
that the issue of human rights violation is important for the preservation of order 
and legitimacy in the society of states, which, in turn, justify humanitarian 
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 In the 1990s Walzer moved his position to the one of recognising the right of self-
determination to peoples who claims it. Walzer (1992, 1994) suggests the creation of “protected 
spaces” as the way of giving to the different tribes the right to “self-determination.” 
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intervention. Thus, the human rights violation by the state is to be seen as the 
underlying cause of humanitarian intervention. 
 
The state-centric outlook of war in the rationalist approach is of little 
assistance to our understanding of ethno-national conflict. In the current 
prevailing normative framework the interpretation of ethno-national conflict as 
war and consequently the recognition of the right to wage war to non-state 
actors by international society, is in Buzan’s view, an act that would require “a 
good deal of functional accommodation” by international society (Buzan, 1993: 
334). This consent seems difficult to be achieved, since states pledge the 
preservation of the present territorial borders in the international system as a 
precondition for order and security (Helsinki Act, 1975; see, also, Aron, 1981).23  
 
However, by pointing to the concepts of order and justice in the 
society of states, this approach can assist our understanding of ethno-national 
conflict. This approach can examine ethno-national conflict from two 
perspectives. From a pluralist perspective, ethno-national conflict is viewed as 
an internal conflict. In this case, the state is legitimised by the society of states 
to resolve the conflict by its own means while international intervention is 
precluded. From a solidarity perspective, human rights violation is considered to 
be a concern of the society of states and significant for the preservation of order. 
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 Helsinki Act (1975) has sanctioned “the inviolability of frontiers” and “territorial integrity of the 
states” and “non-intervention in internal affairs,” as the basic principles and norms that serve the 
preservation of peace and security in Europe.  
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The society of states is held responsible to stop humanitarian disaster by 
intervening. Further details about the rationalist approach contribution to our 
understanding of ethno-national conflict are discussed while looking at the 
Kosovo/a conflict in Chapter 4. The weaknesses of this approach to war in 
general and ethno-national conflict in particular are discussed in the following 
part.  
 
 
1.2.1. Rationalism and War: A Critique  
 
In this section are discussed two main weaknesses of the rationalist scholarship 
that limit our understanding of ethno-national conflict: its state-centrism and 
inflexible meaning of order. First, in this scholarship war is understood as direct 
violence between states. The state-centric outlook of war in both perspectives 
(pluralist and solidarist) of this approach is a barrier to our understanding of 
ethno-national conflict. In the case of ethno-national conflict the adversary 
emerges as violent actor from the sub-state level to challenge state from within. 
The demands of non-state actors for recognition and self-determination,24 on 
equal footing with states, are considered as illegal from an international society 
perspective (pluralist and solidarist).  
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 Self-determination is recognised as “the right or aspiration of a group, which considers itself to 
have a separate and distinct identity, to govern itself and to determine the political and legal 
status of the territory it occupies” (Evans and Newnham, 1998: 497). 
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Furthermore, international society through the policy of non-
recognition denies the recognition of these new actors and turns down their 
claims for self-determination (Aron, 1981). Hence, in the society of states only 
states enjoy the right to wage war. According to Bull (1977), the extension of 
such right to non-state actors would challenge state’s sovereignty and thus, 
order. Referring to the case of the ethnic clashes in Lebanon, Bull argues that 
“war as a mean of enforcing law” or “effecting just change” as claimed by non-
state actors is renounced by states “qualified by a sense of the overriding need 
to contain war within tolerable bounds” (Bull, 1977: 198).  
 
Therefore, even in the case the need for justice in the society of states 
is emphasised as a requirement for the preservation of order in the society of 
states, for solidarists, the safeguarding of state’s sovereignty prevails over all 
considerations. James Mayall argues:  
The constitutional order of international society has not been fundamentally 
modified since the importance of the rule of law to international society remains the 
one of serving the state rather than mastering it (2000: 327). 
 
In the UN Charter, the case of ethno-national conflicts is not considered as a 
threat to international order. In the Charter, the state remains the one who has 
the exclusive right to resolve internal conflicts.   
 
As Stephen Tierney argues, in the society of states, the state is 
assumed to have an instrumental value, being conceived “as a secure 
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environment for the exercise of the individual’s moral autonomy” (2002: 943).25 
In view of that, the Charter does not have explicit stipulation that would allow the 
UN to take all necessary measures, including the use of force to control and 
settle ethno-national conflict. As Mayall points out:  
The reason why the international society cannot cope with societal breakdown is 
that...it is first and foremost a society of states and not peoples. In other words 
when public authority collapses it is not clear with whom foreign governments 
should deal and on what legal or institutional basis (1998: 179). 
  
That is why ethno-national conflict in the rationalist accounts is understood as 
civil war “in which compromise fails in the face of the passionate and self-
righteous belief of the belligerents in the justice of their respective causes” 
(Mayall, 2000: 325). Like the realist approach, rationalist approaches build their 
explanation of war, upon the assumption of the centrality of the state. This, 
however, is in not the best framework for understanding ethno-national conflict. 
  
Second, although Rationalism goes beyond Realism in its recognition 
of “progress” in inter-state relations, it seems inflexible in accommodate 
contemporary forms of violence. This is the case because the existing normative 
framework offers a narrow concept of state sovereignty that leaves unexplained 
its usage in exceptional cases like turmoil, civil strife or the dissolution of the 
state (Berman, 1986; see, also, Werner, 2001). This framework reminds us of 
the medieval Western world where the institution of the Church had a very 
strong influence and nothing existed but Christianity as a norm regulating 
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 However there are scholars that seem to be in favour of some limited right of secession under 
international law for groups denied the opportunity to retain their cultural identity (Franck, 1995; 
Kymlicka, 1995, 2001; Walzer, 1992, 1994). 
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coexistence among actors and as a supreme authority that oversaw relations 
among them. This set-up, although legitimised by God, maintained stability and 
order during that period. The earth was seen as God’s garden; things were the 
way God had made them, and it was a sin to believe that one could improve 
upon God’s work, which is similar to realist and rationalist understanding of 
“states acting as bastions of mutually exclusive identities” (Buzan, 1993: 337) 
and “sovereignty of states as the foundation of social relations among them” 
(Buzan, 1993: 339). This framework restricts our understanding of ethno-
national conflict. The rationalist approach by pointing to order assumes a shared 
consensus in the society of states about the definition of ethno-national conflict. 
However, this consensus refers not to outcomes but to a set of established 
rules, norms and institutions concerned for the continuation and maintenance of 
order in the society of states. This framework does not help much our 
understanding of ethno-national conflict. 
 
 
1.3. Revolutionism and War 
 
For the revolutionist scholarship, human emancipation would undermine the 
significance of war in society. The accumulation of power is viewed as 
threatening, and generating fear. The strengthening of order at the inter-state 
level would encourage despotism and injustice. Order and power, the organising 
principles of Rationalism and Realism, are viewed as “inherently unstable” 
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(Booth, 1991). Different from Realism and Rationalism that study war from its 
own prerogatives, Revolutionism examines the conditions for the establishment 
of peace. Emancipation is perceived by Ken Booth, as a process that leads to 
“freeing peoples from those constraints that stop them carrying out what freely 
they would choose to do” (1991a: 539). Such a process implies the lifting of 
restrictions that may be of a legal, economic, moral, political or physical nature 
(Booth and Wheeler, 1992: 8).  
 
Emancipation, according to Booth, progresses through the growth of a 
state of justice and a feeling of community that guarantees respect and morality 
among states. Hence, it would encourage integration among them. According to 
Michael W. Doyle, “as culture grows and men gradually move toward greater 
agreement over their principles, this leads to mutual understanding and peace” 
(1995: 99).  Hence, peace is to be seen as “grounded in the existence of an 
international moral community in which governments accept the standards of 
mutual respect and peaceful resolution of differences that exits among 
individuals within their societies” (Zacher and Mathew, 1995: 122). The 
emancipation of world society is seen in this approach as an ongoing process 
that can be assessed by looking at the progressive diminishing role of power 
and use of force in international relations. 
 
Revolutionists share the assumption that individual freedom is a value 
above the others, and states ought to be constrained from acting in ways that 
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would undermine that freedom (Booth, 1991, 1991a; Linklater, 1990; Held, 1993; 
Fukuyama, 1989, 1992). The establishment of individual freedom is to be seen 
as the necessary condition for the avoidance of war in international relations. In 
this approach, democratic civil society is understood as the revolutionary force 
that would emancipate and direct society toward a new democratic social order 
that would be the basis for a peaceful order (Cox, 1999). However, as Booth and 
Wheeler note “[s]tates are not the primary referent for emancipatory projects but 
they are key actors and must be taken into account” at least in short terms 
(1991: 13).  
 
This approach represents a major challenge to traditional Realism and 
Rationalism, since it cast doubt on two of their assumptions. First, this tradition 
does not see the state as a unified rational actor in world politics. Thus, state is 
considered to be limited in the decision-making process by its democratic 
accountability to its citizens, and the need to respect human rights and values 
and the rule of law. Second, this approach questions the assumption of Realism 
and Rationalism that presume a sharp division between domestic and 
international domains in studying world politics. Revolutionism emphasises the 
importance of domestic regime in explaining state’s international behaviour and 
the possibilities for internal upheavals.  
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In this approach, the morality of liberal democracy is considered to be 
an important prerequisite against the immorality of the war.  First of all, 
democracy is claimed to be an important idea because as David Held argues: 
[I]t does not just represent one value among many, such as liberty, equality, and 
justice, but is the value that can link and mediate among competing perspectives 
concerns…democracy does not presuppose agreement on diverse values. Rather 
it suggests a way of relating values to each other and of leaving the resolution of 
value conflicts open to participants in a political dialogue (1993: 274). 
  
For revolutionists, liberal democracy holds on the idea that individuals 
everywhere should have freedom, which, in turn, is the condition for the absence 
of war. Liberal-democracy is perceived as peaceful from the foundation since it 
excludes the resort to violence in the settlement of the disputes among various 
actors within the society and democratic pairs. 
 
For traditional Revolutionism progress in international relations, can 
be evidenced in the working of liberal democracy (Doyle, 1986, 1997; 
Fukuyama, 1989, 1992; Held, 1993; Owen, 1994) and “pluralistic security 
communities” (Deutsch, 1954, 1957). In both cases, the examination of the 
conflict is based on two assumptions: democracies are inherently peaceful 
toward each other and democracies are less prone to domestic upheavals 
(Mann, 2004). John M. Owen (1994) believes that liberal states act to preserve 
freedom and therefore, wars are fought by these states only in the cause of 
preserving peace and freedom.  
 
As with Realism and Rationalism, traditional Revolutionism takes the 
state as the point of departure in its analysis. In this 
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war between states is attributed to the very nature of the democratic political 
system inside states. Michael Doyle, drawing from a careful historical empirical 
analysis of international relations formulated the “democratic peace” thesis. In 
this thesis it is argued that “[e]ven though liberal states have become involved in 
numerous wars with non-liberal states, constitutionally secure liberal states have 
yet to engage in war with one another” (Doyle, 1983: 213). Furthermore, “[t]he 
very constitutional restraint, shared commercial interest, and international 
respect for individual rights that promote peace among liberal states can 
exacerbate conflicts in relations between liberal and non-liberal societies” 
(Doyle, 1983: 324).  
 
In support of Doyle’s thesis, Owen (1994) argues that liberal-
democratic states are less prone to wage war since citizens have leverage over 
war decisions. The citizens are expected to use the electoral mechanisms to 
express approval or disapproval on the issue of war. Furthermore, liberal states 
have liberal institutional structures that allow for public control of foreign policy; 
therefore even illiberal leaders will not be able to lead liberal states into war 
against other liberal states. According to Jack S. Levy (1989) the absence of war 
among liberal states has achieved the importance of an empirical law. 
Furthermore, Bruce Russett (1997) in a recent empirical study of “democratic 
peace” theses, founded that all elements mentioned by Kant in his “Perpetual 
Peace” treaty, namely, joint democracy, shared trade and membership in the 
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same international organisations, independently contribute to peace between 
states (see, also, Oneal and Russett, 1997; Maoz, 1997).26  
 
Analysing contemporary politics, Francis Fukuyama (1989, 1992) 
looks at the end of the Cold War era as “the end of history” defined by the end of 
ideological division in Europe and the triumph of democracy over communism. 
This claim rests in the assumption that “the combination of liberal democracy 
and capitalism has proved superior to any alternative political/economic system, 
and the reason lies in its ability to satisfy the basic drives of human nature” 
(Griffiths, 1999: 69). The spread of democratic states and values, from a Kantian 
perspective, is seen as leading towards the ‘perpetual peace.’ Based on the 
assumption of the universality of Western values and ethics, Fukuyama believes 
that liberal democracy will progress regardless of natural and cultural 
distinctions and will be adopted by the rest of non-western world. 
 
Fukuyama claims, that progress in human society can be measured 
by the elimination of conflict and adoption of the principle of legitimacy that in a 
liberal democratic system is embedded in domestic politics. So, a world 
                                                                                             
 
26
 The empirical evidence upon which “democratic peace” thesis is based is contested based on 
different arguments. Gelp (1996) provides evidence that democracies initiate the use of force in 
an effort to divert attention away from their domestic problems. Ray (1995) calling upon the 
problem of definition of democracy underlines its effect upon the case of democratic pairs in 
conflict. Layne (1994) offers the empirical evidence of four cases of confrontations of 
democracies where democratic principles have failed to play any role in mitigating the conflict. 
Building upon the premises of structural explanations Layne concludes that democratic states 
“would be peaceful in their relations with all states, whether democracies or not” (1994: 12) if 
their behaviour is constrained by structural characteristics. Drawing upon the findings of the 
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organised around liberal-democratic principles would provide for a more 
peaceful order since states that are bound by such principles “should have much 
less incentives for war, since all nations would recognize one another’s 
legitimacy” (Fukuyama, 1992: xx).27 
 
Furthermore, democratic states are expected to be spared from 
internal upheavals since domestic politics are under the scrutiny of the public 
and established liberal institutional structures represent and defend 
indiscriminately the interests of the citizens. Following on such arguments, 
Strobe Talbot (2000; see, also, Tierney, 2002) argues that democracy has 
transformed the nature of the nation-state, thereby giving way to a new system 
in which nations feel secure enough in their identities and in their region to make 
a virtue out of porous borders and intertwined economies and cultures. Talbot 
believes that:  
[Democracy] has well-developed mechanisms for opening borders and societies, 
protecting minorities, empowering regions, pursuing trans-national cooperation, 
and promoting the principle that differences in language and culture can be a 
source of strength within societies and states (2000: 162). 
  
By working in a regime based on democratic values, states are expected to be 
feeling free in their identities and trust each other, which, in turn, make them 
more  confident  in  providing  more  autonomy to  sub-national  groups (Talbot,  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
empirical research Small and Singer (1976) have found the evidence that democratic “monads” 
are as war prone as autocratic “monads.” 
27
 Fukuyama (1992) interprets the end of Cold War and the expansion of democracy values as 
the “obsolesce” of war in world politics. Doyle is more cautious since he does not exclude the 
possibility of war between democracies and non-democracies. See, for more, Griffiths (1999: 63-
4). 
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2000). Democracy conceived as such, is expected to contribute to the 
consolidation of peace, stability and prosperity based on the establishment of 
bonds of trust between individuals, social groups and states.   
 
In explaining the conditions for the absence of war in inter-state 
relations Karl W. Deutsch (1954, 1957) puts emphasis on the importance and 
effects of cooperation among states, which leads to the idea of “pluralistic 
security communities.”  Deutsch’s conceptualisation of “pluralistic security 
communities” is based on the idea of international cooperation among legally 
sovereign states.  After certain time, cooperation is seen as leading to 
integration and the development of a set of shared values among peoples and 
elites of respective states where the chance of force being used to resolve 
conflicts between them is seen as being virtually nil.  
 
Cooperation among states (political, cultural or economic) and “the 
growth of integrative institutions and practices among them” (Deutsch, 1954: 39-
40)28 are viewed as the driving forces towards progress in international relations 
that is measured by the absence of war. Peaceful relationships are mostly 
attributed to democratic governance, defined as “economic liberalism and 
political democracy” (Goldgeier and McFaul, 1992: 468) that encourages 
cooperation and sharing of norms and institutions, which, in turn, would explain  
                                                                                             
 
28
 As cited by Griffiths (1999: 179). 
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the softening of the effects of anarchy in the relations among democratic states. 
On the other hand, the set of democratic shared values is expected to develop 
patterns of behaviour that persist over extended periods of time. These shared 
values are seen as infused with normative significance, which would mark at the 
same time the creation of “pluralistic security communities” or “zones of peace” 
(Deutsch, 1957; Goldgeier and McFaul, 1992; Weede, 1996). 
 
According to Deutsch, the maintenance of such “security 
communities” would be possible if three main conditions are fulfilled: 
compatibility of values and ethics, responsiveness to each other’s needs, and 
predictability of policy goals by political elites. The persistence among states of 
the same patterns of behaviour in time can be considered as a socio-
psychological process, during which people come to value and trust each other, 
to spontaneously respond to their needs, to emphasise their similarities and 
dismiss animosities, and to embrace common principles and norms that are 
persistent and compulsory.  
 
Revolutionism offers the necessary preconditions that would eliminate 
war from inter-state relations. “Democratic peace” and “pluralistic security 
communities” theses assume a framework of social interaction among 
democracies freed from tensions and disputes that could cause wars. Although 
this tradition posits progress in social relations of all kinds, state is the object of 
analysis. The state-centric outlook of this approach seems limiting our 
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understanding of ethno-national conflict, since non-state actors are neglected in 
the study of war and peace in world politics. However, some interesting insights 
to examine ethno-national conflict can be drawn from some scholarly work that, 
based on empirical observations, provide evidence that consolidated 
democracies are least prone to internal upheavals compare to new democracies 
(Hegre et al. 2001).  
 
In this literature it is suggested that states in a transition process from 
autocracy to democracy are to be viewed as most at risk for civil wars (Snyder, 
2000). Revolutionism point to facts such as: the lack of accountable leaders 
(Doyle 1986; Ray, 1995), the manipulation and control of the information 
(Schultz, 1999) and deviations from common democratic norms (Risse-Kappen, 
1995) in non—or new—democratic states to explain the emergence of civil 
conflict. This framework can be used to examine the emergence of ethno-
national conflict. Further details about the explanatory capacity of this approach 
to our understanding of ethno-national conflict are discussed while looking at the 
case of the Kosovo/a conflict in Chapter 4. The following of this section deals 
with some of the weaknesses of this approach to ethno-national conflict. 
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1.1.3. Revolutionism and War: A Critique 
 
Revolutionism offers a limited contribution to our understanding of ethno-
national conflict for two main reasons. First, although this approach seems the 
least state-centric of all traditional theories, since the states are not seen as 
black-boxes, state remains the referent object of analysis. Second, democracy is 
considered to be domestically peaceful from the foundation. Revolutionism, as 
with Realism and Rationalism, takes the state as the point of departure in its 
analysis of war and peace in international relations. In the words of Roland 
Axtmann: 
The collective ‘self’ whose own determination modern political liberalism aims to 
ensure in the democratic process is the politically organized nation. Individuals must 
be members of the state, must be its ‘nationals,’ in order to possess citizenship 
rights…Democratic rule is exercised in the sovereign, territorially consolidated 
nation-state (2004: 262). 
 
In so arguing, the democratic regime within the state is viewed as important in 
defining inter—and intra—state relations and resolving disputes among different 
actors.  
 
David Held (1992) offers an analytical critique of Fukuyama’s 
understanding of social processes within the state. Held, while looking at the 
challenging effects of globalisation and fragmentation on liberal democracy, 
asserts that in order to extend democratic control at the international level a 
more cosmopolitan rather than a state model is required. Democracy, according  
to him, needs to assert more flexibility in accommodating peoples’ needs and 
rights beyond centres of national government. A cosmopolitan model of 
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democracy that focuses more on individuals and communities and achieves a 
more inclusive attitude towards others’ cultures, political and economical 
systems is seen as correcting the “democratic deficit” between the sovereign 
state on the base of contemporary democracy and the dispersion of political 
authority away from the state.  
 
Held’s approach shifts attention from states to individuals and 
communities’ well-being and the freedom of movement.  This development 
requires the elimination of exploitation, estrangement and alienation as sources 
of constraint based on gender, race nationalism and state sovereignty (Linklater, 
1996). Drawing from Kantian approach, Ken Booth offers a cosmopolitan model 
that “is not the same as sameness. It entails what has been called ‘sensitive 
universalism,’ with a dialogue between universal values and local definitions” 
(1995: 119).  This cosmopolitan model is viewed as being the end result of an 
emancipatory project, which relies on two concepts that interact with each other: 
“community” and “subsidiarity” (Booth, 1991: 540). As Booth conceives it: 
Community building…is concerned with breaking down distinctions between in-
group and out-group, ‘us’ and ‘them,’ and creating positive relationships based not 
only on reciprocal obligations and mutual self-interest (Gesellschaft) but also on a 
sense of loyalty and moral obligations (Gemischaft) (1991: 540). 
 
On the other hand, “subsidiarity” as a concept implies “the idea that decisions 
will be taken at the lowest level” (Booth, 1991: 540). Peace and the absence of 
war is conditioned by moral behaviour that is embedded in social evolution that 
would progressively diminish the role of power in international relations. This 
approach looks at social groupings other than the state as the referent object of 
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analysis; as such it makes a better contribution to our understanding of ethno-
national conflict. 
 
Furthermore, the euphoria that surrounded the end of Cold War about 
the “end of history” of wars in international elations has been replaced by the 
recognition that the emancipation foreseen as the growth of democratic values 
and institutions is neither inevitable nor irreversible, and there is still a long way 
to go to reach the “the perpetual peace” envisioned by Kant. According to James 
M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul (1992), the disruption of “the end of history” is 
manifested in the existence of two zones: the “zone of peace” and the “zone of 
war.” In the zone of peace, peaceful relations are mostly attributed to the 
democratic governance, which has softened the effects of anarchy in the 
relations among the states. Hence, in the “zone of peace” “rather than 
balancing, core states are seeking to bandwagon, not around a power pole but 
around a share set of liberal beliefs, institutions and practices” (Goldgeier and 
McFaul, 1992: 480).   
 
The “zone of war” is viewed made up of non-democratic and failed 
states, which are faced with internal and external security problems that can 
equally be a cause for war. Relations between groups and within states are 
being defined in terms of power, shifting of interests and hostile alliances. Max 
Singer and Aaron Wildavsky (1993) predict that the two zones will continue to 
persist in international relations. Therefore, it can be concluded that it is too 
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early to talk about the end of history of wars in world politics. This does not 
mean that democracy and emancipation are unimportant: democratic regime still 
is important for determining a democratic state’s behaviour. 
 
Second, the assumption that democracy is speared from internal 
upheavals inhibits us from understanding other sources of tensions that could 
cause ethno-national conflict. In most cases of ethno-national conflict the 
warring parties do not ask for equality they demand recognition of differentiated 
rights or status within the existing state. These demands go beyond the rights of 
citizenship that are supposed to be guaranteed by the institutional arrangements 
of liberal-democracy (Kymlicka, 1995; Franck, 1995). In Montserrat Guibernau’s 
terms:  
The current proliferation of demands for self-determination in several parts of the 
world indicates that the desire of the nation-states to present themselves as 
democracies does not necessarily result in the adoption of a dialogic attitude 
towards the national minorities they contain (1996: 144).  
 
As Franck argues, “self-determination is not an early version of democracy. 
While democracy invokes the right of each person to participate in governance, 
self-determination is about the social right of a people to constitute a nation 
state” (1995: 92). Hence, the right to self-determination and the right to 
democratic government are not one and the same thing. Therefore, self-
determination represents a challenge to the state integrity even in the case of 
consolidated democracies. Thus, democratic regimes are not protected from all 
kind of internal upheavals as pretended in the revolutionist approach. The 
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revolutionist approach fails to see self-determination as a source of tension that 
may lead to conflict. 
 
Furthermore, for some scholars democracy and pacifism are open to 
objections. David Campbell argues:  
What we have been less able to confront is the possibility that the collapse of 
communism has been followed by the failure of democracy, and that, at least as 
conventionally thought, democracy has been insufficient in the face of new forms of 
conflict. Even worse, we have not stopped long to contemplate that democracy 
could be one of the facilitators if not causes of these conflicts (1998: 193). 
 
For Kalevi Holsti, modernity and democratisation do not have only pacifying 
effects as it is foreseen in the revolutionist scholarship. In his words:  
The required goals of the ‘revolution of rising expectation’ in the underdeveloped 
countries will lead to frustrations, domestic revolutions, political instability, and 
messianic politics. These are likely to have spillover effects into the international 
system, causing rivalries at best and the intervention of the great powers at worst 
(Holsti, 1975: 827).  
 
For Kalevi Holsti, this is the case, because the introduction of new values 
“involve breaking down traditional social patterns and practices” that in many 
respects are incompatible with industrialization, “community development” and 
many other “favoured Western notion of what constitute a good society” (1975: 
833; see, also, Jung, 2003). The breaking of old structures of conflict mitigation 
is viewed as leaving those societies vulnerable toward different sources of 
insecurity that are not negligible, since most of the time they lead to conflict 
(Mansfield and Snyder, 1995). According to Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder 
(1995), the basic problem of democratising states is that they lack the stabilising 
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institutions of mature democracy (see, also, Lacina, 2004). As a result, elites 
indulge in short-run thinking and reckless policymaking can lead to war.29  
 
Examples indicate that democracy and ethno-nationalist conflict can 
coexist not only in the case of weak democracies, but also in the case of 
consolidated democracy. Hence, as Bethany Lacina observes, “models of 
conflict onset have not revealed what, if any, mechanisms of democracy offers 
states protection against civil war” (2004: 195). Therefore, it can be concluded 
that the accounts of the revolutionist approach can offer a limited contribution to 
our understanding of ethno-national conflict. 
 
 
Three International Relations traditions, namely, Realism, Rationalism and 
Revolutionism offer interesting and useful explanations of war and the prospects 
for peace in international relations. In these approaches war is understood as a 
means used by the state to an end, be it power, order or emancipation. This 
logic can be used to examine ethno-national conflict as well. However, the 
explanations using these organising principles are too general and can be of 
help in understanding only the necessary conditions that could favour or hinder 
the occurrence of ethno-national conflict. As argued throughout the chapter, the 
state-centred outlook of all traditional International Relations approaches 
appears to be of little help to our understanding of the social context in which the 
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 On the issue of democratisation (formal and substantial democracy) see: Huntington (1991), 
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ethno-national conflict take place. The contribution of these approaches to our 
understanding of ethno-national conflict is further detailed while looking at the 
Kosovo/a conflict in Chapter 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
Nodia (1996) and Linz and Stepan (16). 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
The Post-Cold War Approaches and Ethno-National Conflict 
 
 
 
This chapter discusses two approaches, namely, post-Cold War neo-Realism 
and “New Wars” scholarship. They are included in this chapter because they 
both promise to address the immediate causes of post-Cold War conflicts. 
These approaches attempt to resolve the tensions between the traditional 
understanding of war and the practice of contemporary conflicts by trying to 
mediate for the weaknesses of traditional International Relations approaches. 
Both approaches look at non-state actors such as ethnic groups or politico-
military formations and identity to examine the post-Cold War conflicts. By 
adopting these changes, both approaches pretend to bring an important 
correction to the state-centrism and narrow understanding of power and 
cosmopolitanism of the traditional approaches. The anarchy or globalisation is 
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viewed as the underlying cause of conflict. However, these two approaches 
utilise identity as a means, rather as an organising principle of actors’ behaviour 
and operate the organising principles of the traditional schools through the 
quasi-state or failed state logic, which limit our understanding of ethno-national 
conflict. 
 
This chapter is divided in three parts. First and second part, focus in a 
critical engagement with post-Cold War neo-Realism (Ramet, 1992; Posen, 
1993; Kaufman, 1996; David, 1998; Roe, 1999) and “New Wars” scholarship 
(Kaldor, 1999; Duffield, 1998, 2001; Lacquer, 1997; Franck, 1995) approaches 
to ethno-national conflict. The final part offers an overview of discussed material 
while emphasising the weaknesses of both approaches. 
 
 
2.1. Post-Cold War Realism and Ethno-National Conflict 
 
The traditional Realism and its variants have not addressed the question of 
ethno-national conflicts during the Cold War era. Michael E. Brown (1993: vii) 
attributes this negligence to three main reasons. The first reason of this 
negligence is seen to be related to the fact that “for most of the postwar era, 
authoritarian rule dampened ethnic problems and stifled national aspirations” in 
different parts of the world (Brown, 1993: vii). Second, according to Brown, 
during the Cold War the most serious threat to international security was 
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considered to be the possibility that an East-West confrontation would lead to 
nuclear war. That is why many scholars “not unnaturally, focused their 
intellectual energies on this issue” to the neglect of “ethnic and other forms of 
communal conflict” (Brown, 1993: vii).  Third, the moves toward integration in 
Europe and growing international interdependence led, in Brown’s view, “many 
to think that ethnic and national identifications—and the prospects for ethnic 
conflict—were fading” (1993: vii).  Thus, for one reason or another ethno-
national conflict received little attention in International Relations scholarship 
during the Cold War era.30 
 
With the end of Cold War there is a growing attention in International 
Relations scholarship toward this type of conflict. For Stathis N. Kalyvas (2000) 
two related political developments in world politics have been driving this interest 
(although not explicitly attributed to the end of Cold War): the decline of inter-
state wars and the concomitant rise of internal wars (see, also, Small and 
Singer, 1982; David, 1997); and the decline of civil wars that are classified as 
“ideological” or class based and the concomitant rise of conflict classified as 
ethnic (see, also, Brubaker and Latin, 1998; Fearon and Latin, 2001). 
 
                                                                                             
 
30 To be fair to the IR’s literature, there is an enormous literature on civil wars waged in the 
context of the de-colonisation process (Rejai and Enloe, 1960; Mazrui, 1977). However, this 
literature is mainly concerned with civil wars waged in the colonial possessions, which are 
treated from a legalistic point of view in close linkage with anti-colonialism. This body of literature 
therefore appears to be very specific and difficult to be used for different practical applications 
(Evans and Newnham, 1998: 497-498). 
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However, the reluctance to address the issue of ethno-national 
conflict can also be attributed to Realism’s ontological preference: the view of 
the world as being divided into states pursuing national-interests in terms of 
power. This ontological preference narrows down the range of conflicts that can 
be explained within a Realist framework. This is a comprehensive reason that 
explains why Realism neglected the case of ethno-national conflict for so long. 
Nevertheless, with the end of Cold War there is an increasing tendency among 
realist scholars to study them (Mearsheimer, 1990; Ramet, 1992; Posen, 1993; 
Kaufman, 1996; David, 1998). 
 
The neo-realist scholars just after the end of Cold War examined the 
issue of ethno-national conflict especially with reference to the end of Cold War, 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of multipolarity in world 
order. John Mearsheimer (1990) explains the increasing occurrence of ethno-
national conflicts after the end of Cold War by emphasising the effects of 
multipolarity. He brings ethno-national conflict in the neo-realist framework 
without trying to make any major revision to the main assumptions of the 
scholarship. Mearsheimer is careful to emphasise the three-main assumptions 
of neo-Realism for world politics. First, for him nation-state remains the “principal 
actor in international politics for a long time to come” (Mearsheimer, 1992: 217). 
Second, anarchy is viewed as the underlying and permissive cause of war, while  
polarity (distribution of power) would account for its frequency. Third, war is the 
permanent condition of international relations since with the establishment of the 
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state system; anarchy is viewed as having established its primacy over 
hierarchy.  
 
Trying to explain the emergence of ethno-national conflicts after the 
end of the Cold War era, Mearsheimer argues “the insecure states in 
multipolarity will be irresistibly drawn toward bellicose policies” (Mearsheimer, 
1990: 57). It is still anarchy that for Mearsheimer constitutes “hyper-nationalism” 
as “a force for trouble” because it is expected to release oppressed ethnic 
rivalries and “ancient hatreds” that were silenced by the imposition of the 
ideological beliefs during the Cold War period (Mearsheimer, 1990: 57). Thus, 
the effects of hyper-nationalism are examined in function of the logic of 
international anarchy. 
 
According to Mearsheimer, it is anarchy rather than hyper-nationalism, 
which “compel states to worry about their security” and induce among 
participants the “belief that other nations or nation-states are both inferior and 
threatening” (Mearsheimer, 1992: 221). Thus, anarchy is to be seen as a source 
of exacerbating tensions between participants. However, hyper-nationalism is 
considered to affect offensive capabilities since it is expected to help nations or 
nation-states to “build formidable killing machines” (Mearsheimer, 1992: 221). 
Mearsheimer’s approach does not present any major departure from traditional 
neo-realism approach to war.  
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Barry Posen (1993, 1993a) offers a more sophisticated analysis of the 
causes of ethno-national conflict by making use of Waltzian neo-realism. He 
thinks that: 
[t]he security dilemma and realist international relations theory more generally have 
considerable ability to explain and predict the probability and intensity of military 
conflict among groups emerging form the wreckages of empires (1993: 43). 
  
Posen is not alone in his enterprise of studying of ethno-national conflict by 
using core neo-realist assumptions (Job, 1992; Kaufman, 1996, 1996a; Glaser, 
1997; Snyder and Jervis, 1999; Melander, 1999; Rotberg, 2004). The concept of 
the “security dilemma,” which is widely used by neo-realists scholar to explain 
conflict among states, is employed by Posen to account for ethno-national 
conflict.31 
 
The “security dilemma” is considered to succeed where four factors 
prevail. First, anarchy is the permanent condition of group inter-relations. 
Second, there is a permanent lack of trust among actors (even the present 
friend can turn into an enemy in the future). Third, a situation of misperception 
and lack of communication that is supposed to prevail due to the establishment 
of sovereignty as the ordering principle of states is expected all the time to lead 
to conflict. Fourth, ambiguity regarding the balance between offensive and 
defensive capabilities is a constant incentive that encourages conflict.  
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 For the definition of the “security dilemma” see p. 26. 
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To use neo-realist explanations to account for the case of ethno-
national conflict, this approach draws parallels between anarchy in international 
relations and the emergence of disorder in the domestic realm of dissolving 
“imperial” regimes (Posen, 1993; see, also, Kaufman, 1996; Kaufmann, 1996; 
Snyder and Jervis, 1999) or “failed states” (Job, 1992; Rotberg, 2004). The 
domestic hierarchical authority of the state is viewed as breaking down because 
of the struggle between ethnic, religious or cultural groups (seen as potential 
states) looking for secession (Posen, 1993; see, also, Kaufman, 1996; 
Kaufmann, 1996; Melander, 1999) or because the state have ceded parts of its 
territory to insurgent groups that rule despite the possibility of an ethnic majority 
(Job, 1992; Rotberg, 2004). However, the causation of conflict is to be 
understood as running in the opposite direction.  
 
Hence, in the post-Cold War neo-realist scholarship, the emergence 
of anarchy, rather than groups’ differentiation is to be seen as the underlying 
cause of conflict (Posen, 1993: 27). The situation created after the state loses its 
authority is seen as comparable with Hobbesian “state of nature,” where no 
sovereign protects fearful individuals from each other and security is the 
prevailing objective of all participants. The anarchical nature of created 
structures after the dissolution or failure of the state is viewed as the source of 
uncertainty. In this context, it is to be expected that “groups acting against 
perceived threats to assure their own security or securities consequently create 
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an environment of increased threat and reduced security for most, if not all, 
others within the borders of the state” (Job, 1992: 18).32  
 
Emerging groups are viewed as being not certain of one another’s 
intentions. Anarchy is seen as forcing groups to adopt self-help behaviours. In 
this context, groups are expected to undertake security-seeking policies vis-à-vis 
potential adversaries. The next move is expected to be the increase of group’s 
capacity to mitigate the security policies of others. This situation is summarised 
by Robert Rotberg as follows:  
when state authority is equated with domestic anarchy conditions are rife for 
‘security dilemma.’ Groups that once lived together because they could depend on 
the state to protect them will suddenly become wary of one another (2004: 58). 
  
This view reflects a position similar to that of Waltz, who explains “[a]mong men 
and among states, anarchy or the absence of it, is associated with the 
occurrence of violence” (1979: 102). Hence, in both inter-states and inter-groups 
levels, the cause of conflict is to be viewed as depending on the characteristic of 
the structure that is defined as being anarchical and imposing upon participants 
the need for security. 
 
Differently from the traditional neo-realist approach, Posen points to 
“groups – ethnic, religious, cultural – of greater or lesser cohesion,” which “still 
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 Job (1992) and Rotberg (2004) apply security dilemma in the case of weak or failed states 
when groups within the state have to seek for their own security. To make the difference with the 
security dilemma as an inter-state phenomenon, Job uses the term insecurity dilemma, while 
Rotberg calls it with the traditional name. Job uses different labels to imply that security dilemma 
and insecurity dilemma is not the same thing. However, in Job’s explanations state is viewed as 
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lack many of the attributes of statehood” and emerge after “the ‘sovereigns have 
disappeared’” to explain the ethno-national conflict (1993: 28). However, not 
every ethnic group is to be seen as referent object of analysis. Stuart Kaufman 
(1996) points out that ethnic group can be referred as object of analysis, 
[i]f anarchy reaches the point where the government cannot control its territory 
effectively enough to protect its people, while ethnic-based organizations can, then 
the ethnic organizations have enough of the attributions of sovereignty to create a 
security dilemma (Kaufman, 1996: 151).  
 
For Rotberg “determining whether groups can constitute a security dilemma, 
involves inquiring into their internal characteristics in order to discover how much 
these characteristics shape the behaviour of the individuals who join” (2004: 63). 
Thus, groups are viewed as “black boxes” and what is important is their 
observable behaviour, not the way they have forged the internal ties, quality of 
leadership and so on. Accordingly, groups are assessed in this scholarship 
regardless of inherited or primordial traits, what is important is that “a group can 
serve as a potential vessel for individuals coping with the absence of the state” 
(Rotberg, 2004: 63).  
 
Thus, for post-Cold War neo-realists, the “security dilemma” is to be 
understood as a by-product of "emerging anarchy" after the dissolution of the 
state, which at the same time should be held responsible for groups’ behaviour. 
The “security dilemma” is the tool that for neo-realists relates structure with the 
units and explains their competition and possibility of engagement in conflict. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
a micro-system with which parallels can be drawn easily with the anarchy of the international 
structure. 
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Groups’ priority to assure their security and competition over it in the condition of 
“emerging anarchy” is to be seen as driving the “security dilemma.” In this 
assumption, as in the case of state system, it is supposed that all groups are 
security-maximisers and insecurity is caused by the inescapable self-help nature 
of anarchy. In this anarchical setting, self-help strategies are viewed taking 
precedence and implying preventive attacks to hedge against possible threats to 
security, which would explain for Posen (1993) why leaders adopt a worst-case 
scenario, thus conflict. To cite Posen: 
Often statesmen…do not empathize with their neighbours; they are unaware that 
their own actions can seem threatening. Often it does not matter if they know of this 
problem. The nature of their situation compels them to take the steps they do (1993: 
28). 
 
However, different scholars would claim that security-maximisation is not the 
only priority of actors that would led the “security dilemma” toward conflict. Thus, 
there are cases when group’s leadership would seek to improve their security 
through expansion (Glaser, 1997). Thus, security driven expansions has to be 
seen as the underlying cause of conflict if there is a belief that by doing so the 
power imbalance and security issues can be addressed at the same time 
(Snyder and Jervis, 1999).  
 
However, in both cases, the increase or the decrease of the likelihood 
of conflict is viewed as depending on the relative distribution of military 
capabilities (material and intentional) including the offensive-defensive balance. 
In the condition of the emergence of anarchy after the dissolution of the state, 
groups are expected to evaluate the other’s relative capabilities in order to 
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guarantee their own security and protection. Posen (1993: 27) suggests three 
set of questions that groups are supposed to answer while evaluating their 
power in relation to the other groups. “Are they a threat? How much of a threat? 
Then, “Will the threat grow or diminish over time?” To conclude with the question 
“Is there anything that must be done immediately?” The answers, according to 
Posen would determine the possibility to be involved or not in conflict, as they 
would reveal the group’s potential “windows of vulnerability and opportunity” 
(1993: 34). 
 
In the process of empire dissolution, the distribution of capabilities 
according to Posen (1993) is unfair, which favours one group at the expense of 
the others. In these circumstances: 
[i]f those with greater advantages expect to remain in that position by virtue of their 
superior numbers, then they may see no window of opportunity. However, if they 
expect their advantage to wane or disappear, then they will have an incentive to 
solve outstanding issues while they are much stronger than the opposition (Posen, 
1993: 34). 
 
The group’s power calculations under the condition of the emergence of anarchy 
are viewed as the motivating and driving force for waging or retreating from 
using violence. As Posen argues, perceived military superiority of the other, 
“often motivated states in the past to initiate preventive military actions” and is 
expected to motivate the emerging groups (yet to be granted sovereignty) to 
initiate ethno-national conflict as well (1993: 35).  
 
The evaluation of threats under the new situation (the dissolution of 
the state and the emergence of anarchy) for Posen is seen to be difficult 
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because of two conditions. First, the emerging anarchical structures “produces 
conditions that make the offensive and defensive capabilities indistinguishable” 
(Posen, 1993: 29). Second, the emergence of anarchy “make[s] offence superior 
to the defence,” which is supposed to have “a powerful influence on the prospect 
for conflict, regardless of the internal politics of the groups emerging from old 
empires” (Posen, 1993: 29). In the condition of offensive capabilities superiority, 
Posen expects the “security dilemma” to be acute, which would explain why 
conflict breaks out. 
 
While using the “security dilemma” to explain the emergence of ethno-
national conflict is a commonly used framework in the post-Cold War neo-
Realists’ accounts, different scholars differ on the role of perceptions and 
ideologies in the instigation of conflict. Posen sees nationalism as having an 
“inherent offensive military power” (1993: 29; see, also, Posen 1993a). Thus, 
nationalism purveyed by local politicians in their struggle for power is viewed as 
serving only “the express purpose of improving [group] military capabilities” 
(Posen: 1993a: 81). This is supposed to be the case because nationalism, in 
Posen’s terms “would…help generate the individual commitment and the 
organized cooperation that make for combat power on the battlefield” (1993a: 
81; see, also, Mearsheimer, 1992). The superiority of the offensive capabilities 
acquired from the usage of nationalism should be seen as encouraging the 
occurrence of conflict. This is the case because offence, as Posen explains, has 
“tremendous tactical military advantages in operations” such as “ethnic 
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cleansing,” which is often the main goal of the ethno-national conflict aiming to 
establish an ethnically homogenous state (Posen, 1993: 33). 
 
On the other hand, Kaufman (1996a) views the intentions of group’s 
leadership as “intentionally” causing both “mass hostility” and “security dilemma” 
(1996a: 158). Similarly, Posen (1993) in his explanations emphasises the 
importance of negative past inter-group experiences and domestic speeches of 
different politicians who write their version of history appropriate for mobilising 
the public in favour of their struggle for power. To cite Kaufman, “[l]eaders 
spread the key myth that the ethnic group is somehow threatened, by offering 
false or misleading factual claims as ‘proof,’ and by appealing to motive 
symbolic issues as somehow representing that threat” (1996a: 170). Although 
this conceptualisation seems similar to constructivist accounts of war, this proto-
constructivist understanding is subordinated to the dynamics of realists’ “security 
dilemma.” Posen writes:  
Analysts inclined to view that most of the trouble lies elsewhere, either in the 
specific nature of group identities or in short-term incentives for new leaders to ‘play 
the nationalist card’ to secure their power, need to understand the security dilemma 
and its consequences (1993: 28). 
 
Remaining on the same line of argument with Posen, Kaufman explains that 
“security dilemma” emerges when group’s leadership “fail to recognize the 
degree to which their security measures threaten other states and therefore 
provoke hostility” (1996a: 151). So, both nationalism as an ideology and 
intentions of politicians that use nationalism are viewed in function of the logic of 
anarchy. To sum up, the post-Cold War neo-realist scholarship choice of the 
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“security dilemma” as the key concept to account for ethno-national conflict, 
would allow us to see the conflict as resulting from groups’ power competition in 
the condition of increased insecurities caused by the emergence of anarchy in a 
decaying state. 
 
Different from the above mentioned neo-realist scholars, Sabrina P. 
Ramet (1992) utilises Morton A. Kaplan’s (1957) typology of international 
systems as a framework for analysing patterns of behaviour among ethnic 
groups, rather than states in the multi-ethnic Yugoslav Federation. The Yugoslav 
Federation is viewed as a system in which the constitutive units (republics and 
autonomous provinces) are the referent object of analysis. In the framework of 
such a system, the patterns of behaviour among the constitutive units are 
identified in terms of power and varying conditions of anarchy. Here, parallels 
are drawn between the inter-actors relations in Yugoslavia from 1918-1963 and 
the loose bi-polarity in the international system or the balance of power and 
inter-actors relations from 1965 onwards.  
 
According to Ramet, Yugoslavia was a success story until the end of 
the 1980s because of flexible coalitions and alliances between the constitutive 
units. In her interpretation, the units are conceived as unitary actors and their 
behaviour within the framework of the Federation (viewed as a system) is 
compared with the behaviour of states in the international system.  In Ramet’s 
understanding, peace prevailed among the units in Yugoslavia so long as the 
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balance of power was preserved between the constitutive units at the system 
level (Federation). Conflicts emerged in the early 1990s because the 
requirements for the maintenance of the balance of power were undermined.  
 
Thus, Serbia’s effort for the hegemonic control of the system 
(Federation) is viewed by Ramet as jeopardising the balance of power in the 
system (1992: 225-238; see, also, Caratan, 1997). The fact that Serbs 
represented the biggest ethnic group in the Federation, according to Ramet 
presented a window of opportunity for them. The existence of this window of 
opportunity favoured preventive military actions (direct or indirect) to consolidate 
Serbia’s superiority that was challenged by other national groups (Ramet, 1992; 
see, also, Caratan, 1997). However, Ramet recognises that her interpretation of 
conflict is “relevant only to systems in which administrative units are organized 
on ethnic or quasi-ethnic lines” (1992, 5) to which the quality of unitary units can 
be attributed.  
 
David (1998) is another realist scholar, who finds Realism suitable to 
be used to explain ethno-national conflict. Realism is accounted as important in 
interpreting different aspects of ethno-national conflict. He proposes to view the 
decaying state as a “microcosm” of the international system. In view of his 
assumption, at least three of realists’ fundamental theses are important in the 
interpretation of ethno-national conflict. The realist assumption about human 
nature (the human being’s ability to kill its own kind, is a necessary condition of 
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war) offers according to David the best interpretation of “the brutality and 
persistence of civil conflict” (1998: 78). Furthermore, the author views anarchy 
as having a permissive role in the causation of ethno-national conflict. That is 
because these conflicts “occur because there is nothing to stop them, [which] is 
as true for conflicts within the [decaying] states as it is among them” (David, 
1998: 78). The balance of power is the other assumption of neo-Realism that is 
considered as important in view of the belligerents’ calculations in waging or 
proscribing conflict. David considers this assumption “as relevant for internal war 
as it is for interstate conflict” (1998: 78). 
 
Ramet (1992) and David (1998) as well as Posen (1993) and 
Kaufman (1996) refine the assumptions of Realism and its variants to interpret 
ethno-national conflict. They replace states with ethnic groups and consider the 
decaying state as an anarchical system. The post-Cold War approaches 
compared with traditional neo-Realism are of greater help to our understanding 
of ethno-national conflict. They look to explain the immediate causes of ethno-
national conflict. The unitary actor and billiard ball framework remain present in 
their treatment of ethnic groups and conflict. This framework of analysis offers a 
distorted understanding of ethno-national conflict. The weaknesses of this 
approach to ethno-national conflict are discussed as follows. 
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2.1.1. Post-Cold War Realism and Ethno-National Conflict: A Critique 
 
As argued above realist and neo-realist scholars tried to address the issue of the 
post-Cold War ethno-national conflicts by treating ethno-national groups as 
states and dissolving state as an anarchical system. They consider identity as a 
means used to improve group’s power capabilities (Lapid and Kratochwil, 1996). 
These works, according to David, are “better at explaining the actions of groups 
after state collapse than they are at explaining why the collapse occurred at all” 
(1998: 93). This approach offers a limited contribution to our understanding of 
ethno-national conflict. Two issues are discussed as follows. 
 
First, the post-Cold War neo-realist approaches point to 
ethnic/national groups emerging from the ashes of dissolving empires as the 
referent object of analysis. These groups are viewed, as black boxes acting in 
an anarchical system. Therefore, these groups are expected to have the same 
security concerns as the state in an anarchical system. 
 
The conceptualisation of groups as unitary and reified actors does not 
allow us to look at insecurities that may arise from ethnic minorities within the 
group. These minorities are viewed by the majority group as a challenge to the 
status quo. This status quo implies the rightness of the majority claim over the 
territory and political autonomy of the group (Campbell, 1998). In this case, the 
conflict might arise from the efforts of the majority group in meeting internal 
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rather than external threats (Job, 1992). This context is neglected in the post-
Cold War neo-realist approaches.  
 
Commenting on the work of authors such as Posen, who make unitary 
ethno-national groups as the referent object of analysis, Keith Krause and 
Michael C. Williams argue that a “shift…to a prima facie focus on structures of 
exclusionary group-identity will merely replicate the inside/outside structure of 
anarchy,” which “hardly provides us with a capacity for thinking about [conflict]” 
(1997: 48). Thus, this approach neglects many sources of insecurities that stand 
as underlying causes of ethno-national conflict. 
 
Second, anarchy is not the only factor that forces actors to assume a 
“worst-case” scenario as Posen (1993) and other neo-realist scholars assert. 
This is the case because anarchy is not an inherent condition of the structure as 
neo-realist scholars assume. Thus, Posen’s interpretation of anarchy is 
contradicted by other interpretations, which assume that anarchy is socially 
constructed and therefore there is no single logic of anarchy (Wendt, 1992). So, 
this explains the fact why actors “act differently towards enemies than they do 
towards friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not” (Wendt, 
1992: 397). Thus, unless actors (states or ethno-national groups) have 
constructed each other as enemies in the process of mutual interaction, there 
would be no Hobbesian anarchy and consequently the cause of conflict would 
fail as well. The neo-realist explanation of conflict according to Kalevi Holsti 
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“explains the recurrence [of war] without accounting for non-recurrence or the 
great deviations from and average pattern of recurrence” (1991: 301; see, also, 
Holsti, 1998).  
 
To account for the non-occurrence of conflict, anarchy is to be seen 
as what actors make of it (Wendt, 1992). In this interpretation of anarchy, actors’ 
identity constituted in relation to the other is important in defining the nature of 
anarchy and the way actors behave towards each other (competitive versus 
cooperative).  Thus, groups’ differentiation rather than anarchy is the cause of 
conflict. In view of that, Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil in commenting on 
Posen’s interpretation of the Yugoslav wars argue that “the dissolution of central 
authority [emerging anarchy] was not the ‘cause’ of the outbreak of the conflict” 
(1996: 115). The causes of the conflict, they argue, cannot be found “without an 
explicit theoretical treatment of group differentiation, which, in turn, generates 
the ‘anarchical environment,’ structural arguments do not explain conflict, they 
merely redescribe it” (Lapid and Kratochwil, 1996: 115).  
 
In this scholarship, the relationship between the “security dilemma” 
and conflict seems to be problematic. The emergence of anarchy is considered 
by Posen (1993) and Kaufman (1996) as inevitably promoting competition, 
“security dilemma” and conflict among groups. However, as Hidemi Suganami 
argues, in the neo-realist scholarship the “security dilemma” is supposed to 
follow from the “‘logic of anarchy’—according to which anarchy entails disorder," 
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which "is not even pervasive” (1996: 49). So, “the dilemma is faced only where 
[actors] are unsure of one’s another’s intentions” (Suganami, 1996: 50). So, the 
case of pluralist security communities as an example of cooperation of different 
actors, including states, communities and people indicate that the relationship 
between the “security dilemma” and conflict fails to operate fully (Deutsch, 1956; 
Keohane, 1989; Suganami, 1996). Groups in the case of pluralist security 
communities will still have security problems to solve, but not all problems are 
dilemmas. The emergence of anarchy, in the sense of the absence of the state 
authority, is not sufficient by itself to necessitate the “security dilemma” and to 
explain its escalation to conflict. Other factors should be taken into consideration 
in order to account for the social aspects of conflict.  
 
 
2.2. The “New Wars” Approach and Post-Cold War Conflicts 
 
Among others Mary Kaldor (1997, 1999), Mark Duffield (1998, 2001), Walter 
Laqueur (1998), Thomas Franck (1995) and Kalevi Holsti (1996) have examined 
the ethno-national conflict in the context of globalisation. In these authors’ 
judgments the globalisation process has led to the emergence of a new type of 
violence involving global and local, and public and private actors. Post-Cold War 
conflicts are referred to as “new wars” (Kaldor, 1997, 1999), “post-modern 
conflicts” (Duffield, 1998, 2001; Laqueur, 1998), “post-modern neo-tribalism” 
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(Franck, 1995) or wars of “third kind” (Holsti, 1996) to make the distinction with 
the old wars (inter-state wars). 
 
The “New Wars” approach argues that globalisation do not generate 
only integration, spread of liberal democracy and peace in international relations 
as claimed by liberal scholars (Keohane and Nye, 1989; Hurrel and Woods, 
1995). The process of globalisation for the “New Wars” scholarship generates 
also fragmentation, exclusiveness and conflict (Kennedy, 1993; Hassner, 1993; 
Gaddis, 1992; Jung, 1993; Clark, 1997). In this, the “New Wars” approach differs 
from the liberal approaches. Furthermore, the “New Wars” approach take as a 
referent object of analysis groups composed of local—and trans—national 
actors as well as the state. With this the “New Wars” approach could also be 
considered as attempting to refine and correct the state-centric outlook of war in 
traditional approaches and broaden the understanding of effects of globalisation 
in international relations.  
 
This section is organised in three parts. In the first part, globalisation 
and its effects on international relations, in general, and war, in particular are 
discussed. In the second part, the “New Wars” approach to conflict is examined. 
In the third part, the relevance of the “New Wars” approach to our understanding 
of ethno-national conflict is discussed.  
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2.2.1. Globalisation and Post-Cold War Conflicts 
 
Different scholars would agree that globalisation is the process of “widening, 
deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of 
social life, from the cultural to the criminal, from the financial to the spiritual” 
(Held et al., 1999: 2). Globalisation is viewed as penetrating states and 
societies, “breaking traditional patterns of vertical organization, a contradictory 
process involving integration and fragmentation, homogenisation and 
diversification” (Kaldor, 1999: 3).33 Globalisation is perceived as the driving force 
behind the rapid social, political and economical changes that are shaking up 
and reshaping modern societies and the world order (Giddens, 1990, 1998). 
Globalisation is also considered as an unprecedented development in the 
history of the mankind, where the classical distinctions between internal and 
external, domestic and international, war and peace are becoming blurred and 
governments and societies facing “new frontiers” have to adjust themselves to 
these changes (Rosenau, 1990; Ruggie 1993; Linklater and MacMillan 1995; 
Kaldor, 1999). 
 
                                                                                             
 
33 In IR there are three main theoretical approaches to globalisation, which divide scholars in 
skeptics, transformalist and globalist. The skeptics (Gaddis, 1992; Waltz, 2000) view 
globalisation as the continuation of the historical process of integration and fragmentation in 
international relations. Therefore, globalisation is seen as exogenous to international relations. 
The transformalists conceive globalisation as the driving force behind the changes that are 
reshaping different institutions of international relations (ex. the state) (Held et al, 1999; Giddens, 
1990, 1998; Ruggie, 1993; Rosecrance, 1996; Clark, 1997; Keohane, 1995; Kaldor, 1999). 
Globalists view the globalisation process as bringing changes that are substantially transforming 
international relations (Ohmae, 1995; Rosenau, 1997). 
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Globalisation is also understood as introducing changes in the world 
economy by bringing the de-nationalisation of the economies through the 
establishment of trans-national networks of trade, finance, investment and 
production. Globalisation, as J. Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin (1994) 
suggest, is seen as challenging the traditional meaning of territory. According to 
them, in the condition of globalisation borders are becoming porous and the 
state’s exclusive authority over its territory and population is weakening. Thus, a 
logical consequence of globalisation is the separation of sovereignty from its 
territorial content. To cite Robert Keohane, sovereignty should be better 
understood “less as a territorial barrier” and more “as a bargain resource for 
politics characterised by complex trans-national networks” (1995: 105).  
 
In Rosalie Higgins’s logic, “territory” in the view of globalisation is no 
longer the only source of jurisdiction in international relations. As the concept of 
“impact jurisdiction” has gained importance, since “an acceptable balance 
between the sovereign equality and independence of states on the one hand 
and the reality of an interdependent world and the international law commitment 
to human dignity on the other” is seen as established in international relations 
(1986: 30; see, also, Forbes, 1993: 217). From that it follows that the 
intervention in the internal affairs of the state (undermining the territorial integrity 
of the state) in the name of the human values and rights is to be considered as 
acceptable. 
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It has been suggested that the most significant transformation that 
globalisation has brought in international relations is the one related to the role 
and the place of the state. Thus,  
[t]he impersonal forces of world markets…are now more powerful than the states to 
whom ultimate political authority over society and economy is supposed to 
belong…the declining authority of state is reflected in a growing diffusion of 
authority of other institutions and associations, and to local and regional bodies 
(Strange, 1996: 4).  
 
The state as “the principal aggregation of political power” (Cox, 1981:126) is 
considered as coming under the pressure of different authorities. The presence 
of different authorities is seen as an expression of the erosion of state authority 
and its role in many aspects of social life including war. Many areas of political 
activity, previously considered as the exclusive property of the state, are to be 
viewed as “globalised” in the sense that state authority over these issues is 
shared with other public and private agencies at the local, national and global 
level (Rosenau, 1990). 
 
Hence, the autonomy of the state is weakened by mafia organisations 
and other trans-national agents that are becoming substitute agents for most of 
the state functions including the usage of violence. Thus, revealing in Strange’s 
(1996) terms, the retreat of the state in international relations. Therefore, the 
erosion of state authority and the growing in importance of other local and trans-
national actors is considered as having transformed at the same time the 
dynamics of war and the use of force in world politics. 
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In this respect, the fragmentation processes is attributed to the 
sudden loss of state autonomy and authority in both international and domestic 
domains, as well as to changing security practices (Barkin and Cronin, 1994: 
127). The erosion of state authority is seen as resulting from the growing role of 
different military organised groups that question the state’s autonomy and 
authority and which aim to bring about profound (structural) political and/or 
economic-social changes “in a negative spiral of incivility” (Kaldor, 2000: 5). The 
state is viewed as not capable of regulating the privatisation of violence, justice, 
and taxation, which “gives rise to violent conflicts” (Kaldor, 2000: 5). The manner 
the “new wars” are organised and financed, according to Kaldor, reveals how 
the state’s monopoly on violence is eroding in favour of the privatisation of 
violence. In view of this trend, the military domain is viewed as becoming 
independent, which is reflected in the privatisation of military capabilities and 
self-employment of redundant soldiers aimed at regaining power and control 
over the resources (Albrecht and Schmeder, 1998). 
 
The actors in the “new wars” are viewed as being organised in an 
horizontal way. So, the units that fight these wars are considered to include a 
disparate range of groups, such as: paramilitary troops, local warlords, police 
forces, breakaway units of the regular army, while the global presence in these 
wars includes mercenary troops, diaspora volunteers, military advisers, 
peacekeepers and a veritable “army” of international agencies (Kaldor, 1999: 3-
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4). These distorted politico-military formations34 facing the erosion in legitimacy 
of the established political class are to be seen as using violence as a means to 
fulfil their interests of personal enrichment or extension of control over 
resources. In the external realm, different power groups looking to legitimise 
various criminal or/and informal forms of private aggrandisement, utilise war as 
a means. 
 
 
2.2.2. The “New Wars” Approach and Post-Cold War Conflicts 
 
Kaldor argues that the international community’s approach to post-Cold War 
conflicts is shaped by “misperceptions, the persistence of inherited ways of 
thinking about violence, the inability to understand the character and the logic of 
new warfare” (Kaldor, 1999: 113). Misperceptions are related to the fact that 
these conflicts are treated either as “old wars” or as the outcome of anarchy. 
Therefore, the warring parties in these conflicts are viewed as nascent states 
assuming they possess the authority to negotiate solutions to settle the conflict. 
In fact this is what Posen (1993) and Kaufman (1996) did in their explanation of 
ethno-national conflict and the “New Wars” approach can be seen developing as 
a criticism to post-Cold War neo-Realism scholarship. 
 
                                                                                             
 
34
 Trade networks, tying together individuals, politicians, corporations, governments and 
international institutions are claimed to have created politico-military formations, which are bind 
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In Kaldor’s understanding post-Cold War conflicts are “new wars.” 
She is not alone in this claim; other scholars share her opinion (Franck, 1995; 
Snow, 1996; Laqueur, 1997; Duffield, 1998, 2001). Kaldor defines the main 
distinctions between old and new wars as follows: 
The new wars involve a blurring of the distinctions between war (usually defined as 
violence between states or organized political groups for political motives), 
organized crime (violence undertaken by private organized groups for private 
purposes, usually financial gains) and large-scale violation of human rights (violence 
undertaken by states or politically organized groups against individuals) (1999:2). 
 
For Donald M. Snow, in the “new wars”: 
[t]here is no common centre of gravity to which the combatants appeal; in many 
cases it is not clear that the “insurgents” have any interest in or intent on gaining 
political power or responsibility; and there is little sense of boundaries on the 
extent of violence both sides would commit. These conflicts seem, indeed, to be a 
new breed of internal violence (1996: ix). 
 
In the “New Wars” approach the globalisation process is viewed as creating the 
necessary conditions that permit the emergence of “new wars.” Globalisation is 
seen as favouring the weakening of the capacity of states to inflict maximum 
violence; and generating increased opportunities for economic motives in the 
post-Cold War conflicts. These two developments are viewed as having 
influenced the changing patterns of violence in world politics (Newman, 2004). 
Kaldor (1999: 5) lists some of the factors that she sees as having contributed to 
the weakening of state monopoly over the means of violence such as: the 
growing destructiveness of military technology, the increasing 
interconnectedness or interdependence of states especially in the economic and  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
together by common socio-economic interests although, having different loyalties (Strazzai, 
2003). 
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military fields, the evolution of the international law and norms and the 
privatisation of organised violence.  
 
It should also be noted that different authors (Mearsheimer, 1990; 
Keohane and Nye, 1989; Franck, 1992) have examined these two developments 
and their effects on the obsolescence of war. The contribution of the "New 
Wars" scholarship is the discussion of these developments in the context of 
globalisation and their role in the causation of conflict. So, “new wars” are 
viewed in this scholarship as “one aspect of the current globalized era” (Kaldor, 
1999: 1; see, also, Duffield, 1998, 2001; Lacqueur, 1997; Franck, 1995).   
 
The “New Wars” scholarship looks at different features of post-Cold 
War conflicts to establish the difference between the "old" and the "new" wars. It 
looks at features, such as: the actors that are to be considered as the referent 
object of analysis; the context in which the conflict is taking place; the primary 
motives and ideologies of protagonists and the strategies they use. By looking at 
these features of conflict this scholarship aims not only to establish the 
distinction between the “new” and “old" wars, but to provide, at the same time, 
an understanding of them. In what follows these features are discussed by 
looking at the insights of different scholars of this approach. The purpose of 
such examination is to present the explanatory capacity of this approach to our 
understanding of ethno-national conflict.  
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The referent object of analysis in the “new wars,” is the group 
composed of insurgents, criminal gangs, mafia organisations, diaspora, 
international organisations, mercenaries, paramilitary troops as well as regular 
armies. The protagonists are viewed as not being bounded by common loyalties 
such as ethnic or national identity. An interesting observation of this literature is 
the fact that international organisations and interventions are viewed as 
exacerbating “new wars.” To cite Dietrich Jung: “mafia-style economies and 
protracted internal warfare are often a result of international interventions which 
are actually claiming to foster the establishment of market structures and 
democracy” (Jung, 2003b: 12). The goals of these actors are viewed as being 
particularistic and aiming at satisfying needs of private aggrandisement rather 
than the ones of community. Their goals may be material, identity-based, or 
ideological or a combination of all three (Duffield, 2001: 14). However, socio-
economic interests are the ones that bind together different protagonists of the 
“new wars” in common formations. 
 
In this approach, globalisation is to be seen as the context that permit 
both the erosion of the state autonomy and the increase in influence of other 
than state actors, such as trans—and sub—state actors. Globalisation, at the 
same time, is considered as standing for a new mode of warfare (the means 
with which war is fought). For Kaldor, the mode of warfare reflects upon the 
mode of production, which has come, in turn, to dominate and shape the means 
and the way wars are fought. Following on the same logic, Martin Shaw writes:  
 97 
Once economy and society had been incorporated directly into the supply side of 
war, as a ‘home front’, then military logic (with the aid of aerial technology) 
transformed them into a part of the battlefield. The logic of warfare-production 
relationship made first ‘strategic’ industries and then whole urban populations into 
targets (2000: 175). 
 
Total war became a mode of warfare, which dominated the capitalist mode of 
production, during mid nineteenth century and was “intimately bound up with the 
evolution of the modern state” (Kaldor, 1999: 13). War during this period is seen 
as being waged for borders and territorial integrity. In the contrary, the post-Cold 
War period’s conflicts are defined as “new wars” because the post-Cold War 
period’s conflicts are to be seen as “part of a process which is more or less a 
reversal of the process through which modern states evolved” (Kaldor, 1999: 5). 
These conflicts are viewed as using a new mode of warfare that represent a 
mixture of war, organised crime and the massive violation of the human and civil 
rights (Kaldor, 1999). This change in the mode of warfare is seen to be a by-
product of globalisation that has favoured a global production.  
 
The “new wars” literature suggests that globalisation has created the 
necessary conditions for the privatisation of violence. Globalisation is favouring 
the growth of “organised crime and the emergence of paramilitary groups,” while 
the “political legitimacy [of the state] is disappearing” (Kaldor, 1999: 9). These 
groups’ informal and criminal activities are seen to serve to generate the 
financial resources to sustain the war. Furthermore, the fighting units are seen 
as financing themselves through plunder, the profits coming from the illegal 
trade and international aid or assistance. According to Duffield (1998), these 
groups finance themselves through domestic “asset transfers” (redistribution of 
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dissolving state’s assets) and/or the revenues generated from the “parallel 
economy” including drug and arms trafficking. In his latter book, he also claims 
that this financing logic is self-sustaining and rational, rather than a 
manifestation of the emergence of anarchy, as pretended by neo-realists’ 
accounts (Duffield, 2001:14). In Kaldor’s words, “the warring parties need more 
or less permanent conflict to reproduce their position of power and for access to 
resources” (1999: 110). Because these different resources finance the conflict 
the “new wars” are also referred as “globalized war economies” (Kaldor, 1999: 
9). For Kaldor, the resources that finance the war are sustained through 
violence; therefore “a war logic is built into the functioning of the economy” 
(Kaldor, 1999: 9; see, also, Jung, 2003; Pugh et. al, 2004).  
 
Furthermore, the protagonists of “new wars” are viewed as seeking 
alternative sources (international and domestic) to sustain their positions of 
domination and access to resources. Thus, conflict is seen as a vicious circle. 
To cite Kaldor  “[t]he warring parties need more or less permanent conflict both 
to reproduce their position of power and for access to resources” (1999: 110). 
This is the reason why the “new wars” are viewed as representing forms of 
criminal and informal activities rather than conflicts in the Clausewitzian 
understanding.  
 
This approach also adopts identity in the form of identity politics to 
study "new wars." For Kaldor “the goals of the new wars are about identity 
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politics in contrast to the geo-political or ideological goals of earlier wars” (1999: 
6). For Kaldor, “identity politics means movements around ethnic, racial or 
religious identity for the purpose of claiming state power” (1999: 76). In the 
conflicts after the 1990s, political nationalism has come to be seen as the 
mobilising ideology of identity politics. Different from modern nationalism, which 
gave birth to the modern state, political nationalism in the 1990s is viewed as 
leading to fragmentation of the state and the discrimination of the other. Identity 
politics is viewed as a means, which, serves to legitimise the violence against 
the civil society and the civil population and in the worst case, expel it from a 
given territory (Bougarel, 1995). Thus, identity politics is considered in the 
explanations of this approach as a means utilised by political groups to 
legitimise their activities of private aggrandisement and for access to resources. 
In Snow’s words, the “new internal wars” give the impression of being “less 
principled in political terms, less focussed on the attainment of some political 
ideal” and they “often appear to be little more than rampages by groups within 
states against one another with little or no ennobling purpose or outcome” 
(1996: 57). Thus, the “new wars” are to be seen as missing clear political 
objectives and ideology. 
 
The aim of “new wars” is considered to be the total annihilation of the 
other group and seizure of the territory in its disposal. Here, territory represents 
the market. Hence, the protagonists use war to achieve control over the territory 
by the displacement of the population and ethnic cleansing (Bougarel, 1995). 
 100 
Thus, to cite Kaldor, “atrocities against non-combatants, sieges, destruction of 
historical monuments, etc., now constitute an essential component of the 
strategies of the new mode of warfare” (1999: 8). Otherwise, these wars are 
described also as cases of violations of human rights and systematic destruction 
of the social, economic, cultural and historical existence of the targeted 
population, which, in turn, is to be seen as part of the war’s aims. In function of 
the conflict's aims, the techniques used to achieve the political control over a 
territory require a guerrilla type of warfare, which would involve a low-level 
confrontation, viewed as a feature particular to the "new wars." 
 
To sum up, the “New Wars” approach considers globalisation as a 
process contributing to the erosion of state authority and privatisation of the 
means to wage war. In this context, the economic motives and greed of different 
non-state actors for private enrichment are to be understood as the driving 
forces of violent conflict. This approach offers a distorted picture of the causes of 
the post-Cold War conflicts. The weaknesses of this approach are discussed in 
the next part. 
 
 
2.2.3. The “New Wars” Approach and Post-Cold War Conflicts: A Critique 
 
In the "New Wars" approach, conflict is viewed as taking place in the context of 
state’s eroding capacity to manipulate coercion due to the process of 
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globalisation, which gave rise to different militia and distorted politico-military 
formations. So, the “new wars” are seen as fought by these new actors engaged 
in “a negative spiral of incivility” for “personal aggrandizement and access to 
resources” (Kaldor, 1999: 110). In the “New Wars” approach there is an effort to 
extend the referent object of analysis by including different actors from the local, 
national and international levels. This effort is to be seen as an attempt to 
correct the state-centrist outlook of war in the traditional approaches. The 
protagonists in the “New Wars” approach are viewed as being a mélange of 
different power groups that struggle against the state, sometimes displacing or 
harnessing the state.  
 
Looking at the post-Cold War period’s conflicts as “new wars” limits 
our understanding of their causes for three reasons. First, the “New Wars” 
approach to conflict remains state-centric. As in the case of the mainstream 
accounts of “state failure”35 the understanding of “new wars” is reduced to an 
explanation of: 
[s]tate strength and success, or weakness and failure, [which] is therefore 
simplistically reduced to an empirical observable capacity to manipulate (usually) 
coercive resources resulting in an anti-democratic overtone of control and 
subordination (Bilgin and Morton, 2002: 63). 
 
Thus, as in these accounts, in the “New Wars” approach, the state is understood 
primarily as an actor which has lost the monopoly of coercive violence in the 
                                                                                             
 
35
 Buzan defines as such weak or failed states, “their principal distinguishing feature is their high 
level of concern with domestically generated threats to the security of the government; in other 
words, weak states either do not have, or have failed to create, a domestic political and societal 
consensus of sufficient strength to eliminate the large-scale use of force as a major and 
continuing element in the domestic political life of the nation” (1991: 99). 
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condition of the erosion of its authority. Hence, according to this scholarship, the 
restoration of the legitimacy of the state in the framework of a cosmopolitan 
project that seeks a role for international organisations and civil society would 
bring to an end the “new wars.” So, at the end, the state is the object of analysis, 
while the other actors are part of a transitory process. 
  
Second, the “New Wars” approach uses the concept of identity to 
explain the post-Cold War conflicts. In these explanations, identity is used in 
instrumental terms; it helps to legitimise actors’ power positions and interests of 
enrichment. However, as Scharpf argues:  
Peoples act not on the base of objective reality, but on the base of perceived reality 
and of assumed cause and effect relationships operating in the world they perceive. 
And peoples act not only on the base of objective needs but also on the basis of 
preference reflecting their subjectively defined interests and valuations and their 
normative convictions of how it is right or good or appropriate to act under the 
circumstances (1997: 19).  
 
By using identity as a means to an end the “new wars” approach fails to account 
for variations in the forms of groups’ inter-relations (enmity, rivalry or friendship) 
(Wendt, 1992). To account for the social aspects of conflict, the identity and the 
interests of groups have to be seen as constructed in the process of mutual 
interactions, which, in turn, can help accounting for variations in the forms of 
groups’ interactions. The conceptualisation of identity as a social signifier rather 
than a means to an end allows to account for the conflict as the result of groups’ 
differences constituted in subjective rather than economic terms. The “New 
Wars” approach misses this explanation. 
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Third, the “New Wars” approach defends the idea that the post-Cold 
War conflicts are “new” because they are the outcome of the recent acceleration 
of the globalisation process. Differently from Kaldor, other scholars do not see 
the “new wars” as really new (Gaddis, 1992; Fearon and Laitin, 2001; Newman, 
2004). For Gaddis, globalisation is not a new process. In the contrary he sees 
globalisation as an ongoing process of the internationalisation of modernity, 
world capitalist economy, nation-state system, world military order, and of the 
division of labour. In this respect, most of the so called “new wars” are seen as 
being caused by a steady accumulation of protracted conflicts of an ethnic 
nationalistic nature since the 1950s and 1960s rather than a sudden change 
associated with a new, post-Cold War international system (Fearon and Laitin, 
2001; Newman, 2004).  
 
Following in the same line of argument, Ted Gurr et al. (2001; see, 
also, Harff and Gurr, 1994) supports the idea that the post-Cold War conflicts 
are the continuation of de-colonisation process started in the 1950s rather than 
a new type of conflict attributed to the acceleration of globalisation. For Stephan 
Van Evera, in Eastern Europe, in the Balkans and in the countries of Third World 
the process of transformation from the nation to statehood remains of great 
significance since the transition is still on going and this transformation quite 
often is done by using violence (Evera, Van, 1990/91: 11). Thus, the so-called 
“new wars,” for these scholars rather reflect types of conflict that are not 
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particularly “new,” that in fact, represent enduring patterns of processes 
continuing from the last century. 
 
To sum up, besides finding a new name for post-Cold War conflicts, 
the “New Wars” approach offers a limited contribution to our understanding of 
ethno-national conflict. The analysis of conflict ends up ignoring the historical 
contingent processes of conflict formation.  
 
 
In Chapter 2, two approaches to the post-Cold War period’s conflicts, namely, 
post-Cold War neo-Realism and the “New Wars” approach were discussed. 
These approaches claim to offer some new interpretations to the causes of 
current conflicts. Both approaches focus on actors other than states and use 
nationalism and identity in their explanations in an effort to refine traditional 
theories approach to ethno-national conflict. Post-Cold War neo-Realism looks 
at the emergence of anarchy and “security dilemma” in the case of dissolving 
imperial or federal states as the permissive cause of the post-Cold War ethno-
national conflicts. The “New Wars” approach suggests that globalisation is the 
underlying cause of “new wars.” The rivalry of emerging private—often 
criminal—groups in the vacuum created by the erosion of state authority in the 
condition of globalisation is pointed as the immediate cause of “new wars.” 
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Both approaches’ arguments contain a number of problems that limit 
our understanding of the causes of ethno-national conflict. Nationalism and 
identity are considered in the explanations of the causes of conflict in 
instrumental terms affecting either the material offensive capabilities of groups 
or legitimising the private economic interests of different actors. This way of 
involving identity in approaching conflict, remains in the same line with traditional 
approaches that consider identity as given and unproblematic. Furthermore, 
these approaches exaggerate the importance of anarchy (for Posen) and 
globalisation (for Kaldor), while neglecting how conflict is used not only to 
advance interests (economic and politic), but also to define and defend identity.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
Constructivism and War 
 
 
 
Traditional International Relations theories and the post-Cold War approaches 
discussed in the previous two chapters offered an understanding of war that 
emphasised power calculations and the immediate interests of actors as the 
main causal factors. In these assumptions, the state and ethno-national groups, 
treated as states, are considered as the referent objects of analysis. Conflict is 
seen as the struggle of states or quasi-states for power, security and economic 
domination. The traditional and the post-Cold War approaches, according to 
Paul Kowert, 
explain how actors should choose (parametric theories) or how they should bargain 
(strategic theories). They offer answers to some important questions about when 
states should cooperate and when they may be expected to fight (1998: 2).  
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Hence, traditional International Relations theories and the post-Cold War 
approaches offer an important contribution to the understanding of actors’ 
choices, applying mainly the “rational choice” theory36 as a guide for 
understanding actors’ behaviour. However, they restrict our understanding of 
conflict to a particular conception of society, set of actors and values.  This is the 
case because in these approaches the process of rational logic is separated 
from the process of subjective interaction, capturing as such a structure of 
actors’ inter-relations stripped of the social context (Ashley, 1986).  
 
 These approaches in many respects do not clearly distinguish 
between objective and subjective aspects of the practices that are scrutinised 
(Ruggie, 1986).  These theories distance themselves from questioning how 
social actors have been constituted and interact over time. The post-Cold War 
approaches, on the other hand, made an effort to introduce the concept of 
identity to the understanding of ethno-national conflict. However, as Lapid and 
Kratochwil (1996: 105-126) argue, in these approaches identity was considered 
as a means rather than a social signifier.  
 
The set of social theories, known as Constructivism try to address the 
weaknesses of the traditional and post-Cold War approaches. Constructivism is 
                                                                                             
 
36 The “rational choice” is defined in terms of utility maximisation that presupposes efficient 
decisions. The social dimension of choice is mainly neglected and as such, experience has 
revealed that subjects’ perceptions could lead to modifications in behaviour. See, for more, on 
the “rational choice,” Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman (1992) and Stephen M. Walt 
(1999). 
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used for the study of the problem of collective action in international relations. 
This chapter looks at the constructivist approaches of Alexander Wendt and the 
Copenhagen School, to see what they can tell us about ethno-national conflict.37 
These approaches point to identity and culture to explain behaviour in 
international relations. Although, neither of these two approaches specifically 
deals with the issue of conflict this chapter tries to demonstrate that useful 
insights and specific explanations can be drawn from the constructivist theory to 
account for ethno-national conflict. These approaches use identity and culture to 
organise the study of conflict.  
 
The chapter discusses first the constructivist approach of Alexander 
Wendt and its relevance in explaining ethno-national conflict. Then it discusses 
the operationalisation of the concept of identity and culture in the theorising of 
the Copenhagen School and its contribution to our understanding of the 
immediate causes of ethno-national conflict. The chapter concludes with a 
section that emphasises the contribution of these approaches while showing 
awareness of their weaknesses. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                             
 
37
 Constructivism is not a homogenous body of thought (Reus-Smith, 2002: 488). This Chapter 
looks only at what Wendt’s and the Copenhagen School approaches can tell us about conflict. 
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3.1.1. Alexander Wendt’s Approach and War  
 
Alexander Wendt in his approach addresses the inadequacies of the traditional 
approaches, especially of neo-Realism in dealing with the problem of collective  
action in international relations. Wendt’s theorising with a particular emphasis on 
what it can tell us about war in particular is discussed in this section. Wendt 
offers a constructivist approach to the understanding of war and peace in 
international relations. Hence, war is seen as an human practice that has been 
socially constructed. Wendt organises his study of international relations by 
using the concepts of identity and culture.  
 
The aim of Wendt is not to show that traditional approaches are 
wrong. He is trying to mediate their incomplete explanations and bridge the gap 
between Realism, Rationalism and Constructivism (Wendt, 1996, 1999). The 
way Wendt views structure and agency and their role in behaviour (including 
war) constitute what he calls “via media.” Wendt’s “via media” would aim “at 
reconciling what many take to be incompatible ontological and epistemological 
positions” (1999: 40). In theoretical terms, reconciliation, for Wendt, aims to 
combine in a single theoretical explanation the holists’ (structuralist) top-down 
conception of social life with individualists’ bottom-up view. In Wendt’s terms: 
The real debate between individualist and holist is not about whether culture 
constructs agents, but about the character of this construction process, and in 
particular whether it is limited to causal effects or also includes constitutive ones 
(1999: 166).  
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Constructivism is offered by Wendt as the way towards a synthetic view that 
could combine the relationship of “interaction” or “co-determination” that define 
agency with the relationship of “conceptual dependence” or “mutual constitution” 
that define structure (1999: 165). In his words:  
Constructivism can show that culture not only causes but also constitutes agents 
therefore, its value-added over rationalism is twofold. It helps us look at causal 
effects on the properties of the agents and it helps us think about constitutive effects 
on behaviour and properties (1999: 166).  
 
Accordingly, Wendt’s theorising provides a combination of material conditions 
with institutionalised subjective interactions in the explanation of war. In Wendt’s 
understanding, agency and structure are mutually constructed in the process of 
interactions. Therefore, they both are responsible for the recurrence of war 
(Wendt, 1987). The agency and structure as constituted entities has to be 
researched separately and in the interaction process, to explain different 
expressions of collective behaviour such as war, rivalry and peace in 
international relations. Although a greater dependence of agents on structure in 
constitutive terms is recognised, Wendt argues that the source of social 
behaviour within the realm of interaction is the outcome of both agents and 
structure.38  
 
Furthermore, Wendt tries to combine in a single theoretical 
explanation both constitutive and casual effects on an agent’s properties and 
                                                                                             
 
38
 Regarding the relationship between the agency and the structures of the system, Wendt has 
moved his position from “mutual” construction (1987) to bilateral “supervenience” (1996, 1999). 
Thus, for Wendt “[s]upervenience is a nonreductive relationship of dependency, in which 
properties at one level are fixed or constituted by those at another, but are not reducible to them” 
(Wendt, 1996: 49).  
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behaviour or on both (1999: 26-29). This theoretical framework is expected to 
delineate both the sources and the character of behaviour in international 
relations. Given the importance of the interrelationship between the structure 
and agency, where the potential of motivational and behavioural dispositions is 
located, the arguments developed by Wendt about them are outlined and 
assessed as follows.  
 
In Wendt’s approach ideational factors assume a predominant role in 
explaining international relations and consequently war. For Wendt, the 
intersubjective aspects of culture (socially shared knowledge) account for the 
primacy of purposes and worldviews that shape actors and explain their 
behaviour. Although power and related interests in their material standing are 
not dismissed as sources that effect actors’ war prone or friendly behaviours, 
according to Wendt both “have the effects they do in virtue of the ideas that 
make them up. Power and interests explanations presuppose ideas, and to that 
extent they are not rivals to ideational explanations at all” (1999: 135). 
 
For Wendt, the material factors’ effects upon collective actions depend 
on the ideational explanations that the agency assigns to them. In other words, 
power and related interests are considered to be what the agents make of them. 
Thus, Wendt shifts the attention from rational theorising and the importance of 
the material factors to explain war and peace in international relations, to culture 
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and the ideas that make them.39 His approach addresses the issue of 
subjectivity and its implications on behaviour by accounting for the relationship 
between culture and the intersubjective aspects of an agent’s identity. In this 
framework it is instructive to examine these two aspects of subjectivity in order 
to understand how both culture and agency would play a role in the recurrence 
of conflict. 
 
 
3.1.1. Culture and the Problem of Collective Action  
 
Wendt would argue that war prone behaviour as an expression of interactions 
with the “other” depends upon social structures (culture). In Wendt’s theorising, 
social structure has three important characteristics. First, structure is made of 
ideas that are intersubjectively shared by the members of the system. So, to cite 
Wendt “[c]ultural structure consists of the stock of interlocking beliefs, ideas, 
understandings, perceptions, identities,” which otherwise are called “knowledge 
held by members of the system” (1996: 49).  Second, the structure “constrains” 
agents, as such affecting their social behaviour. Third, structure “constitutes” 
agency. In this it is assumed that structure defines an agent’s properties such as 
identity and interests. These characteristics are considered by Wendt to be 
endogenous  to  social interactions, which  create, reproduce  and  reinforce  the  
                                                                                             
 
39
 “Culture,” “culture of representation” and “shared collective knowledge” are used 
interchangeably throughout the text.  
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properties of the structure and of the members of the system. Wendt, however, 
assumes that “constitutive effects imply a greater dependence of agents in 
structure” (1999: 27). His argument is based on the logic that:  
Structural theorising is likely to yield a high rate of explanatory return. Even if we 
lack detailed knowledge about actors and their intentions, we should be able to 
explain, and even predict, patterns of their behaviour if we know the structure of 
rules in which they are embedded. Structure confronts actors as an objective 
social fact that constrains and enables actions in systematic ways, and as such 
should generate distinct patterns (1999: 184). 
 
Wendt’s particular understanding of social structure plays a vital role in his 
theorising about the problem of the collective action in international relations.   
 
For Wendt, social structures are defined by the distribution of culture, 
rather than power at the international level. In this assumption Wendt (1999) 
differs form Waltz (1979), which assumes a structure defined by the material 
distribution of capabilities. According to Wendt, the cultural form “refers to 
macro-level regularities that are discontinuous with micro-level ones; neither 
explains the behaviour of particular actors nor relies on the intentional theory of 
action” (1999: 164). Accordingly, an agent’s war prone behaviour is expected to 
reflect upon culturally defined situations that stand for “homeostatic tendencies,” 
which are seen as important prerequisites for having a “stabilised social order” in 
international relations (Wendt, 1999: 187).  
 
Accordingly, Wendt would define war as a practice that reflects upon 
an agent’s previous experiences that would tell him how to handle a dangerous 
situation. However, behaviour according to Wendt is a two-fold process. First, 
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before acting, agents have to define the situation they find themselves and 
culture serves as a guide. In the case an actor perceives a threat to his survival, 
culture provides the information to get engaged in conflict or not. Second, 
cultures, besides being the necessary foundation for guiding an agent’s 
behaviour, depend on the process of interaction that helps in Wendt’s logic to 
produce and reproduce the structure of international relations. 
 
For Wendt, an undefined situation would offer surprises all the time in 
the process of interaction with the “other.” The end result of interaction in an 
undefined context not only will question an agent’s subjective self-
understanding, but will also create perpetuated chaos in international relations. 
As a matter of fact, international relations are not in a perpetual state of disarray, 
which for Wendt demonstrates both the existence and the importance of culture. 
 
Anarchy is a situation culturally defined in Wendt’s approach. 
Differentiating between different kinds of anarchy is fundamental to Wendt’s 
approach to international relations and to what he can tell us about war. 
Different cultures of anarchy, according to Wendt, provide for enemy, rival or 
friend images with almost “homeostatic” qualities, sustaining the logic of 
respectively Hobbesian, Kantian or Lockean anarchy. These types of anarchy 
would explain the behavioural predisposition of an agent.  So, in the condition of 
Hobbesian anarchy Wendt would expect war to recur since culture induces 
actors to define one another as enemies. 
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Furthermore, for Wendt, culture provides a coherent and plausible 
account for the satisfaction of an agent’s needs for “socialisation and ontological 
security” (Wendt, 1999: 187). These validity-claims are supposed to be present 
in all cultural situations. They are useful according to Wendt:  
[a]s long as individuals see themselves as having an allegiance and commitment 
to the group, collective memories will be available as a resource for mobilising 
collective action even if they are not believed, in a phenomenological sense, by 
individuals, and in that way they can help explain patterns in aggregate behaviour  
(1999: 163). 
 
The implications of culture are far reaching for Wendt. Thus, culture viewed as 
constructed “by an on-going process of socialisation and ritual enactment” 
(Wendt, 1999: 163) defines stereotypes or imageries upon which behaviour is 
based. In Mattern’s terms, culture implies “a particular instance of force” that not 
only shows who the agent is and how it relates to others, but at the same time, 
justifies an agent’s existence (2001: 358). Thus, culture provides the narrative 
that “cements or stabilizes an identity/reality in the face of competing 
alternatives. Fastening reinforces an identity’s ability to perpetuate normative 
structures and affect behaviour” (Mattern, 2001: 362). 
 
In the case that the negative collective memories prevail over the 
other memories of the group, for Wendt, there is an “aggregate tendency 
for…conflict to recur over time” (Wendt, 1999: 163). Collective memories are 
viewed as being constituted in the historical process of agents’ interactions with 
each another and kept alive through generations by an on-going process of 
socialisation and ritual enactment. Thus, negative collective memories are to be 
seen as the guide that channels behaviour toward conflict. This assumption 
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would hold true for Wendt, if actors share at least three things. First, interacting 
actors should be unitary and alike. Second, the “other” has to be seen as the 
enemy and a threat to actor’s existence. Third, the negative collective 
knowledge would tell the actor why and when to use violence to handle the 
enemy (Wendt, 1999: 268).  
 
On the other hand, collective representation of the “other” that are 
positive explains, for Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (1998), the absence 
of conflict. Security communities are an example of that. Thus, positive collective 
representation of the “other” used in the process of sharing meanings and norms 
(collective knowledge) and kept alike by an on-going process of socialisation 
would establish, for Adler and Barnett, a culture of cooperation. This culture of 
cooperation would condition social behaviour by excluding the use of force 
between the members of community. 
 
Although, for Wendt, culture reveals “homeostatic qualities” that 
agents refer while trying to meet their needs, it is constituted in the process of 
agents’ interactions. So, “in both a causal and constitutive sense, therefore, 
structure [culture] is an ongoing effect of process, at the same time that process 
is in an effect of structure” (Wendt, 1999: 186). The fact that agents are 
constructed by society and that structure is continually in a process of 
construction might seem to suggest that there is an infinitively changeable 
society and cultural realm.  
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However, the emphasis on the process and its variability, although a 
recurrent feature of Wendt’s theorising, is a circumscribed version.  For research 
and practical purposes, Wendt proposes to “bracket” the process of construction 
in order to study structure and its effects. In Wendt’s words: 
Constitutive analysis is inherently static. It tells us what structures are made of and 
how they can have certain effects, but not about the processes by which they 
move through time, in short about history. This is clearest in the case of structural 
change, which is caused by actions that undermine existing structures and 
generate new ones (1999: 185). 
 
This approach, according to Wendt, makes it possible to account in practical 
terms for the source and character of international behaviour.  
 
The cultural forms, although a property of the structure and an 
important point of departure in explaining social relations, cannot exist according 
to Wendt separately from an agent’s beliefs and interests. Anarchy as a cultural 
form (as Wendt’s puts it) is what "states make of it" (1992: 183). So, an agent’s 
war prone behaviour, for example, is to be viewed both independent of culture 
and dependent on it. Wendt argues that:  
The distribution of knowledge in a social system at any given moment exists only in 
virtues of actors’ desires and beliefs...but it is also true of collective knowledge, 
which supervenes on desires and beliefs even if it cannot be reduced to them  
(1999:185).  
 
This injunction highlights the importance of the interrelationship of structure with 
agency that for Wendt should not be regarded as separate entities. The cultural 
forms (anarchy) are understood as associated with agency through the concept 
of an agent’s roles. At this point, it is important to explain an agent’s roles, how 
they are constituted, what their effects are on war prone behaviour and how they 
relate to cultural forms (anarchy) and agency’s properties: identity and interests.  
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3.1.2. Role-Structure Relationship and the Problem of Collective Action 
 
Wendt views roles as constituted in a process that entertains three rationales. 
First, roles are seen as being constituted in the process of agent’s interactions. 
Second, roles represent the objective “configuration of subject positions” 
(Wendt, 1999: 257). Third, roles are viewed as being “attributes of structures” 
embedded in different forms of culture. In Wendt’s understanding, roles are 
attributes of the structure and as such they represent “the configuration of 
subject positions that shared ideas make available to its holders” (Wendt, 1999: 
257). Roles, according to Wendt, differ from identities because they "are not 
based on [agent’s] intrinsic properties and as such they exist only in relation to 
others” (Wendt, 1999: 227). So, roles are understood as “the objective, 
collectively constituted positions that give meaning to [the] understanding” of the 
“other” (Wendt, 1999: 257). 
 
In this approach, roles depend on the culture and the “other,” which, in 
turn, is expected to extinguish an agent’s self-potential for autonomous action. 
For Wendt, “the sharing of expectations on which role identities depend is 
facilitated by the fact that many roles are institutionalised in social structures that 
pre-date particular interactions” (1999: 227). However, roles, in Wendt’s logic, 
cannot be reduced to a simple account of a structure’s cultural context. Roles 
are considered to be internalised in an agent’s identity and reflecting upon 
individual beliefs and ideas about whom or what the agent is. Therefore, war 
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and peace in international relations should be analysed as resulting from the 
combination of factors that reflect upon an agent’s values and interests, 
“substantial rights and behavioural norms” and “the degree of interdependence” 
or “intimacy” between the “self” and the “other” (1999: 228).  
 
For Wendt, the interaction, establishes the options of choices that are 
considered to remain within the limits of structural effects such as: constitutivity 
and constraints. In this approach, agents are considered as being restrained in 
choosing their behaviour since in their choices they have to face the collective 
knowledge about the “other.” The “other’s” reaction in the process of interaction 
is seen as providing for a reflective appraisal to the agent that is expected to 
constrain the redefinition of an agent’s values and interests. Accordingly, 
following Wendt’s logic, war is what agents make of it.  
 
In Wendt’s theorising, identity is a crucial concept linking social 
structure with agent’s role in enacting social behaviour. Different from the 
traditional International Relations approaches that introduce identity in analysing 
conflict as a substitute for missing resources; Wendt offers a social narrative of 
identity. He adopts the concept of “social identity,” which is borrowed from social 
theory, to analyse the behaviour of corporate agents. Thus, identity and culture 
are to be seen as the organising principle of Wendt’s theorising and as such 
they can be utilised in the examination of the Kosovo/a conflict. 
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 In social theory, social identity can be seen as the various ways in 
which people understand themselves in relation to the “other” and how they view 
their past and their future (Peirce, 1995). For the purpose of this work it is 
important to examine Wendt’s definition of social identity and it relation to the 
problem of collective action and war as an expression of it. 
 
 
3.1.3. Identity, Interests and the Problem of Collective Action  
 
In Wendt’s conception, social identity indicates both the social construction of 
the agent and its dependence on the interaction of independently existing 
agents (1999: 169). Hence, social identity “takes the relationship between ‘self’ 
and ‘other’ to its logical conclusion, identification” (Wendt, 1999: 229). Agents’ 
identity in Wendt’s terms, is simply to have certain ideas about who one is in a 
“relatively stable, role specific understanding and expectations about self that 
would be hard to change” (1992: 398).  
 
 Identity, as Wendt understands it is “a property of international actor 
that generates motivational and behavioural dispositions” (1999: 224). 
Accordingly, social identities represent “cognitive schemas that enable an actor 
to determine who ‘I am/we are’ in a situation and positions in a social role 
structure of shared understanding and expectations” (Wendt, 1994: 385). Seeing 
social identity as an attribute of structure has two implications. First, state is 
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privileged as a referent object of analysis. Second, the corporate identity, which 
“refers to the intrinsic qualities that constitute actor individuality” (Wendt, 1996: 
50), is not sees as responsible for the collective action. For Wendt, corporate 
identity has its roots in domestic politics and is ontologically prior to the state 
system (1999: 21). Therefore, to explain war, we have to point how an agent 
defines the “self” in relation to the “other,” which would offer the necessary tools 
to study his behaviour. 
 
Wendt recognises that an actor has multiple identities “constituted to 
varying degree by cultural forms,” which, in turn, indicated “why they are and 
what should we do in a certain context” (1992: 230). Wendt’s approach provides 
an account of behaviour where much depends “on the extent to which an 
identity is threatened” in this case “a non salient identity which is highly 
threatened may dominate a more salient one that is not. But as a first 
approximation to a general, long-term tendency the proposition may have merit” 
(1999: 231). The implication of such an assumption defines behaviour as the 
result of mutually constitutive relationships between the self and the other, while 
neglecting the interaction between an actor’s internal and external identities. 
This assumption privileges the unitary nature of the actors, which is a weakness 
of this approach with implications for our understanding of ethno-national 
conflict. The issue is further discussed in the next part. 
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In Wendt’s theorising interests assume also an important role in 
explaining the behaviour of an agent. Interests, together with identity, are 
considered to be interrelated properties of an agent, and are responsible for an 
agent’s behaviour. To define the relationship between identity and interests 
Wendt stipulates, “without interests identities have no motivational force, without 
identities interests have no direction” (1999:231). Identity defined as such drive 
interests and since identity reflects upon various forms of culture so do the 
interests. Thus, interests defined in terms of needs are a necessary condition 
but insufficient contributor to constant behaviour since there is no guarantee that 
they would be translated into beliefs. Thus, interests are subordinated to identity. 
This assumption aims at stressing the importance of identity and its ideational 
nature in the understanding an actor’s behaviour, while underdetermine the 
effects of the material factors that are mainly embedded in interests.  
 
 Wendt offers a state-centric outlook of international relations. Wendt 
argues that explaining international relations requires viewing states40 as agents 
and structure as made up of states. Wendt justifies this choice as such: “states 
are unitary actors to which we legitimately can attribute anthropomorphic 
qualities like identities, interests and intentionality” (1999: 43). States are viewed 
as “self-organised entities whose internal structures confer capacities for 
                                                                                             
 
40 Wendt’s choice of the state as the referent object of analysis excludes the individuals as a 
referent object. This choice is done on the merit of an agent’s social identity, which compared to 
that of an individual allows us to “see how the relationship between agents and structure can be 
at once independent and dependent, causal and constitutive. We can have both dualism and 
duality (Wendt, 1999: 183-184). 
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institutionalised collective actions—corporate agency—on their members” 
(Wendt, 1999: 43). In Wendt’s approach, the accounts of internal identity 
(corporate identity) are considered as unimportant in the understanding of 
international politics.41 This assumption is based on the premise that “the 
boundaries and policies of the state coincide with the boundaries and needs of 
the pre-existing groups subject to its rule” (Wendt, 1999: 211).  
 
For Wendt, state-society interaction is unproblematic. This assumption 
is based in his conclusion that the historical process of “the emergence of the 
state, in which coercive resources become monopolised by political-military 
elites, creates enormous potential for constructing societies from the top down” 
(Wendt, 1999: 210). In this process all points of contentions between the state 
and the society are seen as being erased. The institution of citizenship, 
according to Wendt’s logic emerged out of this historical process as an 
egalitarian principle that excluded the “other” that did not share the same 
citizenship. Following this logic, the relations between individuals and the state 
are seen as being unproblematic.  
 
State, according to Wendt, represents the best form of social 
organisation that provides for security by offering both protection from 
foreigners’ assaults and well-being by keeping order and preventing individuals 
from hurting each other. Under this assumption behaviour is to be seen as 
                                                                                             
 
41
 Wendt, however, admits the importance of “corporate identity” in explaining foreign policy. 
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resulting from a mutual constitutive relationship between the “self” and the 
“other” that transcends the state-society interaction problem. This assumption 
keeps Wendt and us away from understanding the role of state-society 
interactions in shaping actor’s behaviour, which appears to be of relevance in 
the interpretation of ethno-national conflict. This issue is discussed in the 
following section.  
 
 
3.1.4. Wendt’s Approach and War: An Assessment  
 
Wendt’s scholarship offers a constructivist and structuralist approach to the 
understanding of war and peace in international relations. The concept of 
collective identity viewed as a social signifier is introduced to explain war and 
cooperation in international relations. The structure constituted by ideas (culture) 
is the ones that according to Wendt (1996, 1999) provides the basis for an 
actor’s knowledge and behaviour. Culture is viewed as helping an actor to find 
common solutions to problems and define its behaviour. How an agent thinks 
about the “other” and how it comes to frame identity, interests and the future 
actions of the “other” is supposed to depend upon the characteristics of the 
structure and the process of agent-structure interaction.  
 
In the condition of Hobbesian anarchy, Wendt assumes that actors, 
which fear each other, develop identities in enmity terms. In this case, culture is 
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comprised of formalised practices of antagonism, hostility concerning the 
conception of the “other” and repetitive aggressive methods of conflict 
management. The culture constituted as such is supposed to define and 
redefine an actor’s identity in enemy terms and indicate whom and what would 
constitute a serious threat to his existence as well. For Wendt, collective 
identities and the cultures that constitute them may be quite durable, although 
they are viewed as continuously in a process of construction. That is because as 
Wendt argues: 
Indeed, if anything, structural change should be quite difficult. As a self-fulfilling 
prophecy culture has natural homeostatic tendencies, and the more deeply it is 
internalised by the actors the stronger those tendencies will be (1999: 315).  
 
Although, it is supposed that “the evolution of identities is a dialectic of actual 
and possible selves…there are no guarantees that the weight of the past will be 
overcome” (Wendt, 1999: 340). Thus, conflicting densities embedded in the 
negative collective memories of actors are viewed as persisting in time without 
major changes and as such, the possibility for the recurrence of conflict. Wendt 
posits this conclusion as such: 
The members of a system represent each other as enemies, eventually a ‘tipping 
point’ is reached at which these representations take over the logic of the system. At 
this point actors start to think of enmity as a property of the system rather than just 
of individual actors, and so feel compelled to represent all others as enemies simply 
because they are part of the system (Wendt, 1999: 264).  
 
The change of existing conflictual structures is limited because as Wendt 
explains “once collective memories [structure] have been created it may be hard 
to shake their long-term effects, even if a majority of individuals have ‘forgotten’ 
them at any given moment” (1999: 163). Thus, the collective identity formation 
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would end up reproducing the Hobbesian anarchical nature of the international 
system. This is the case for Wendt because:  
[s]ometime [collective identity] reproduction is unproblematic because contestation 
is low, in which case taking them as given may be analytically useful. But in doing 
so we should not forget that what we take to be given is in fact a process that has 
simply been sufficiently stabilized by internal and external structures that it 
appears given. A methodology should not be a tacit ontology (1999: 340). 
 
The possibility of change from enmity to friendly identities among actors is 
viewed as embedded in the argument about cultural transformation at the 
system level. For Wendt, system change is “frequency dependent.” As more and 
more states represent each other as friends rather than enemies, “a tipping 
point” will be reached when this representation take over the system (1999: 264, 
see, also, 340). At this point, the possibility of war between friendly states would 
become nil. However, for Wendt this situation has a long way to become reality.  
 
From these explanations two main implications can be drawn for our 
understanding of ethno-national conflict. Actors’ engagement in conflict is to be 
seen as resulting from their conflicting identities, embedded in conflictual cultural 
structures, which indicate war as the appropriate solution to handle the situation. 
The conflict is expected to recur as long as actors see each other as enemies. 
Considering that the change from enmity to friendly identities is rather difficult, 
the conflict is to be seen as being almost a permanent condition of interrelations 
between actors that view each other as enemies. This framework can tell us little 
about the discursive practices, which encourage the use of violence. The 
Copenhagen School approach promises to address this issue by using the 
concept of “securitisation.” This approach is dealt in the next section. 
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Furthermore, this approach cannot account for the “non-recurrence or the great 
deviations from and average pattern of recurrence” of conflict (Holsti, 1991: 301; 
see, also, Holsti, 1998), which provides us with a distorted picture of the 
relations between actors.  
 
Similar to Waltz (1979), Wendt’s social theory of international relations 
is state-centred. Wendt clearly admits that:  
Regardless of the extent to which interdependence blurs the de facto boundaries 
between domestic and foreign policies, in the contemporary international system 
authority is organized formally in a bifurcated fashion: vertically within states 
(‘hierarchy’), horizontally between (‘anarchy’). This is partly due to the nature of 
states, and partly to the international institution of sovereignty, in which states 
recognize each other as having exclusive political authority within separate 
territories. As long as political space is organized in this way, states will behave 
differently towards each other than they do towards their own societies (1999: 13). 
 
The boundary between the state and the system as social constructions is 
presented in Wendt’s approach as un-problematic. Consequently, the state is 
understood as a unitary and rational actor that has resolved the problems of 
unity and cohesion by the monopolisation of the means of coercion in the hands 
of a single authority. 
 
Wendt, while recognising the existence of non-state actors that 
constrain state activity, at the same time dismisses their importance based on 
the assumption that: 
States are still the primary medium through which the effects of other actors on 
the regulation of violence are channelled into the world system. It may be that 
non-state actors are becoming more important than states as initiators of change, 
but system change ultimately happens through states (Wendt, 1999: 9). 
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In Wendt’s thinking, state and society (or state-nation) have matched each other 
and as such their objective interests are translated into needs, which do not 
contradict with each other. Whatever Wendt’s theoretical justification is, treating 
the state an unitary actor and the referent object of analysis is subject to 
criticism (Booth, 1991a; Wæver at al, 1993; Shaw, 1994, 2000; Buzan et al., 
1998; Bilgin, 2001, 2002, 2003). 
 
Critical of Wendt’s state-centred approach, Martin Shaw states: “state-
centrism is an inadequate beginning” for Wendt’s approach. In the state-centric 
approach of Wendt, “the key structural differentiation of national and 
international is taken for granted as foundational. Subjectivity enters only into 
how the separated ‘international’ sphere is constituted” (Shaw, 2000: 1). This 
assumption does not allow Wendt to see that an actor’s identity is a dual 
process that reflects upon both internal and external processes. Discounting the 
relationship between the two processes is to ignore some of the most basic 
sources and dynamics of conflict in contemporary politics on the one hand and 
security community building on the other hand (Barnett, 1993; Adler and Barnett, 
1998). In Paul Kowert’s terms the lack of scrutiny over state’s internal 
processes, 
[h]as implications for international relations: civil wars, spin-off crises, changing 
alliances patterns, the dissolution of existing states, and the constitution of new 
ones. It is easy to recognize the importance of such identity politics in international 
relations (1998: 101). 
 
In Campbell’s words “the social space of inside/outside is both made possible by 
and helps constitute a moral space of superior/inferior” (1992: 85). The 
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preservation of this distinction through the practice of “securing” the state 
through “discourses of danger” creates the possibilities of turning both aspects 
of identity (internal and external) to deal with the threatening “other” that, in turn, 
prioritises national interests and at the same time reconstitutes state’s political 
identity. This framework prevents us from understanding the consequences of 
the breakdown of state’s internal cohesion and threats that states cause to their 
own population or segments of them (Linklater, 1995; Moller, 2000), which 
represent the main causes of intra-state conflicts in contemporary politics.   
 
Wendt’s approach beside its state-centrism that is shared with the 
traditional International Relations theories (and as such it is vulnerable to the 
same criticisms as they are), offers an intersubjective and constructivist 
explanation of war and peace in international relations. Thus, the key structures 
in the state system are considered to be intersubjective rather than material and 
actor identities and interests are in large part viewed as constructed by those 
structures. Therefore, since importance is given to socially constructed 
“meanings” and to causal mechanisms that construct and promote collective 
actor’s identities this approach offers interesting “interpretative understanding 
with causal explanation” (Lapid, 1996: 133). The priority that is given to culture 
and social identity and intersubjective “meaning” to explain the problem of 
collective action in international relations is the main contribution of this 
approach. By pointing to social identity, as a key link in both the mutual 
constitution of agent and structure and in the way agents relate to each other, 
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this approach helps our understanding of social aspects of ethno-national 
conflict. Further details about Wendt’s contribution to our understanding of 
ethno-national conflict are discussed while looking at the case of the Kosovo/a 
conflict in Chapter 6. 
 
 
3.2. The Copenhagen School’s Approach and War.  
 
Many scholars view nationalism and its equivalent, namely, nation-state ideal, 
as one of the several sources of instability in world politics. The process of 
matching state with nation has been crucial and the source of many wars in 
Europe aimed to get a close correlation between the state and the nation. In 
Western Europe this process seems to be almost exhausted while in Central 
and Eastern Europe and in other parts of the world this process is still in an 
earlier phase (Larabee, 1990/1991; Sugar, 1995; Todorova, 1995, 1997; 
Schopflin, 2000). So, nationalism and identity issues are to be seen at the root 
of violence. However, explanations about identity and its role in collective 
actions have been founded wanting in International Relations before the end of 
Cold War.  
 
In defining and explaining the dynamics of current international 
relations different perspectives other than the state-centred ones need to be 
adopted. The changing practices of conflict in world politics during the 1990s, 
 131 
according to Copenhagen School scholars42 revealed that these dynamics "can 
be brought out by a constellation made up of at least three kinds of (non-like) 
units: states, nations and the EU” (Buzan and Wæver, 1997: 249). The 
approach of the Copenhagen School scholars came as a theoretical challenge 
to classical state-centric approaches in International Relations. These scholars 
deal with issues such as nationalism and ethno-national conflict using a new 
theoretical conceptualisation of identity-security issues. For Wæver, et al., 
(1993) “society” is about identity. At the same time, society is seen as the 
referent object of security. This is the case because as Buzan and Wæver 
argue: 
‘Societies’ defined in terms of identity could be seen as the referent object for 
some cases of securitisation, where that which could be lost was not sovereignty 
but identity. The two share the role of being the definition of existential threat: for a 
state, sovereignty defines when a threat is existential, because if a state is no 
longer sovereign, it is no longer a state; and similarly identity is the defining point 
regarding existential threats for a society because it defines whether ‘we’ are still 
us (1997: 242). 
 
However, the state in this approach is not dismissed as a referent object of 
security. Hence, both society and the state are considered referent objects of 
security, both assuming the same importance in explaining security problems. 
 
Why is society chosen as referent object of analysis of security? This 
choice is justified based on the fact that “societal insecurities” over ethnic, 
national and religious identities have become as important as “national 
                                                                                             
 
42
 The Copenhagen School was named as such for the first time by Bill McSeeeney (1996). The 
Copenhagen School acknowledges the collective work of Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Pierre 
Lemaitre, Morten Kelstrup, Jaap de Wilde, Haakan Wiberg, Ula Holms, Bjorn Moler and many 
others that for reasons of space can not be all mentioned here. 
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insecurities.” Hence, this scholarship looks about nationalism and identity 
implication on security issues. So, the societal security like national security in 
traditional approaches is considered as an important mobilising force for 
collective action including war and peace in international relations. In this case, 
security is cast as an issue of the survival of society, which, in turn, is defined in 
identity terms (Wæver et al., 1993).  
 
 Furthermore, the dynamics of the events in the post-Cold War era, 
have demonstrated according to Copenhagen School’s scholars, that in many 
cases, the state, instead of being the protector of its citizens’ rights, has become 
a source of threat to them (Moller, 2000). This situation of insecurity in many 
cases is expected to lead to conflict that need to be studied and state seems not 
the right referent object of analysis. For the scholars of this approach, the 
current dynamics of world politics have revealed, “society detached from the 
state” (Buzan and Wæver, 1997: 248). Therefore, society is to be seen as a 
referent object of security and for the same reason of conflict as well. 
 
By this choice, at the same time, the Copenhagen School scholars 
seem to be looking for a concept of security that is not reduced at the individual 
level or “negating state security” (Wæver et al., 1993: 24).  In Wæver’ words: 
Whenever security is defined via individual security there is a high risk that the 
core of the classical security problematic which one is allegedly trying to redefine, 
not forget, will be missed. A new agenda may be set successfully only at the price 
of losing one’s grip on something, which is also very real: the specific type of 
interplay among human collectivities, which follows the logic of security. This 
classical logic can neither be studied nor avoided by measuring how secure 
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individuals are. Security in this sense is a collective phenomenon and the way 
these collectivities relate is a trait of the system (1993: 24). 
 
Wæver’s position is not much different from the one of Buzan in his book 
Peoples, States and Fears. Buzan argues: “[t]o pursue individual security as a 
subject in its own right would take one deeply into the realm of politics, 
psychology and sociology” (1991: 35). Buzan, in contrast to his previous state-
centric approach to security that is central to his seminal book People, States 
and Fear, redefined his position in his later works, by dropping the state as the 
only referent object of security. He argues for his change as follows:  “[w]e argue 
that what is or is not prime in international security, including the state, depends 
on historical conditions” (Buzan and Wæver, 1997: 249). So, the Copenhagen 
School scholars would present this change as an answer to the dynamics of 
conflict in contemporary politics, which have encouraged according to them, 
transcending the individual and state levels of analysis. This is the case because 
conflict is a collective action that cannot be the responsibility of the individuals 
although they are the subjects that experience its violence. 
 
Although, this approach does not deal explicitly with the case of 
ethno-national conflict, its theoretical underpinnings can offer interesting insights 
that would help our understanding of ethno-national conflict, since  society can 
be considered as a referent object of analysis.43 In this approach, the state and 
                                                                                             
 
43
 Wæver provides a more detailed explanation of the choice of society and state as a referent 
object of security in his article “Securitization and Desecuritization” (1995: 53-54). 
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society are seen as autonomous actors that stand for the political will of their 
members.  
 
 
3.2.1. Society, Societal Identity, Societal Security and War 
 
The Copenhagen School’s approach points to concepts such as society and 
societal identity to examine security issues in contemporary international 
relations. These concepts can be used to study ethno-national conflict as well, 
since security issues and conflict seem to be interrelated. In Buzan’s terms 
“societies are fundamentally about identity. They are about what enables a 
group of peoples to refer to themselves as ‘we’” (1993: 5-6). In Ole Wæver’s 
words: “[s]urvival for a society is a question of identity, because this is the way a 
society talks about existential threats: if this happens, we will no longer be able 
to live as us” (1993, 25-26). This charge has a somewhat double-edged quality 
emphasising both the continuing importance of preserving the processes and 
practices that construct peoples’ and groups’ self-image and perpetuating at the 
same time their existence. So, society is to be understood in terms of identity 
and security is to be seen as presuming the need for identity preservation. 
 
 Wæver distinguishes between the definition of societal identity and its 
political usage. He defines societal identity in function of ethnicity and religion. 
The reason for this choice is justified by the fact that they “have acquired 
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prominence...because of their historical association with the development of the 
modern state” and have created well-established structures of representation 
that in time remains almost unchanged (Wæver, 1993: 23). Different from the 
number of social identities that a group is supposed to have, national identity is 
considered in this approach as the most important collective identity that 
challenges all other kinds of identities.  
 
 Wæver writes: “national identity is usually able to organise the other 
identities around itself” (1993: 22). That is because, national identity is viewed 
as the glue that bind peoples together when facing vulnerabilities caused by 
scarcity, violence and quest for a self-positive image, which generate 
respectively “interests of physical security, recognition by the other actors, and 
economic development” (Adler, 1997: 252). In such a case, national identity 
acquires a primordial character that marks common loyalties, which, in turn, 
have the capacity to mobilise for collective actions based on general collective 
approval. 
 
 In the definition of national identity, Wæver draws upon Anthony 
Smith. Smith defines a nation as “a named human population sharing an historic 
territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a 
common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members” (1991: 
14). Wæver sees nationality as a manifestation of societal identity and shared 
property of the group based on cultural, linguistic, religious and ethnic ties.  
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 Furthermore, the Copenhagen School’s scholars view identity as “an 
intersubjectivity constituted value” that stands at the base of society (Buzan and 
Wæver, 1997: 245). For them, identity is constituted in the process of 
interactions among a nation’s people, which with time precipitate in a common 
identification, which patterns would be hardly malleable in normal conditions. 
Accordingly, identity is to be understood as being “the same throughout the 
period relevant for an analysis...Identities as other social constructions can 
petrify and become relatively constant elements to be reckoned with” (1997: 
245). This approach is considered by Buzan and Wæver (1997) as  
[a] social constructivist position ‘all the way down’…that focuses on how the very 
security quality is always socially constructed: issues are not security issues by 
themselves, but defined as such as a result of political processes (Buzan and 
Wæver, 1997: 243).  
 
Yet, for them identity can change in time by the redefinition of the “self” and the 
“other.” Hence, change is to be seen as contingent upon a new circle of 
interactions. However, for research purposes, Wæver proposes to see identity 
as fixed at the moment of analysis. This position is not any different from the one 
presented by Wendt (1996, 1999).  
 
 At the same time, Wæver looks at the political significance of societal 
identity to explain the security problems of the post-Cold War period. He later 
uses this aspect of identity to explain “securitisation,” which is discussed in the 
next section. For Wæver, the political significance of societal identity should be 
seen in its ability to be a referent object of security. As Wæver argues: 
Societal identity is the one that is not only robust in construction and 
comprehensive enough in its following, but also broad enough in the quality of 
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identity it carries, to enable it to compete with the territorial state as a political 
organizing principle. A societal identity is able to reproduce itself independently 
from the state and even in opposition to the state’s organizational 
principle…societal identities provide legitimacy for governments, and partly 
contradictory, as when societal division provide the basis for assaults on 
governmental legitimacy and authority (1993: 23). 
 
To assess the causes of ethno-national conflict, then we should scrutinize the 
nature of threats to societal identity to define the nature of security problems that 
could lead to conflict. Society as a referent object of security draws on a 
complex combination of material/physical and sociological/emotional needs. 
First, society is expected to satisfy the individuals’ needs of survival and well-
being. Second, it provides the possibilities for development and improvement. 
Thus, societal identity is seen implying the creation and the preservation of the 
conditions in which the members could develop and be safe. Threats to society’s 
social and physical conditions, which might be translated as threats to its 
survival, are viewed as having negative consequences, which may even justify 
the emergence of conflict. 
 
 In this approach, the examination of the nature of relations between 
state and society is seen as being helpful in the identification of the sources of 
the security problems. In the case state and society match each other; the 
relation between the two would serve, according to Buzan (1991), the 
consolidation of state’s social cohesion, which contributes, at the same time, to 
the reproduction without problem of state and society identity that has 
sovereignty as its ultimate criterion. In that, Buzan is in agreement with Wendt’s 
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(1999) claims about the constructed nature of international politics and the role 
of state’s social identity in behaviour. 
  
 In the case that the state does not match with society than the 
interactions between the two can be problematic. Then, “society” is to be seen 
as representing a potential opponent to the state. In this case, as Pierr Hassner 
argues, the state of citizenship “is being jeopardized by the trend towards 
national, sub-national and ethnic re-territorialisation” (1993: 129). The claims of 
different ethno-national groups for self-determination in the face of oppression 
from the state, would explain the emergence of conflicts involving disputes over 
autonomy as a challenge to state's sovereignty.  
 
 Threats to societal identity some time assume the form of ethnic 
cleansing even genocide (that aims to cause irreparable damages to the 
“other”). In extreme cases the objective of such actors is aiming at the 
elimination of the “other’s” existence. This explains why civilians, women, 
children and youth are chosen as targets for ethnic cleansing. In this case, the 
security of society is seen as related with the preservation of identity, defined as 
the process that constructs peoples and groups self-image and perpetuates their 
existence (Wæver, 1993: 25). Hence, identity is to be understood as an 
important determinant for the security of the group since, as Schopflin suggests: 
“identity offers individuals the security of community and solidarity of shared 
patterns of meanings, a bounded world in which to live and in which one can find 
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others like oneself” (2000: 10). Accordingly, identity is seen as a mechanism that 
provides for security; this is why it receives importance vis-à-vis the “other.”  
 
Threats to societal identity are expected to be manifested with “the 
collapse of the state monopoly on the use of force and recognize social relations 
which forces an ethnicisation of society” (Schoch, 2001: 57). So, threats to 
society and societal identity are to be seen as creating a “societal security” 
problem. Wæver defines the concept as such: 
[s]ocietal security concerns the ability of a society to persist in its essential 
character under changing conditions and possible or acute threats. More 
specifically, it is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, 
of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national 
identity and custom (1993: 23). 
 
Buzan and Wæver, by introducing the concept of “societal security,” offer an 
understanding of identity that makes it operational and helpful to study ethno-
national conflict. To understand the dynamic of conflict this approach would 
suggest to scrutinise the security and societal identity interaction. The societal 
identity as the social glue that binds members of society together operates at 
two levels, which vary in terms of outwards distinguishability and resistance to 
threats. For Wæver, the outwards distinguishability reflects upon the intrinsic 
characteristics of the group that are expected to persist over time and resist 
change, which for Wendt are embedded on actor’s ”corporate identity.” Societal 
identity presumes also differences that depend on intersubjective 
understandings of the group and the “other.” Differences do not self-generate 
security problems. Differences can be source of richness, dynamism and 
progress or vice versa depending on negotiated interests and collective norms, 
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which are viewed as congruent to mutual responsiveness of the independent 
agents.  
 
 In this approach identity becomes a referent object of security when it 
is used as a political leverage that mirrors conflicts of interest on the 
preservation of power dominance and established structures of relationships, 
which might take the form of a “security dilemma.” In difference with the 
traditional “security dilemma,” “societal security dilemma” develops out of 
ideational rather than material processes. Thus, the actors while competing to 
strengthen their societal identity would escalate a “security dilemma,” which, in 
turn, would lead to conflict (Bilgin, 2003). A more detailed contribution of this 
approach to our understanding of ethno-national conflict is discussed while 
looking at the Kosovo/a conflict. However, to better understand the dynamics of 
this “security dilemma,” we have to see what Copenhagen School can tell about 
the “securitisation” process and the role it plays in the dynamics of conflict. 
 
 
3.2.2. Operationalising Societal Identity: “Securitisation” and War 
 
The Copenhagen School’s approach points to the concept of “securitisation” to 
explain the dynamics of the contemporary security issues. “Securitisation” is to 
be seen as a process that “takes politics beyond the established rules of the 
game and frames an issue either as a special kind of politics or as above 
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politics” (Buzan et al., 1998: 23). This approach looks at security as a practice of 
social interaction. To cite Wæver, security is: 
[a] specific field of social interactions, with a specific set of actions and codes, 
known by a set of agents as the security field…National security is simply social in 
the sense of being constructed intersubjectively in a specific field, and it should not 
be measured against some real or true yardstick of ‘security’ derived from 
(contemporary) domestic society (1995: 51). 
 
Wæver defines “securitisation” as a “speech act” through which an actor intends 
“by uttering security…to move a particular development into a specific area, and 
there by claims a specific right to use whatever means are necessary to block it” 
(1995: 55). So, by labelling a particular development as a security problem, it 
became a security issue. Wæver (1995, 1998) presents the “speech act” as a 
domestic discursive process used by elites (of state or society) rather than other 
actors (Wæver, 1995: 54) to achieve pre-defined political goals. 
 
“Securitisation” is to be seen as a process that relies on arguments 
that make reference to the survival of the actor (state or society). However, the 
questions of survival need not necessarily be of a military nature and an actor 
need not necessary be the state. The Copenhagen School’s scholars view 
society as equally important as the state, and referent object of security. To 
explain the causes of conflict this approach would suggest to study the process 
through which a chosen development is claimed as a serious security threat to 
the very existence of the actor and how an appropriate audience accepts this 
threat. In this context, conflict would be explained as the response of the 
“securitising actor” (Roe, 1999: 196, footnote 21) to the claimed threat. 
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Accordingly, conflict is to be viewed as the end result of a successful 
“securitisation” process.  
 
Different from traditional power politics explanations that emphasise 
the material aspects of power in explaining behaviour, the Copenhagen School’s 
approach emphasises the causal role of the “speech act.” In the 
conceptualisation of the “speech act,” the contextual and intersubjective 
character of security issues is emphasised. Following the earlier explanations 
about the fact that the identity of the actors is seen as petrified at the moment of 
analysis, the accounts of the “speech act” define security as a question of 
survival, and identity as a determinant of society. In this approach, identity alone 
does not define threats to actors’ existence, however it can “be the definition of 
external threats” (Buzan and Wæver, 1997: 242).  
 
To explain ethno-national conflict, the Copenhagen School’s approach 
would suggest to study the process of the successful “securitisation” of the 
ethnic aspects of identity. “Securitization” is to be understood as the strategy 
used to create rather than respond to threats (Gagnon, 1994/1995: 194-195). 
However, successful “securitisation” is not seen as a process where actors are 
free to do what they choose to do. In this approach, the “speech act” elements 
should reflect upon a “specific rhetorical [social] structure” that facilitates the 
conditions for the ‘securitisation’ of a claim” (Buazan at al. 1998: 26). In that the 
Copenhagen School is in agreement with Wendt that social structures (culture) 
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“shape actors’ identities and interests, rather than just their behaviour” (1999: 
71).  
 
In the “securitisation” process, the narratives in the “speech act” are 
suggested to be exploiting ethnic differences to create a political context in 
which the interests of the actors are claimed to be in danger. The other aspects 
of identity are silenced in this created environment. Thus, in the case of images 
of threat to the nation, a context where actor’s ethnicity is all that matters is 
expected to be created and other identities are not considered relevant. By 
using the “securitization” process to provoke conflict the ruling elite creates the 
possibility for repositioning itself and receive advantages that would have been 
unthinkable in “normal” politics when identity was un-problematised. 
  
In the case of “normal” politics the rationalist models that hold identity 
and interest constant might fare well in explaining actor’s behaviour. However, 
these models do not hold in the case identities are securitised. Differently from 
the traditional rationalist approaches, Copenhagen School’s approach by looking 
at the “securitisation” processes that put the pre-existing identities in a 
discursive practice is able to tell us how identity is translated into behaviour in 
the current practices of conflict. 
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3.2.3. The Copenhagen School’s Approach and War: An Assessment 
 
The Copenhagen School offers a comprehensive theoretical framework for the 
understanding of ethno-national conflict. This approach by pointing to societal 
identity and security would explain conflict as emerging from an escalated 
“security dilemma” that is build on actors’ competing identities. Like Wendt, this 
approach points to identity, which is viewed as socially constructed in the 
process of interaction to analyse behaviour. Differently from Wendt, this 
approaches focuses to one aspect of international relations, that of security. On 
the other hand, society is seen to be about identity, which refers to ethnic and 
religious loyalties. The contrast with Wendt, who takes states as the object of 
analysis, is pronounced in the introduction of the society as a referent object of 
analysis. This framework fits better the changing practices in international 
relations and opens the way for the study of ethnic and national conflict in a 
more comprehensive way. 
 
The other contribution of this approach is its constructivism, which is 
similar to the one of Wendt. So, the “shared meanings” are considered to be 
created in the process of actors’ interactions and be responsible for actor’s 
behaviour. The Copenhagen School’s approach introduces beside societal 
identity the concept of “securitisation,” which explains the process through which 
identity is translated into behaviour, and helps our understanding of the 
dynamics of contemporary security problems and conflict. 
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Nevertheless, we need to be aware of this approach’s weaknesses. In 
the Copenhagen School approach society is presented as a referent object of 
analysis on equal footing with the state. This association of “society” with “state” 
according to Lapid and Kratochwil runs the risk of “leading us straight back to a 
narrow statist matrix” (1996: 119). This is the case, because identity in this 
approach is assumed as identifying the group and being little more than mutual 
recognition of ‘like’ units interacting in a system” (Lapid and Kratochwil, 1996: 
119). For Bill McSweeney, the objective definition of the concept of society and 
identity in the Copenhagen School approach assumes “the same objectivity and 
ontological status as the state” (1999: 90). Being in the same line with Wendt, 
this understanding does not allow us to understand the intra-group interaction 
dynamics, which can be a source of conflict. Therefore, society as a referent 
object can be criticised with the same arguments as the state-centric 
approaches and be responsible for hiding some of the sources of tensions that 
can be the cause of current ethno-national conflict. This argument prepared the 
ground for the following critique.  
 
 Second, for McSweeney, societal identity in the Copenhagen School 
approach just identifies society. Identity as a cognitive concept “is stressed to 
the point that loses sight of an essential material feature of all questions of 
security and identity formation” that is interests (McSweeney, 1999: 126). For 
McSweeney, this approach fails to give a proper role to interests in the 
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perception of security issues and the definition and transformation of collective 
identity.  
 
 In the Copenhagen School approach as in the case of Wendt, 
interests are subordinated to identity following the logic of structure’s primacy 
over agency. McSweeney claims the opposite. For him, “[t]he range of interests 
available to us can cause us to reinvent the social identity appropriate to them” 
(McSweeney, 1999: 127). Wendt’s and the Copenhagen School’s assumption 
about identity dismiss the primacy of interests over identity. However, 
McSweeney thinks that actor’s interests should have almost the same weight in 
explaining behaviour in international relations. Therefore, this assumption would 
ask to see the causes of conflict behind actors’ interests constituted in the 
process of interaction.  
 
 Furthermore, in the Copenhagen School approach, society is defined 
as a function of “a single value and interest” (McSweeney, 1999: 90). This 
conceptualisation, for McSweeney may excuse racist claims or ethnic 
cleansings, by allocating identities in an “ontological hierarchy” that, is not 
admissible and permissible for a society that speak for the respect and equality 
of human rights. In this case, as McSweeney argues, “the security is not there 
because peoples have separate identities, it may be well the case that they have 
separate identities because of the security problem” (1999: 73). This underlines 
the fact that identity not only shapes behaviour and interests, but it is also 
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shaped by interests. From that it can be assumed that conflict should not only be 
expected out of conflicting or competing identities as it would be the case in 
Wendt’s and the Copenhagen School’s approaches explanations. Hence, 
interests for McSweeney would have the potential to transform otherness in 
exclusivist terms; therefore, they should be equally considered to explain 
conflict. 
 
 
This chapter looked at what Wendt's and Copenhagen School's approaches can 
tell us about ethno-national conflict. Both approaches offer a constructivist and 
structuralist approach to war, which allow for a combined interpretative and 
causal explanation of behaviour. This framework can easily be applied to study 
conflict. Hence, conflict in these approaches is to be understood as a socially 
constructed practice developing out of the shared meanings of participants. At 
the same time, conflict recurrence is to be seen depending on the properties of 
the structure that are identity (social identity for Wendt and societal identity for 
the Copenhagen School) and culture, although, neither approaches specially 
relies on the concept of culture (Pasic, 1996: 85). Conflict is to be understood as 
a social practice embedded on actors’ collective knowledge about one another. 
 
There are two problems with both approaches that are related with 
their conceptualisation of identity and actor-centrism. Both approaches look at 
identity (socially constructed and petrified at the moment of the analysis) and 
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culture to explain collective behaviour in international relations. These 
approaches assume an established conflictual relationship, which would be hard 
to change, which justify, at the same time the idea of the recurrence of the 
conflict in time.  
 
At the same time, the actor-centrism prevents both approaches from 
recognising tensions within the unit of analysis, which can provide guidance for 
understanding alternative sources of conflict. Although, actor-centrism is a 
general weakness of both approaches their constructivism and structuralism 
allow us to develop interesting accounts of the social aspects of the conflict 
neglected from the other approaches. These constructivist approaches are used 
to study Kosovo/a conflict in Chapter 6. 
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Part II: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES AND THE 
KOSOVO/A CONFLICT. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
Traditional International Relations Theories and the Kosovo/a 
Conflict 
 
 
 
The traditional approaches of International Relations discussed in Chapter 1 
offer alternative principles that can be used to look at the Kosovo/a conflict. 
Chapter 4 presents the explanations that traditional approaches offer to the 
Kosovo/a conflict in three sections. The first section examines what Realism can 
tell us about the Kosovo/a conflict. Realism would point to power as the 
underlying cause of the Kosovo/a conflict. The second section discusses 
Rationalism and assesses its contribution to our understanding of the Kosovo/a 
conflict. By looking at order Rationalism would allows us to account for the 
intersubjectively shared definitions of the Kosovo/a conflict in the society of 
states. The third section assesses the contribution of Revolutionism in 
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explaining the case study. Revolutionism refers to emancipation to examine the 
Kosovo/a conflict. This chapter concludes by summarising the contribution of 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in explaining the Kosovo/a conflict. 
 
 
4.1. Realism and the Kosovo/a Conflict 
 
Realism would explain the Kosovo/a conflict by looking at Serbia’s power 
(classical Realism) and security (neo-Realism) interests. In the realist 
interpretations of conflict, Serbia is understood as a rational unitary unit. Hence, 
the Kosovo/a conflict would be resulting from Serbian leadership’s efforts to 
manipulate power and opportunities with the aim of preserving and 
strengthening its dominant position vis-à-vis the other states of the region.44 This 
section discusses both classical realist and neo-realist approaches to conflict. It 
concludes with some remarks on the weaknesses of Realism to our 
understanding of the Kosovo/a conflict.  
 
 
4.1.1. Classical Realism and the Kosovo/a Conflict 
 
Classical Realism would interpret the Kosovo/a conflict by pointing to the state 
of Serbia and its power as defined in military terms. Thus, the conflict in 
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Kosovo/a is to be seen resulting from the efforts of Serbian leadership to 
maximise power. A stronger Serbia, according to classical Realism, stands the 
best chance for survival and for securing its borders. By pointing to power and 
the efforts of Serbia to maximise it, realist scholars would explain wars that 
ravaged Yugoslavia including the conflict in Kosovo/a as Serbia’s state wars 
(Cigar, 1995: 62-85; Caratan, 1997: 293-296). To cite Branko Caratan, “[t]he 
conflict did not have the characteristics of a civil war because Serbian state 
planned, organized, armed and supplied the war in all parts of Yugoslavia” 
(1997: 294).45 
 
Explaining conflict by referring to power, realist accounts draw 
attention to the fact that nowadays, the acquisition of power is a difficult job for 
the state. As Ronnie D. Lipschutz argues “[w]ithin a liberal framework, efforts to 
capture power are now seen as internationally legitimate only if they occur 
through some form of nominally democratic electoral process” (1998: 51). By 
applying this reasoning to the Yugoslav case it can be concluded that the lack of 
inherited democratic structures and practices would exclude from Serbia the 
possibility of acquiring power through normal electoral processes.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
44
 Works that explain the conflict from this perspective include: Mearsheimer (1990), Banac 
(1992), Cigar (1995), Caratan (1997), Judah (1997), Lipschutz (1998) and Aybet (2000). 
45
 The idea of the Serb guilt is contestable. Serbs cannot be blamed for all that happened in 
Yugoslavia. Yet, “the Serbian leadership must take the lion’s share of the blame” (Judah, 1997: 
75) because as Tim Judah explains they acted first.  
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However, from a realist perspective the efforts of the political 
leadership to create “a state of one’s own” are to be viewed as “another strategy 
available to those seeking power and control” (Lipschutz, 1998: 51). Under this 
strategy “[i]f one cannot capture power within an existing state, why not create a 
new one, within which one’s brethren or associates in political belief do 
constitute a majority” (Lipschutz, 1998: 51). Accordingly, realist approaches 
would understand Serbia’s efforts of building a “state of it’s own,” as an act of 
maximising power and strength. At the same time, this effort has to be seen as 
the underlying cause that led Serbia to get involved in the Kosovo/a conflict. 
 
The intentions of Serbian elite to maximise Serbia’s power through the 
creation of a “state of one’s own” can be seen in the slogan “all Serbs in one 
state” that was issued at the start of the Yugoslav conflicts in the early 1990s. 
Hence, Serbian leadership’s involvement in the four consequent wars46 and 
policies of centralisation within both the Federation and Serbia proper (resulting 
in the removal of the autonomous region status from Kosovo/a and Vojvodina) 
would make sense for realist scholars if this actions are interpreted in terms of 
power (Ramet, 1992; Banac, 1992; Cigar, 1995; Caratan, 1997; Anastasijevic, 
2000; Pavkovic, 2001).  
 
                                                                                             
 
46
 The Serb-Croat war in Croatia, Serb-Moslem and the Serb-Croat wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and the Serb-Albanian war in Serbia. Except for the Kosovo/a case, Serbia did not wage all the 
wars directly. In the other wars Serbia was supporting Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
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Hence, Serbia’s support for Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and in a direct way its involvement in Kosovo/a are seen in a realist perspective 
as state's efforts to maximise power. Power of Serbia is expected to be 
maximised by including detached territories inhabited by ethnic Serbs from the 
other republics of Yugoslavia (the Srbska Republic from Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Krajina from Croatia) and keeping under control the adjacent territories such 
as Kosovo/a and Vojvodina although a Serbian majority was not present (Cigar, 
1995; Caratan, 1997; Anastasijevic, 2000). Hence, including all the Serbs living 
in Yugoslavia in one state means the creation of a state twice in number and 
territory of what is the present Serbia. To cite Tim Judah, the wars in Yugoslavia 
were waged in order to establish Serbia as “the strongest nation in the region to 
lead and dominate” (1997: 59) the other nations next to its borders.  
 
Classical realist explanations for Serbia’s behaviour and the conflict in 
Kosovo/a can be summarized as follows. The demand of the Albanians for the 
secession of Kosovo/a is to be understood as a threat to the power of the 
Serbian state. This threat is to be seen as magnified by similar demands for 
secession in Vojvodina and Sandjak by the Hungarians and the Muslim 
minorities respectively (Clement, 1997). Hence, the dissolution of Yugoslavia, 
which left territories inhabited by Serbs outside Serbia’s borders, and serious 
problems in Kosovo/a with the Albanians, would justify from a realist 
perspective, Serbian leadership’s concerns regarding its power. In this context 
the use of military force to establish a state of all Serbs is to be expected, since 
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Serbia is viewed as having military superiority compared to the other republics. 
This superiority is based on the accounts that the Yugoslav army was under 
Serbia’s control (Larrabee, 1990/1991; Caratan, 1997; Aybet, 2000; Dérens, 
2003).47 The decision of Serbia’s leadership to wage war in Kosovo/a and other 
parts of Yugoslavia for Realism at the same time is to be viewed as a rational 
calculation of Serbia’s national interests in terms of power.  
 
 
4.1.2. Neo-Realism and the Kosovo/a Conflict 
 
The neo-realist approach points to both the end of bipolarity and the return of 
multipolarity in the international system to explain the increase in frequency of 
ethno-national conflicts such as the Kosovo/a case (Mearsheimer, 1990). 
According to neo-realists scholars, during Cold War (bipolar system), security 
threats in international relations were limited to the ones coming from the 
confrontation of the two superpowers. In this case the two super-powers are 
viewed as successfully containing, even suppressing, all other kind of threats in 
international politics. Hence, to use John Mearsheimer’s words, during the Cold 
War Yugoslavia is to be seen as being “secure from [the] other as well as from 
attack by the rival great powers” (1990: 3). So, in the condition of bipolarity, each 
                                                                                             
 
47
 In the framework of the legal dissolution of Yugoslavia, the equal distribution of assets of the 
dissolving Federation to the successor states did not apply to the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) 
(Aybet, 2000). Therefore, the Serbs inherited the lion’s share of the Yugoslav army and 
controlled it through the officers’ corps and non-commissioned officers 70 percent of whom were 
Serbs (Caratan, 1997: 295; Larrabee, 1990/1991: 71). 
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superpower, while looking to take the Yugoslav Federation under its own sphere 
of influence, is expected to have protected Yugoslavia from different threats.  
 
In a bipolar system, neo-Realism views states’ choices to acquire, 
increase and project power as being limited. According to Mearsheimer, under 
these circumstances, states “no longer providing for their own security lacked 
the incentive to whip up nationalism to bolster public support for national 
defence” (1990: 6). Yugoslavia, in the neo-realists’ view, represents a good 
example for this assumption. The transition of the international system from 
bipolarity to multipolarity is to be understood as the underlying cause of the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia. 
 
The neo-realist perspective would understand multipolarity as the 
cause of the main pathologies of Yugoslavia and Serbia’s wars. To cite John 
Major:  
The biggest single element behind what has happened in Bosnia is the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and of the discipline that exerted over the ancient hatreds in the 
old Yugoslavia. Once that discipline had disappeared, those ancient hatreds 
reappeared, and we began to see their consequences when the fighting occurred 
(John Major as cited by Malcolm, 1995: 5). 
 
The neo-realist approach would explain Serbia’s behaviour as being motivated 
by “expectations about future trends and assessments of the likely effects of 
today’s policies on tomorrow’s distribution of power resources” (Wohlforth, 1993: 
98). Following this logic, the crumbling of the Yugoslav Federation would 
account for Serbia’s worries about its security and power. Haakan Wiberg 
articulates these frustrations as follows “the Yugoslav project and the Greater 
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Serbia project were…complementary to each other” providing “two basic 
guarantees important for the Serbian nation: the protection of Serb identity and 
safety under the Federation coverage” (1993: 100; see, also, Banac, 1992). This 
account suggests that the perception of multiple threats emanating from the 
dissolution of Yugoslav Federation is expected to fuel Serbia’s “security 
dilemma,” which would explain Serbia’s engagement in war(s) of last resort. 
Hence, Milosevic’s efforts to seize control of the Yugoslav Federation through 
policies of centralisation in the framework of the Federation and Serbia proper48 
should be explained in the light of the "security dilemma" accelerated in the 
condition of multipolarity.49 
 
Furthermore, the neo-realist perspective explains that multipolar 
system imposes upon states greater threats than the bipolar one. The multipolar 
system is expected to encourage states’ search for zones of influence as an 
effort of establishing the balance of power. In this unstable environment the 
possibilities for the recurrence of war are considered to be high (Mearsheimer, 
1990; Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989; Kupchan, 1998). The great powers’ policies 
in the pursuit of zones of influence in the Balkans and the bandwagoning of the 
states of the region, in the condition of multipolarity, would be considered in a 
neo-realist perspective as the underlying causes of conflict. 
 
                                                                                             
 
48
 For Milosevic’s policies of centralisation see, for example Cigar (1995), Caratan (1997), Judah 
(1997), Pavkovic (2000). 
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The credibility of these explanations is supported in the neo-realist 
accounts by drawing parallels between the post-Cold War situation and the one  
before World War I (WWI) in Europe and in the Balkans. That is, before WWI, 
the Balkan actors were manipulating opportunities to increase their power by 
using the card of nationalism50 and alliances with the great powers of that time. 
The great powers of Europe were dragged into region’s affairs to help drawing 
the borders of the region. But their contribution is viewed as reflecting their geo-
strategic interests in the region as opposed to the interests of regional states 
(Danopoulos and Messas, 1997). Nationalism combined with great power rivalry 
at the international and regional levels in the condition of multipolarity are to be 
seen as the plausible causes of the Balkan’s wars in late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries that later led the whole of Europe into WWI (Toynbee, 1923; 
Seton-Watson, 1935).51 In this accounts nationalism is understood in 
instrumental terms. It is seen as the ideology that is used to either mobilise an 
army (Mearsheimer, 1992; Posen, 1993) or change the redistribution of territory. 
The consequences of nationalism are viewed as affecting the distribution of 
power in the region and challenging the established balance of power at the 
regional and international level that is accounted for as the underlying cause of 
WWI. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
49
 We are obliged to refer to both Yugoslavia and Serbia, the first one for the Cold War period 
and the later for after the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation.  
50
 Posen (1993) also, views nationalism as a strategy of the nation aiming to boost and project 
groups’ power.  
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Through drawing parallels with a previous multipolar period in world 
history, neo-realists scholars would like to give credibility to their explanations 
about the causes of wars in Yugoslavia (Larrabee, 1990/91; Mearsheimer, 
1990). Accordingly, neo-realist scholars would pointing to the political games of  
the current great powers, which saw the need to be active in the Balkans in 
order to protect their own interests and “pursue a relative power advantage over 
the other states” (Desch, 1996: 361), as the underlying cause of the Kosovo/a 
conflict. 
 
In these explanations the support of Germany and the United States 
(US) for the Kosova Liberating Army (KLA)52 and their siding with the Albanians 
in the Rambouillet negotiations53 are to be understood as affecting the balance 
of power in the region. The alliance of the US with the Albanians of Kosovo/a is 
to be understood in the light of American interests in the region. Hence, some 
observes suggested that Kosovo/a represent the US’s zone of influence in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
51
 See, also, Todorova (1997: 116-139) for a more detailed account of the literature that blames 
the rivalry and nationalism of the Balkan’s states for causing WWI.  
52 According to the data of transnational peace organizations, the German intelligence first, then 
the US Central Intelligence Agency, CIA and private mercenary companies, did their utmost to 
make the KLA a forceful actor in the province from 1993 onwards. See, also, for more details in 
this issue: Oberg (2000), Chossudovsky (1999). 
53
 The first round of Rambouillet negotiations was held on 6-23 February 1999. The second 
round was held from 15 to 18 March 1999. Only the Kosovo/a Albanian representatives signed 
the Peace Agreement. The Agreement had five main points: immediate cessation of violence; 
the withdrawal of FRY military, policy and paramilitary forces from Kosovo/a; the stationing in 
Kosovo/a of an international military force led by NATO; the safe return of all civilians and 
displaced peoples; political solution for the autonomy of Kosovo/a. Different sources claim that 
the text of the agreement was prepared in such a way that was going to receive a “yes” from the 
Albanians and a “no” from the Serbs. This situation is expected to establish Kosovo/a as an 
American zone of influence. The Albanians are considered to serve American interest in the 
region Oberg (2000), Chossudovsky (1999). 
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Balkans. The construction of Bonsteal Air Base in Kosovo/a that can replace 
Aviano Air Base in Italy (one of the primary European airfields of the U.S. Air 
Force) can be mentioned among other facts in the support of raised assumption. 
Hence, the US allying with the Kosovo/a’s Albanians to the disfavour of the 
Serbs (Oberg, 2000; Chossudovsky, 1999) should be seen as an action that 
disrupted the balance of power in the region, as such, it can be seen as an 
underlying cause of violence.  
 
On the other hand, Russia’s alignment with Serbia is to be understood 
in the framework of Russia’s policies of extending zones of influence in the 
Balkans (Levitin, 2000: 131).54 The duration of NATO’s air campaign in 
Kosovo/a for 78 days, is to be assessed in this perspective as an example that 
show how the alliance between Russia and Serbia55 translated in terms of 
power did shape the behaviour of the latter. 
                                                                                             
 
54 Different sources claim that Russia favoured a close relationship with Milosevic’s regime. First, 
it is mentioned the special relationship developed between Russian military intelligence and the 
Belgrade regime. Second, the exchanges of visits between Moscow and Belgrade high officials 
that became more frequent on the eve of the Kosovo/a conflict, including the visit of Milosevic to 
Moscow and his meeting with Yeltsin in June 1998, are mentioned as being of relevance for this 
relationship (Reuters, 21 June 1998). Furthermore, calls for saving Slav kinship and the creation 
of a Pan-Slavic Union drafted by the Committee on Legislation, Judicial and Legal Reform and 
its Committee on International Affairs of the Russian Duma, but ever approved, is accounted as 
another aspect of this close relationship (Reuters News Service, 06 November 1998). In the 
neo-realist perspective these close relations are to e weighted in terms of power and creation of 
zones of influence.  
55
 The situation was considered by Boris Yeltsin, the Russian president at the time, as a serious 
threat to Russia’s own security. He is recorded as having denounced the act as a “naked 
aggression” and warned that Russia reserved the right to take “adequate measures, including 
military ones, to defend …the overall security of Europe” (Niall, 26 March 1999). Different 
agencies reported that all cooperation between Russia and NATO was suspended and Russia’s 
military and diplomatic representatives were recalled from NATO headquarters (ITAR-TASS-
World Service, 23 March 1999); Duma abandoned the ratification of the Start III arms reduction 
treaty (Daily Telegraph, 03 April 1999). 
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To sum up, neo-Realism holds the view that in a multipolar world, 
states try to maximise their security by resorting to power accumulation and 
alliances with the great powers. In these context the preservation of the balance 
of power is difficult both at regional and international level. The disruption of the 
balance of power in the condition of anarchy is to be seen as the fundamental 
cause of conflict. 
 
 
4.1.3. Realism and the Kosovo/a Conflict: A Critique 
 
Realist accounts points to Serbia’s quest for power and security to explain the 
Kosovo/a conflict. However, power and security, while important, cannot be the 
only determinants of Serbia’s behaviour. The weaknesses of Realism in 
explaining the case study lie mainly on its state-centric outlook (Bilgin, 1999; 
Wyn Jones, 1999) and single logic of anarchy (Wendt, 1992). First, the state-
centred outlook of Realism is of little help to our understanding of the causes of 
conflict. The realist accounts would point to Serbia as a unitary actor to explain 
the case. This assumption does not allow us to account for state-society 
relationship as an important determinant of state’s behaviour (Campbell, 1993; 
Wæver et al., 1993; Holsti, 1995; Buzan et al., 1998). Hence, in the realist 
explanations, the other party in the conflict, the Kosovo/a Albanians as an 
ethnically defined group within the state of Serbia, and their claims for self-
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determination are seen in function of Serbia’s national interests or need for 
security.  
 
Furthermore, the state-centred perspective of the realist approaches 
would point to power either as an end in itself (classical Realism) or as a means 
to an end (neo-Realism) to explain the Kosovo/a conflict. Looking at the recent 
historical facts, Serbia, after the removal of the autonomous status of Kosovo/a 
in 1989, assumed full control over the province. So, Serbia did fulfil its aim of 
creating a “state of its own” at least in military and institutional terms, thus, 
maximising its power vis a vis the others. Then, why did Serbia felt the need to 
carry on with its policy of ethnic cleansing against the Albanians in Kosovo/a? 
Power based explanations cannot account alone for this behaviour of Serbia in 
Kosovo/a. In Chapter 6 is argued that identity is a better referent to explain the 
policies of the Serbian government toward the Albanians. 
 
Second, the realist approach looks at anarchy as the underlying cause 
of conflict. This single “logic of anarchy” excludes cooperation between states as 
a possible situation in international relations.56 This assumption, however, is 
contradicted by the practice of international involvement in the Kosovo/a case. 
Thus, although there were divergences among major international players about 
                                                                                             
 
56
 Wendt (1992, 1999) views anarchy as what states make of it and as such there are three 
types of anarchy in international relations: Hobbesian, Grotian and Kantian. Realism considers 
only the case of Hobbesian anarchy. 
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their respective attitudes toward the Kosovo/a conflict,57 there was cooperation 
to end the violence. Close consultations took place to settle the conflict between 
Russia and NATO. The UN Security Council resolutions 1160 (31 March 1998) 
and 1199 (23 September 1998) were approved with the full consent of the UN 
Security Council members (China abstained).  
 
Furthermore, there was cooperation in the framework of the Contact 
Group, including Russia, before and during the Rambouillet negotiations. The 
intermediation of the Russian envoy helped to finalise a military-technical 
agreement, which led to the withdrawal of the Serb forces from Kosovo/a and 
the establishment of the peace implementation mission, KFOR in Kosovo/a (10 
June 1999). Therefore, the accounts of cooperation of great powers in the case 
of Kosovo/a conflict are inconsistent with the explanations of Realism that 
foresee only competition and contradiction over the zones of influence between 
states in international relations. Therefore, Realism does not get to the heart of 
the problem: the causes of conflict (Crawford and Lipschutz, 1997). 
 
Third, in the neo-realist accounts, the Kosovo/a conflict is explained 
as a by-product of multipolarity, which is considered to increase state’s 
insecurities and make the balance of power harder to be achieved. Under these 
circumstances war is expected to occur more frequently. According to these 
explanations, multipolarity is to be seen as the fundamental cause of conflict. 
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 The major players in international politics did consider the conflict as an internal conflict. The 
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However, the conflict between the Serbs and the Albanians for the control of 
Kosovo/a is not new. So, it is difficult to relate this conflict occurrence with the 
end of bipolarity. Recent historical evidence reveals several clashes between 
the two communities during the Cold War period.  
 
Accordingly, the Kosovo/a Albanians unsuccessfully rebelled and tried 
to secede from the second Yugoslav Federation (1944) several times. For 
example, the Albanian armed uprising for the independence of Kosovo/a from 
Serbia started after the end of WWII and continued until 1947. In 1968, 
Albanians rose up again. The life-long president Yosef B. Tito, decided to calm 
them down by granting extensive minority rights and an autonomous status for 
Kosovo/a. In 1981, right after Tito’s death (1980), Albanians asked again for the 
status of the republic, but they were unsuccessful, due to the lack of support 
from the other Yugoslav republics. Another unsuccessful riot took place in 1989 
before the conflict in 1999. Therefore, the emergence of multipolarity in 
international relations did not create a new conflict, since the problem of 
Kosovo/a is not new for Serbia and it existed during bi-polarity as well.  
 
To sum up, in the realist scholarship the Kosovo/a conflict is to be 
seen as either caused by Serbia’s desire to maximise its power and 
miscalculation of it (classical Realism) or security threats emanating from the 
international anarchy and distribution of power on it (neo-Realism). Overall, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
divergences were seen only upon the internationalisation of the conflict.  
 165 
power and anarchy are viewed as the underlying causes of war. The 
assumptions of the realist approaches are too general and based only on 
descriptions of power and security threats (Weldes, 1996; Rosenberg, 1990). 
These explanations contribute to the understanding of the general context that 
would favour the emergence of the Kosovo/a conflict. However, they cannot 
account for the immediate causes of the conflict. 
 
 
4.2. Rationalism (English School) and the Kosovo/a Conflict 
 
This section promises to present what Rationalism can tell us about the 
Kosovo/a conflict. Rationalism, as it was explained in Chapter 1, refers to 
intersubjectively shared principles and norms in the society of states to offer a 
definition of war. So, different from Realism, which looks at military power to 
examine conflict, Rationalism views the Kosovo/a conflict through the lens of 
order. The rationalist accounts of the conflict points to Serbian state and 
traditional principles (sovereignty and non-interference) and norms (rejection of 
ethnic secession and preference for multi-ethnic state) of international order to 
account for the Kosovo/a conflict (Wheeler, 2000; Mayall, 2000; Groom and 
Taylor, 2000).  
 
A. J. R. Groom and Paul Taylor argue that two decisive and 
determining principles of international order “fixed territorial boundaries” 
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(internationalisation of the internal borders of the Republic of Serbia within the 
Yugoslav Federation) and “a doctrine of multi-ethnicism” (multiethnic Serbia) 
determined international community’s interpretation of the Kosovo/a case (2000: 
292). At the same time, rationalist explanations reflect also on the principle of 
just in bello – the right to war. The right to war, from a rationalist perspective is 
assigned to a legitimate authority, which in the case of Kosovo/a conflict is held 
by the state of Serbia, and consented for a just cause (self-defence) as the last 
resort.  
 
The rationalist interpretation of the Kosovo/a conflict is inferred from 
the relevant literature and the international arrangements and international 
diplomatic documents on the case.58 The analysis is confined to the conceptual 
aspects of the researched case, that is, to discuss what Rationalism enables us 
to see in the Kosovo/a conflict. Accordingly, this section does not provide an 
exhaustive overview of all issued international diplomatic documents, 
international negotiations and arrangements offered to settle to the case. Some 
of the weaknesses of Rationalism that limit our understanding of the Kosovo/a 
conflict are discussed at the end of this section.  
 
Rationalism, by pointing to the principles and norms of international 
order, would provide a definition of the Kosovo/a conflict that is intersubjectively 
shared in the society of states. The rationalist approaches refer to the 
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peremptory and universal nature of sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia 
to define the Kosovo/a conflict (Wheeler, 2000; Mayall, 2000). The commitment 
of international society to these principles would explain why the Arbitration 
Commission of the European Community,59 the so-called Badinter Commission, 
did choose to apply the principle of uti possidetis juris (recognition of the existing 
borders at the time of independence) to reach its legal judgment on the right of 
self-determination in the dissolution of Yugoslavia.60  
 
Accordingly, although the Commission considered self-determination 
as a safeguard of human rights and an important principle in the society of 
states (International Convenants on Human Rights, 1966), it took the decision to 
guarantee this right without questioning the inter-republican borders (territorial 
borders) of the Republic of Serbia and its ethnic composition (Pellet, 1992; 
Weller: 1993; Kamminaga, 1996; Vereshchetin, 1996). In the Opinion 2 of the 
Arbitration Commission (1992) it was stated: 
Republics must afford the members of those minorities and ethnic groups, all the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms recognized in international law, including 
where appropriate, the right to their nationality (Opinion 2 of the Arbitration 
Commission, 1991, as cited by Pellet, 1992: 184). 
 
This predisposition of the Badinter Commission infers from the rationalist logic 
that accepting the right to self-determination on national and ethnic ground 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
58
 This analysis considers the international diplomatic documents since the moment the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia started (1991). 
59
 In August 1991, the peace conference on Yugoslavia hosted by Lord Carrington established 
the European Community Arbitration Commission recognised as the Badinter Commission, 
which was embodied with authority to negotiate solutions for the dissolution of Yugoslavia. 
60
 Some authors would question the decision-making legitimacy of the Badinter Committee. For 
more on this topic see, for example, Williams (1998: 130-131,138, 140-141), Akhavan (1996: 
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would “challenge territoriality as the basis of claims to statehood in the society of 
states” (Wheeler, 2000: 248). This normative consideration would explain why 
the legitimisation of the right to self-determination on national grounds to 
Albanians61 and Serbs62 at the moment of the dissolution of Yugoslav was 
rejected. The propensity of international society towards the preservation of 
territorial integrity, which is viewed as the precondition for the safeguarding of 
order in the society of states would explain the decision of international 
community. In this decision the right to statehood was accorded to the Republic 
of Serbia and as its international borders were recognised its inter-republic 
borders at the moment of the dissolution of Yugoslavia.  
 
Consequently, drawing from this rationalist perspective, international 
community considers the Kosovo/a Albanians living within the Republic of 
Serbia as a minority group. Therefore, the demands of the Albanians for self-
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
227-228,233-235, and 240-242). However the issue of legitimacy will not be discussed in this 
chapter since it goes beyond its purpose. 
61
 Albanians of Kosovo/a did base their request for self-determination in equal footing with the 
other republics of the Yugoslav Federation, in two arguments. The first argument was explained 
in the “Letter by the Government of the Republic of Kosova to the Extraordinary EPC Ministerial 
Meeting in Brussels, 21 December 1991” (Truth About Kosova, 1993: 329). In this letter the 
Kosovo/a Albanians argued to the Badinter Committee that under the 1974 Yugoslav 
Constitution, Kosovo/a enjoyed equal rights of representation along with the other republics at 
the Federal level, ever thought it had the status of an autonomous province. The second 
argument was based on the fact that on July 1990, the Albanian delegates of the Kosovo/a 
Assembly declared Kosovo/a region an “independent and equal entity within the framework of 
the Yugoslav Federation and as an equal subject with its counterparts in Yugoslavia” 
(Constitution Declaration of the Assembly of Kosovo/a, 2 July 1990,1993: 329). After this 
declaration, in September 1991, a clandestine referendum was organised. 87.01 percent of the 
voters voted in favour of an independent and sovereign state of Kosovo/a, which was proclaimed 
soon after the referendum (Silber, 1992: 25; see, also, Maass, 1991: 13; Troebst, 1998).  
62
 Serbs did ask for the right to self-determination based on nationality grounds, claiming that 
they were a constituent nation (not republic) of the Yugoslav Federation. This claim implied the 
inclusion of all Serbs living in Yugoslavia in one state (Weller, 1992). 
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determination on national and ethnic grounds are to be seen as an internal affair 
of Serbia.63 The Kosovo/a case is understood as a domestic issue of Serbia 
because in the moment of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, it was a simple region 
within the Republic of Serbia. Since 1989, its status of autonomous province 
was changed to that of a simple region within Serbia by the constitutional 
changes adopted by the Serbian parliament (1990).64 
 
This rationalist interpretation of the Kosovo/a case can also be 
inferred from all UN Security Council Resolutions 1160 (31 March 1998), 1199 
(23 September 1998), 1203 (24 October 1998) and international diplomatic 
documents and negotiations referring to the case after the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia. Concerned with the pluralist principles of order, these resolutions 
establish the commitment of  “members states [of the Security Council] to the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” and 
reaffirmed the “substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for 
Kosovo” (Resolution 1244, 10 June 1999). As Werner argues, “the policy of the 
European Community and its Member-States, approached the exceptional 
situation more from the perspective of state sovereignty” (2001: 183).  
 
                                                                                             
 
63
 The implication of the EC decision was that Serbs living outside Serbia would have to accept 
the status of a minority group (Weller, 1992: 569-607). 
64
 In the framework of the Yugoslav constitution of 1974, the republics and the autonomous 
provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina) enjoyed equal rights of representation at the Federal 
institutions. However, regions did enjoy an inferior status. The regions enjoyed the right of 
representation only at the republic’s structures.  
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Pointing to the importance of Serbia’s sovereign exclusive 
competence in internal affairs, the pluralist perspective would recommend to see 
the Kosovo/a conflict as an internal violence. James Mayall states:  
In former Yugoslavia, once the overreaching federal structure had been removed, 
the populations of the successor republics refused to accept the legitimacy of their 
previously internal-but now international-borders. What were formally interstate 
wars had all the characteristics of a ferocious civil war, in which compromise fails in 
the face of the passionate and self-righteous belief of the belligerents in the justice 
of their respective causes (2000: 324-325). 
 
Based on a pluralist understanding of order, different rationalist accounts 
understand the Kosovo/a case as a domestic uprising. In these accounts the 
events in Kosovo/a are seen as encouraged by criminal activities that aimed at 
the secession of the region from the Serbian state (Chossudovsky, 1999; Oberg, 
2000; Judah, 2001; Artisien, 1984).65 
 
In a document published in Serbian Government official web site 
entitled Albanian Terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija (1998), the events in 
Kosovo/a are defined as terrorist activities aiming at secession. In the document 
is stated: “the activities of Albanian terrorist organizations function to create 
ethnically pure territories in Kosovo and Metohija and to promote the secession 
of this region.” At the same time, Serbian government appeals to international 
community are to be seen as being in accordance with the pluralist attitude 
toward the principle of state sovereignty. In the appeal is stated: the “terrorism 
deserves the same condemnation everywhere” and fighting it requires 
                                                                                             
 
65
 The act of secession assumes the division of Kosovo/a from Serbia or its (re)unification with 
Albanian an act that would lead to the creation of “Greater Albania” (Judah, 2001). See, Artisien 
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“cooperation and coordination by the entire international community, in 
consistency with international agreements and declarations on terrorism.” 
 
This definition of the case can also be found on the declaration of the 
US special envoy for the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, who defined 
also the KLA as “without any questions a terrorist group” and its activity as 
terrorism (Gelbart, 1998). Soon after, the Resolution 1160 (31 march 1998) of 
the UN Security Council reaffirming the pluralist principles for the preservation of 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 
condemned “terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation Army or any other group or 
individual and all external support for terrorist activity in Kosovo, including 
finance, arms and training.” 
 
Drawing from the international legal stipulations about international 
terrorist activity66 and secessionism67 the Kosovo/a conflict is to be seen as an 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
(1984) for a detailed analysis of the Kosovo/a case in the framework of the Yugoslav Federation 
and the Republic of Serbia. 
66
 If we refer to the Geneva Convention on Terrorism (1987), then the use of force by Serbia’s 
against the Albanians can be considered as legitimate. Referring to the stipulations of the 
Declaration the case can be defined as “non-international armed conflict” and the right to use 
force by the Kosovo/a Albanians is constrained. At the same time, the Declaration and the 
Article 51 of the UN Charter allow for Serbia’s unilateral use of force in the region against the 
KLA for purposes of self-defence (countering terrorism and secession).  
67
 The United Nations and its member states do not support claims for unilateral secessions.  In 
normal cases the claims of different groups for secession are dealt under a human rights 
paradigm. International community in a series of declarations and covenants insists that these 
groups have the right to the protection of their identities and that they should have the 
opportunity to participate effectively in the political and economic life of their states to develop 
their culture, language, religion, traditions and customs (Draft Declaration on the Rights of the 
Indigenous Peoples, 1994; Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities, 1993; Council of Europe, Framework Convention Regarding 
the Rights of National Minorities, 1995; see, also, Nanda, 2003; Buchanan, 1996). 
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internal conflict and as such a domestic affair of Serbia. Since the society of 
states rejects the idea of secession and condemns terrorism, the use of violence 
by Serbian government is to be seen as justified by its right in the society of 
states to exercise violence to enforce authority upon its internationally 
recognised territory and population. This right, at the same time, precludes 
international intervention based on the principle of non-interference and self-
defence sanctioned respectively in the Article 2(7) and Article 51 of the UN 
Charter. In this case the rationalist approach, besides defining the Kosovo/a 
conflict as an internal conflict, preclude the case from being a subject of analysis 
in International Relations and as such is of no help to our understanding of 
conflict.  
 
However, the level of violation of human rights in Kosovo/a raised, as 
Nicholas Wheeler frame it, “the dilemma of what to do about strangers who are 
subject to appalling cruelty by their governments” (2000: 1). The rationalist 
solidarist perspective would suggest to see the violation of human rights in 
Kosovo/a by Serbian government not as an exclusive issue within the domestic 
jurisdiction of Serbia. This perspective allows us to view the issue of human 
rights violation as threat to international peace and security. 
 
Different accounts understand the violence used by Serbian 
government in Kosovo/a conflict as a violation of human rights and a threat to 
peace and security. The foreign ministers of the Contact Group meeting in 
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London on 9 March and in Bonn on 25 March 1998 agreed that “the situation in 
Kosovo is not a simply internal matter, but also has a direct impact on the 
stability of neighbouring countries and peace in the Balkans.”68 Later this 
statement was repeated in the UN Security Council Resolution 1160 (31 March 
1998). This solidarist interpretation of the case imply the importance of justice 
for the preservation of order by assuming that “there is a mutual compatibility 
between order and justice” in the society of states (Wheeler, 2000: 267). 
 
From this interpretation can be inferred a retreat from a strict 
interpretation of the inviolability of Serbia’s sovereignty, which at the same time 
implies international intervention as a means to censure the regime of Belgrade 
in its actions in Kosovo/a. However, the territorial sovereignty rights of Serbia 
are not proscribed in the solidarist perspective as well. In all issued diplomatic 
documents, the commitment of all member states of the UN Security Council 
reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).  
 
The preservation of sovereignty is important even in the solidarist 
perspective. So, different solidarist scholars and international diplomatic 
documents, which reflect on this perspective, while discussing the conflict are 
very careful in their statements to refer to the person, not to the group. Thus, 
human rights not the right of the group to secede are of concern in the solidarist 
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 Statement by the US Ambassador to the United Nations, Bill Richardson, to the UN Security 
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perspective (Watkin, 2004). As Wheeler states “this conception of international 
society recognizes that individuals,” in our case the Serbs and Albanians, have 
“rights and duties in international law, but it also acknowledges that [these] 
individuals can have these rights enforced” only by the state that in our case is 
Serbia (2000: 11). This solidarist perspective can be ascertained in the 
insistence of international community on the preservation of Serbia as a 
multiethnic state.  
 
To sum up, the pluralist approach enables a view of the Kosovo/a 
conflict as an internal conflict, which does not help our understanding of the 
case in International Relations. The solidarist approach allows for an 
understanding of the Kosovo/a conflict under the international humanitarian law. 
This framework accounts for the consequences of the conflict rather than its 
causes. Furthermore, the rationalist approach offers a state-centric outlook to 
theconflict, which is an hindrance to our understanding of the Kosovo/a conflict. 
These two issues and their implications in our knowledge about the case are 
further discussed in the following section. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
Council on Kosovo Resolution, 31 March 1998, as cited by Duke (1998). 
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4.2.1. Rationalism and the Kosovo/a Conflict: A Critique 
 
As mentioned above, like Realism, Rationalism offers a state-centric outlook of 
the Kosovo/a conflict. As Bull (1977) argues in the society of states since its 
inception, the state is the one who holds the monopoly to use legitimate violence 
within and outside its borders. So, at both levels, international and intra-state, 
state is held as the legitimate authority to negotiate and settle conflict. One 
exception to this interpretation is the case of humanitarian intervention treated 
by the Chapter VII, Article 39 of the UN Charter. The dispositions of the Chapter 
VII allow other states to intervene in the domestic affaires of member state with 
the permission of the UN Security Council. However, even in this case the 
preservation of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the intervened state 
overrides other social and political considerations. For that reason, Rationalism 
would start looking at the Kosovo/a case by emphasising the sovereignty and 
territoriality of the state of Serbia, considering them as essential for its 
membership in the society of states and the preservation of order. 
 
Accordingly, the rationalist literature on the Kosovo/a case has 
discussed the conflict either by emphasising Serbia’s right to self-defence 
(pluralists) or seeing it as a case of violation of human rights (solidarists) 
(Mayall, 2000; Wheeler, 2000; Groom and Taylor, 2000). The state-centric 
outlook to war in the rationalist approaches impedes us from finding a proper 
definition for the Kosovo/a conflict. As explained above, the major international 
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documents and the vast literature on the Kosovo/a case based on a rationalist 
perspective did define the conflict as a terrorist activity, ethnic secession (civil 
war) or an human right violation case.  
 
An alternative explanation, which would interpret the struggle against 
the incumbent government as a national liberation movement, is neglected. This 
is the case because in the rationalist’s interpretation of conflict “state sovereignty 
and self-determination are seen as competing notions: more state sovereignty is 
emphasized, the less room is left for the self-determination of peoples” (Werner, 
2001: 172; see, also, Wilson, 1990; Quaye, 1992). Hence, to recognise the right 
to self-determination to the Kosovo/a Albanians in the society of states, would 
mean to define an ethno-national conflict like the Kosovo/a case as international 
war. In this case, state-based international regime and institutions would be 
challenged, which according to the rationalist scholars would have implications 
for the maintenance of order (Wheeler, 2000).  
 
In the case of ethno-national conflicts like Kosovo/a, the violation of 
human rights points to the definition of sovereignty, which appears to be too 
narrow in the rationalist perspective. Hence, the traditional conceptualisation of 
sovereignty leaves unexplained the use of the concept in the case of Kosovo/a 
conflict. In this case, the effective control over Serbia’s territory (including 
Kosovo/a) was no longer the exclusive right of Serbian government, since the 
establishment of the shadow government of the Albanians in Kosovo/a (1990). 
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Hence, Albanians as a group of people were separated from the political 
processes in Serbia and the entire population of that state. This situation can be 
defined as the separation of the Kosovo/a “people” from the entire population of 
the Serbian state.69 This situation rendered Serbia’s “sovereignty uncertain.”70 
However, in the rationalist approaches as Werner states: 
This separation of ‘people’ and ‘the entire population of the state’ is set aside: the 
bearer of the right of self determination (and consequently the right to freedom from 
foreign intervention) is the entire population living on the territory of the state and 
not ‘the people’ as a group with distinctive ethnic or cultural characteristics (2001: 
189).  
  
Hence, rationalist approaches by giving primacy to state’s sovereignty defined in 
territorial terms undermine another aspect of sovereignty. Sovereignty is also 
defied as the effective control of a government over a population living in a well-
defined territory (Werner, 2001: 184). Accordingly, the rationalist accounts of 
Kosovo/a conflict, by emphasising Serbia’s territorial exclusive rights, prevent us 
from looking at the Kosovo/a case as a self-determination case or national 
liberation movement. The rationalist framework allows for a very narrow 
interpretation of the case in International Relations, which limits our 
understanding of the case study. 
 
The accounts of the case indicated that the case was not simply an 
internal uprising or a case where the human right were abused, as the rationalist 
approaches tell us. Different accounts demonstrate that the force used by 
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 Three criteria are suggested by Werner (2001: 175-180) to identify “a people”: objective 
criteria (common language, culture, history, etc.), subjective criteria (the will to be recognized as 
a people) and territorial grievances.  
70
 This terminology is used first by Werner (2001: 180). 
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Serbian government against the Albanians in Kosovo/a was greater than what is 
considered as necessary to bring to an end a terrorist activity. Different authors 
provide facts, which prove that Serbia was following a policy of ethnic cleansing 
in Kosovo/a (Caplan, 1998: 475; Soloway, 1998: 30; Smith, 1998: 13; Maliqi, 
1998; Daalder and O’Hanlon, 2000: 27-28). The brutality of the Serbian 
government in Kosovo/a made clear as Craig Nations states that:  
Serbian repression was now interpreted not merely as an exaggerated reaction to a 
domestic insurgency, but as a campaign launched with genocidal intentions at the 
Kosovar Albanian population as a whole (1998: 35). 
 
Other accounts show that by the end of 1998, Serbian offensive, codenamed as 
“Operation Horseshoe,” in essence aimed to shift the ethnic balance of 
Kosovo/a rather than settling an internal uprising. In Daadler and O’Hanlon’s 
words:  
[T]he attacks would involve a broad swath of territory in the shape of a horseshoe, 
moving from the northeast down to the west and back to the southeast of Kosovo 
along the Albanian and Macedonian borders. It also apparently entailed emptying 
the cities of Prizren, Pec and Prishtina of their largely Albanian populations (2000: 
59). 
 
The rationalist approaches seem to neglect these dynamics of the conflict 
revealing that its accounts are of little help to our understanding of the Kosovo/a 
conflict. 
 
 
4.3. Revolutionism and the Kosovo/a Conflict 
 
Revolutionism allows us to scrutinize the case of Kosovo/a through the lenses of 
emancipation. As should be evident from Chapter 1, in this approach democracy 
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and “pluralist security communities” are seen as part of emancipatory projects, 
which pacify the relations between states and different agents within society 
(Deutsch, 1957; Doyle, 1986; Talbot, 2000). The revolutionist approach points to 
Serbian state’s regime to explain the Kosovo/a case. The accountability of 
Serbian leadership, the character of the information and reforms are scrutinised 
in this approach in order to define whether Serbia is a democratic state or not. 
The nature of the state’s regime would define whether Serbia is prone to internal 
uprising or not. This section outlines and assesses what the revolutionist 
approach can tell us about the Kosovo/a conflict. It concludes by accounting for 
the weaknesses of the revolutionist approach to our understanding of the 
Kosovo/a conflict.  
 
The reforms (decentralisation and self-management) that took place in 
the Yugoslav Federation, since early 1950s, are considered to be short of 
democratic content (Crawford and Lipschutz, 1998; Isakovic, 2000; Dragovic-
Soso, 2000). Different scholars provided facts to argue that the reforms in the 
Yugoslav Federation did favour the development of political rivalries and intra-
party ideological competition within the republics rather than the consolidation of 
democracy. This claim is based on the fact that the republics were established in 
the constitution of the Federation to represent the interests of the dominant 
nation rather than that of all citizens.  
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The reforms that many revolutionist scholars are looking at in order to 
understand the nature of the regime in Yugoslavia and Serbia, are considered to 
have transformed the Yugoslav Federation from a multicultural state into an 
“ethno-federation” (Crawford and Lipschutz, 1997: 169). Beverley Crawford and 
Ronnie D. Lipschutz (1997) argue that the reforms (including the changes of the 
constitution of 1974) offered compromises that would counter Serbia’s strategies 
for seizing control of the Federal institutions rather than an attempt to increase 
the regime’s legitimacy. Supporting the same argument, Robert M. Hayden 
explains that the constitution was the first step towards a new nationalism in 
Yugoslavia, which he calls “constitutionalist nationalism” (1992: 654-673).   
 
This understanding of the reforms leads to two further related 
arguments. First, the reforms did not favour the establishment of a democratic 
regime in Yugoslavia, since the resolution and settling of the conflicts and 
disputes were not left to the institutions of the Federation representing all 
citizens, but to the dominant nation within each republic and its leadership. 
Second, these reforms did not guarantee the rights of citizens, but those of the 
dominant national group within the republics (Banac, 1992; Caratan, 1997; 
Crawford, 1998; Ramet, 1999; Isakovic, 2000). Thus, for example, in the 
constitution of Serbia (1990) the status of the autonomous provinces were 
removed from Kosovo/a and Vojvodina together with the rights to use the 
mother langue in the upper level of education and media. Thus, the reforms did 
reduce the rights of the nationalities like Albanians and Hungarians within the 
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Republic of Serbia, instead of providing for the accommodation of all people’s 
needs and rights. 
 
Elections in the revolutionist approach are understood as a process 
essential in assuring the "consent of the governed” for government policies. 
Therefore, fair and free elections are viewed as an expression of progress in 
democratic policies. The understanding of the electoral process leads the 
scholars of this approach to the understanding of the accountability of the 
Serbian governing system. Different accounts observe that the Serbian election 
process was not democratic. To cite Garton Ash:  
What happened in Serbia was a uniquely complex combination of four ingredients: 
a more or less democratic election; a revolution of the new, velvet, self-limiting type; 
a brief revolutionary coup of an older kind; and a dash of old-fashioned Balkan 
conspiracy (2001: 5).  
 
Drawing from these observations, it can be concluded that elections in Serbia 
were not a means of consolidating democracy. Instead, they served to bring the 
nationalist parties to power and helped to transform the republics from holding 
multiculturalistic values to supporting ethnic based politics. For revolutionists, in 
this environment, conflict is expected to happen because the high level of 
political decentralisation combined with weak democratic institutions in the 
Yugoslav Federation created a situation embedded with insecurities. In this 
context, warlike factions are expected to mobilise mass sentiment without 
having to account for the interests of the public being mobilised (Mansfield and 
Snyder 1995: 2, 22). The rise of nationalistic rivalries between different nations 
in Yugoslavia and Serbia in the condition of an undemocratic regime is to be 
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seen as encouraging the prospects for war between different actors of the 
society (Fearon and Laitin, 2001). 
 
In her book, ‘Saviours of the Nation.’ Serbia’s Intellectual Opposition 
and the Revival of Nationalism, (2002) Jasna Dragovic-Soso offers a 
revolutionist explanation of the Yugoslav wars. She argues that on one hand the 
emergence of the nationalist discourse in Serbia and the rising in power of 
Milosevic were the responses to the crisis produced by institutional and 
constitutional reforms in the Yugoslav Federation. On the other hand, the 
nationalist discourses of the mid-1980s were instrumental in deflecting the 
working of democracy in Serbia (see, also, Colovic, 2002). She argues that the 
nationalist discourse of Serbian intellectuals in the 1980s “removed at a crucial 
moment the presence of a democratic alternative to Milosevic’s policy, helping 
the regime overcome its legitimacy crisis and contributing to Yugoslavia’s 
descent to war” (Dragovic-Soso, 2002: 2). 
 
In accounting for the Kosovo/a conflict, this approach would establish 
a direct relationship between the manipulations and undemocratic control of the 
information and the prospect for conflict. Different scholars observe that from 
1985 onwards, in Serbia, the information served to manipulate the public.  
Different examples are provided to support the claim. So, it is observed that 
from 1985 onwards a series of publications in the popular press, lamented the 
“loss” of the Serbian homeland and its magnificent monasteries to the “invading” 
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Albanians (equated with the Ottoman Turks that defeated the Serbs at the Field 
of Kosovo in 1398) (Malcolm, 1998: 58-80).   
 
Furthermore, contributing to the manipulation of information, the 
Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts issued in 1986, a memorandum, in 
which the present physical, political, juridical and cultural genocide towards the 
Kosovo/a Serbs was presented as being particularly evocative of “the blackest 
periods of Turkish impaling” (Malcolm, 1998: 340). The press presented the 
Kosovo/a Albanians as aiming to mutilate or eradicate the Serbian presence in 
Kosovo/a (Magas, 1993: 51; see, also, Silber and Little, 1997).  This rhetoric 
effectively suggested that Albanians “inside” Serbia were a threat to Serbs in 
Kosovo/a. 
 
The question of Kosovo/a in these different propaganda documents is 
treated as a matter of the “holy land” in danger, not as an institutional question. 
Hence, the way the case of Kosovo/a was presented in the media and other 
written documents did thwarted the possibility for a democratic institutional 
settlement of the Kosovo/a case (Colovic, 2000). According to Branimir 
Anzulovic, the manipulation of the information created a situation, which 
imposed upon politics, media, civil society and the public the acceptance of the 
fact that the borders of Serbia should “correspond to the boundaries of the 
Serbian national group” (1999: 429). The way the question of Kosovo/a was 
presented promoted ethno-nationalistic particularism in a multiethnic state, such 
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as Serbia, instead of insisting upon the equality rights of all citizens. In this 
context, conflict is to be expected, since there are no other intermediary 
institutions that are characteristic of a democratic regime, which is expected to 
have the capacity to resolve disputes and accommodate people’s rights. 
 
Civil society, which in the condition of democracy is expected to play 
an intermediary role in settling frictions between the state and citizens, in the 
case of Serbia is viewed as the “manifestation of the naked power of the state” 
(Thomas, 1999: 424). So, different sources indicate that Serbian civil society did 
not question Milosevic policies of ethnic cleansing against the Albanians in 
Kosovo/a that in legal terms are citizens of Serbia. As Troebst (1998) observes, 
there was no difference between Milosevic, opposition and public in the attitude 
toward the Kosovo/a Albanians. The opposition is considered as even having a 
more radical position.  
 
The manipulation of information, lack of accountable institutions and 
civil society in Serbia are understood in the revolutionist perspective as 
developments that describe a situation so embedded with tensions as to 
undermine any hope that presented problem might ever be settled in institutional 
ways. While the developments in Serbia, far from promising the development of 
a multicultural and accommodating society, indicate conflict as a means to settle 
the situation, the way information is manipulated and civil society and institutions 
act would serve to define whose interests are being served and in which way. In 
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different accounts Milosevic is pointed as the “nationalist authoritarianist” 
(Gordy, 1999: 2), which encouraged a new type of nationalism in Serbia as a 
way to capture power.  
 
For Dragovic-Soso, this nationalism was founded “upon double 
standards” (2000: 9). On the one hand, this nationalism was “based on an 
extreme notion of victimisation, ‘genocide’ and conspiracy theories, all of which 
preclude negotiations and compromise essential to any democratic process” 
(Dragovic-Soso, 2000: 9). On the other hand, this nationalism is seen to have 
encouraged the search for a “saviour figure,” preparing the ground for 
Milosevic’s plebiscitary monopolisation of power in the 1980s and 1990s. In the 
revolutionist explanations of the Kosovo/a conflict, intermingled relationship 
between the lack of democracy and the presence of authoritarian leaders is 
expected to work as follows. The lack of democracy favours the establishment 
of authoritative leaders, which, in turn, leads to the development of a more 
oppressive regime, and the effacement of all possible mechanisms that would 
settle disputes by peaceful means. In this context, disputes between different 
actors are expected to be resoled by using conflict. The case of Serbia seems to 
match these explanations and the Kosovo/a conflict is the result of this 
undemocratic processes.  
 
To sum up, revolutionist scholarship would point to the pseudo-
democratic nature of reforms, the destructive role of Milosevic as a leader 
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together with the manipulation of information to explain the creation of an 
environment inherently unstable and embedded with possibilities for conflict in 
Yugoslavia and Serbia. This undemocratic environment is viewed as responsible 
for war perspectives and programs in settling disputes and differences. In this 
approach, our understanding of the Kosovo/a conflict depends upon the nature 
of the domestic regime in Serbia. Therefore, the establishment of democracy in 
Serbia should be seen as the solution to the Kosovo/a case. Such a reduction 
gives rise, in turn, to an understanding of the causes of conflict that seems to be 
misleading. The weaknesses of the revolutionist approach and the way they 
undermine our understanding of the Kosovo/a conflict are discussed in the 
following section. 
 
 
4.3.1. Revolutionism and the Kosovo/a Conflict: A Critique 
 
This section starts by challenging the validity of two intermingled assumptions of 
Revolutionism, which are considered to limit our understanding of the Kosovo/a 
conflict. These assumptions are: un-democratic regimes are more prone to 
internal upheavals and democracies are inherently pacific. Another problem of 
this approach is the state-centric outlook of the conflict. The criticisms in this 
section are organised to reflect upon the case study. 
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The revolutionist approach defends the thesis that “the best guaranty 
of both democracy and peace is the strength of non-state secondary institutions 
within a country…These form a ‘civil society’, which is seen as essentially 
virtuous. Where this is weak, states will perpetrate atrocities” (Mann, 2004: 4). 
According to this assumption, civil society is regarded as having only positive 
effects, a means to help mediate and accommodate peoples’ needs and rights 
and is thus pacifying. The revolutionist accounts will apply the same rationality 
while telling about the effects of elections or elected institutions upon society. 
This rationality is exposed to criticism, which is illustrated by looking at the case 
of Serbia.  
 
Different accounts indicate that Serbia cannot be considered totally an 
undemocratic state, since it did have a civil society and secondary institutions. 
To cite Timothy Garton Ash:  
Milosevic’s Serbia was never a totalitarian regime like Ceausescu’s Romania. That 
is one major reason why Milosevic’s fall was different. Yet, he was a war criminal, 
who caused horrible suffering to the Serb’s neighbours in the former Yugoslavia. 
But at home he was not a totalitarian dictator.  Instead, his regime was a strange 
mixture of democracy and dictatorship: a ‘democratura’ (2001: 3). 
 
Following on the same line of argument, Robert Thomas writes: 
For all the entrenched power of the ruling elite, Serbia under Milosevic was not a 
dictatorship in the totalitarian sense of the world. Opposition parties, and civil 
organisations, continued to operate throughout the period, and the independent 
media continued to publish and broadcast (1999: 424).  
 
Thus, in Serbia there were political pluralism, universal franchise, holding of 
periodical elections and the formation of an operational parliament. As Dragovic-
Soso (2002) notes, in Serbia there were created even institutions for the defence 
of the civil rights such as the Writers’ Association of Serbia and the Committee 
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for Defence of Freedom of Thought and Expression, since 1984. The opposition 
and the democratic movement of students were active players of the political life  
in Serbia. In the course of 1996 local elections, the opposition was able to 
organise daily rallies. These rallies led to the annulment of the November 17, 
1996 local elections in which the opposition gained control in almost all relevant 
cities in Serbia.  
 
It was again “the other Serbia” (Garton Ash, 2001: 4) who defeated 
Milosevic in the elections of 24 September 2000. As Garton Ash (2001) 
observes, there was opposition to Milosevic’s policy in Serbia, but not to the one 
toward Kosovo/a. To quote Ash: 
There are Serbs who have spoken, written, organized, and worked against 
Milosevic from the very outset-from Veran Matic and his independent radio B92 to 
countless journalists who went to prison for printing what they believed to be true to 
the thousands engaged in the radical student movement Otpor. Their struggle was 
different from, but no less difficult or dangerous than, the struggle of dissidents 
under Soviet communism (2001: 4). 
 
Different accounts witness that Milosevic was ousted from power through 
democratic procedures. He was defeated in the September 24, 2000 elections in 
which “2.4 million Serbs put a circle next to the name of Vojislav Kostunica on 
Sunday, September 24, 2000” (Garton Ash, 2001: 2-4). The daily demonstration 
of peoples pressured Milosevic to accept the result of the elections (Milosevic 
did try to deny the result by fraud, intimidation, and manipulation of the courts) 
(Garton Ash, 2001: 2-4). These accounts highlight the fact that democracy was 
present in Serbia. However, the conflict in Kosovo/a indicates that democracy 
did not pacifying the relations between the Serbs and the Albanians. By seeing 
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democracy as wholly pacifying this approach cannot adequately account for the 
Kosovo/a conflict. 
 
As well as being too broad, the understanding of democracy as 
proffered in the revolutionist accounts is also, reductionism. In this approach all 
kinds of insecurities that would cause conflict are seen as coming from one 
source: nature of domestic regime. This framework makes extremely difficult to 
give an account of any other cause of conflict. This approach does not allow us 
to see that conflict may be rooted in the way both parties in the conflict are 
constructed and how they have interacted with one another. Historical accounts 
demonstrate that the conflict between Serbs and Albanians over Kosovo/a is 
old. 
 
The conflict between the Serbs and the Albanians goes back at the 
time of the Congress of Berlin (1878), which tried to settle the borders of some 
Balkan states in the framework of the so-called Eastern Question.71 Alternative 
explanations that reflect upon historical interactions of the Serbs and the 
Albanians seem to offer better explanations of the dynamics of the conflict. 
These explanations are exposed and discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
                                                                                             
 
71 The Congress of Berlin recognised Kosovo/a as part of Serbia. However, the Albanian national 
movement, at the League of Prizren (1878), organised at the same time with the Congress of 
Berlin, made clear its aims of establishing an Albanian state, which would include all territories 
inhibited by ethnic Albanians in the dissolving Ottoman Empire. The League claimed that among 
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The arguments of the revolutionist approach are problematic for our 
understanding of the Kosovo/a conflict for another reason as well. By looking at 
the Serbian state’s regime to understand the Kosovo/a conflict, this approach 
remains state-centric in focus. Thus, the use of violence against the Albanians is 
examined as a “statist” phenomenon, which creates the idea that with the 
establishment of democracy in Serbia, the conflict in Kosovo/a will disappear. 
This framework seems to simplify the understanding of the causes of the 
Kosovo/a conflict to the point that the explanations lose their practical relevance. 
An alternative approach is needed to understand the causes of insecurities and 
the way they are constructed and mobilised for political action by societies 
or/and groups rather than states as explained above. Alternative approaches to 
the understanding of the case study are discussed in the next two chapters. 
 
 
This chapter discussed what the traditional International Relations theories-
namely, Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism could tell us about the 
Kosovo/a conflict. The Kosovo/a conflict in the traditional accounts is seen as a 
means used by the state of Serbia to achieve its ends defined in terms of power 
and order. Although different traditional International Relations approaches are 
based on different ontological premises they share a state-centric outlook of 
conflict. They work on the basis of pre-given and unchanged assumptions about 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
other territories, Kosovo/a was going to be part of the new Albanian state (Malcolm, 1998; 
Jelawich, 1983; Elsie, 1997; Almond, 1994; Judah, 2001). 
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identity, which tend to abstract the understanding of conflict from its historical 
and social context.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
The Post-Cold War Approaches and the Kosovo/a Conflict 
 
 
 
Two post-Cold War approaches are used to examine the Kosovo/a conflict in 
this chapter: post-Cold War neo-Realism and the “New Wars” approach, 
theoretical foundations of which were exposed and discussed in Chapter 2. 
These approaches differ from the traditional International Relations theories 
since they focus on non-state actors, respectively on ethno-national groups 
(Posen, 1993; Kaufman, 1996; Roe, 1999) and distorted political formations 
(Kaldor, 1999; Duffield, 1998, 2001; Lacquer, 1997; Franck, 1995) to interpret 
the case study. There are two sections to this chapter. The first section uses 
neo-realist logic of “security dilemma” to study the case of the Kosovo/a conflict. 
The second section presents what the “New Wars” approach can tell us about 
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the Kosovo/a conflict. The chapter concludes with a section that discuses the 
weaknesses of these two approaches to the Kosovo/a conflict. 
 
 
5.1. The Intra-State “Security Dilemma” and the Kosovo/a Conflict 
 
This perspective would suggest that, in the condition of the emergence of 
anarchy after the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation (1991), the efforts of 
both the Serbs and the Albanians to enhance their own group’s security 
established the working of a “security dilemma,” escalation of which led to 
conflict. Different from the traditional neo-realist approach to conflict the actors 
involved in the “security dilemma” are two ethno-national groups: the Serbs and 
the Kosovo/a Albanians. In this approach the dissolving state is seen as an 
anarchical system and groups as quasi-states. 
 
Explaining the Kosovo/a conflict by referring to the intensity of the 
“security dilemma” this approach would draw attention to power calculations 
estimated in terms of the groups’ cohesion and military capabilities (Posen, 
1993, 1993a). So, ethnic groups’ power situation, estimated as functions of 
created windows of opportunity and vulnerability for the Serbs and the Albanians 
of Kosovo/a, would define the intensity of “security dilemma” and the prospects 
for conflict. To define what are the windows of opportunities and vulnerabilities 
and their effects on the occurrence of conflict, Posen would suggest to look at 
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offensive capabilities, which can be used for attacks against the other group 
(Posen, 1993: 34).  
 
To estimate the “offensive potential” of the Serbs as an ethnic group, 
this approach would suggest scrutinising both military capabilities and the 
effects of solidarity between the Serbs in Kosovo/a and the ones in Serbia 
proper. This solidarity is to be viewed as improving the offensive capabilities of 
the Serbs as an ethnic group. So, Posen would explain the nationalism used by 
Milosevic to breed solidarity among the Serbs as an effort to enhance the 
offensive capabilities of Serbs in the condition of increasing insecurity after the 
dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation. The need for security would explain, for 
Posen, the high solidarity among the Serbs, and the erasing of differences 
between the opposition forces, the public and Milosevic’s regime on the question 
of Kosovo/a (Thomas, 1999). Stefan Troebst’s views this solidarity as such: 
[t]he whole spectrum of Serbian political opposition to Milosevic was even more 
nationalistic than ‘Slobo’ himself…the ideas of Vojislav Sesel, Vuk Draskovic and 
Zoran Dindjic were much more radical than Milosevic’s comparatively flexible 
approach (1998: 9).  
 
There are other examples that evidence the forging of Serbs’ solidarity and their 
common attitude toward the Kosovo/a question. The findings of a public opinion 
survey on the “Readiness of the Serbia’s Citizens to Solve Ethnic Conflict,” 
which was carried out on November 1997 by Helsinki Committee for Human 
Rights in Serbia confirmed this solidarity. In the document it is stated that: 
An independent Kosovo, or the Republic of Kosovo within FRY, is admissible in 
the view of only a negligible number of our respondents. Likewise, very few 
respondents would accept a division of Kosovo. A vast percentage (41.8%) 
believes that the solution is to be looked for in the forcible or ‘peaceful’ expulsion 
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of the Albanians. On the other hand, 27.7% of those manifesting ‘democratic 
tolerance’ would be willing, at best, to grant the Albanians their cultural autonomy 
(November 1997). 
 
To use Posen’s logic, the high cohesion among different layers of Serbian 
society bounded by nationalism is to be viewed as a means to enhance group’s 
offensive capabilities, which, in turn, would explain the “worst-case” outcome of 
the inter-groups’ “security dilemma,” which is conflict (1993: 31).  
 
Following Posen’s scholarship to study the Kosovo/a conflict, it can be 
said that the window of opportunity created for Serbs after the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia does not suggest that Serbs have to get involved in conflict, since 
Serbs did enjoy superiority in power terms. Therefore, why did we have the 
“worst-case” scenario in Kosovo/a? Posen would explain the “worst-case” 
scenario by looking at the “uneven progress” in the creation of state structures 
and “shifting power” (Posen, 1993: 29) between ethnic groups.  
 
Accordingly, in the case of Kosovo/a the removal of the status of 
autonomy, which was followed by the declaration of independence from the 
Albanians, is to be understood as a change in the existent state structures, 
which have effects on the security of both groups. Thus, the declaration of 
independence of Kosovo/a by the Albanians (1990), implied a separation of 
Kosovo/a from the Serbian state structures. This move explains the 
intensification of the Serbian fears about the future of the Serbs in Kosovo/a. 
The Serbs in Kosovo/a were scattered in a number of vulnerable pockets 
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compared to the Albanians who dominated numerically the province. Thus, 
although the Serbs’ capabilities were superior to the one of the Albanians, the 
security of Serbs in Kosovo/a is seen as being in danger.   
 
Under these circumstances, drawing parallels with the explanations 
that Posen (1993) gives for the case of Serbs in Croatia, only offensive actions 
from Serbia proper can rescue the Serbs in Kosovo/a. Serbia’s military 
superiority would explain for Posen, Serbia’s preventive attacks in the province 
before its secession. So, this situation is to be seen as a window of vulnerability 
for the Serbs of Kosovo/a, which can be resolved by offensive actions of small 
military troops. This logic explains the action of the small Serb paramilitary units 
such as the “tigers” of Arkan, which were used to terrorise the Albanian 
population and force it to move out of the province. In the neo-realist approach, 
these actions are to be understood as preventive actions that would aim to 
resolve the security problem of the Serbs. So, Serbs are expected to feel safer 
in case these actions would be able to shift the ethno-demographic balance 
sheet of Kosovo to the disadvantage of the Albanian majority.  
 
Different sources provide evidence that would justify Posen’s 
assumptions. Thus, in different accounts the actions of small paramilitary troops 
are seen as aiming to compel the defenceless Albanians to leave Kosovo/a or at 
least to facilitate the settling of “between 700 000 to 1 million [Serb] 
peoples…from the North-East toward the South-West” of the province (Surroi, 
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1997: 45; see, also, 1998; Troebst, 1998: 15). According to Posen's scholarship 
these measures have to be understood as efforts of the Serbs to resolve the 
cause of their fears, which was the extinction of the Serbs in Kosovo/a.  
 
On the other hand, Serbia’s preventive measures, to use Posen’s 
logic, would intensify the “security dilemma,” if the Albanians would take 
measures to cope with these security threats. Posen would expect the 
intensification of the “security dilemma,” in case the Albanians would get the 
arms and organise themselves to fight for their security. The emergence of the 
KLA and the organisation of the Albanians in Kosovo/a around it, is to be seen 
as the moment that “security dilemma” started to accelerate leading the way to 
conflict. Drawing from Kaufman’s assumptions in explaining the case of 
Moldova, it can be said that in the moment some parts of Kosovo/a passed to 
the control of the KLA, this ethnic organisation has to be seen as receiving the 
attributes of sovereignty (1996: 151). From 1998 onwards, the conflict 
intensified, which according to Posen’s approach, is to be expected since 
anarchy was the condition of inter-group relations (the KLA is to be seen as 
being endowed with elements of sovereignty). In such a case, “security 
dilemma” is to be seen as leading groups’ behaviour. Thus, the intensification of 
the “security dilemma” explains the “worst case” scenario—the instigation of 
conflict on a large scale. 
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5.1.1. The Intra-State “Security Dilemma” and the Kosovo/a Conflict: A 
Critique 
 
The application of the “security dilemma” to intra-state level by the post-Cold 
War neo-realist scholarship represents an effort to make use of traditional neo-
realist concepts to explain contemporary conflicts. Nevertheless, the application 
remains problematic and in many respects undermines our understanding of the 
causes of conflict. In the post-Cold War neo-realist approach, the ethno-national 
groups are seen as autonomous and unitary units acting under the conditions of 
“emerging anarchy” after the dissolution of imperial regimes (Posen, 1993: 27). 
Based on this assumption the ethno-nationalist entities—in our case the 
Albanians, are expected to be controlling the territory of Kosovo/a. In the 
condition of the emergence of anarchy, the Serbs and the Albanians are 
expected to be alike, since both are looking after security. There are three main 
problems with these explanations of the Kosovo/a conflict. 
 
First, in Kosovo/a anarchy is not the condition in which groups’ inter-
relations take place. The situation, referring to Kaufman’s scholarship can be 
considered as “approximate” not systematic anarchy (1996: 151). The Serbian 
state did not at any moment (not until the peace deal with the Contact Group 
was reached, June 1999), lose control over the territory of Kosovo/a.  On the 
contrary, the Serbian authorities were the protagonists of the violence in the 
region. They are held responsible for organising the campaigns of ethnic 
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cleansing and the deportation of the civil population out of the territory of 
Kosovo/a (Caplan, 1999; Ignatieff, 2000; Amnesty International, 1998; Médecins 
Sans Frontières, 1999; United States Department of State, 1999). Neither did 
the Albanians have control over the territory of Kosovo/a (1990-1999), despite 
the actions of the KLA (1997-1999) against the police stations and seizing of 
some separated areas of the region.  
 
Although the Serbian state had lost legitimacy of governance in 
Kosovo/a72 the political, economical and military life of the region was in the 
hands of Serbs (Khol and Libal, 1992; Caplan, 1999; Vicker, 1998). Thus, the 
political organisation in  Kosovo/a was  hierarchical, which  attests the  absence  
of anarchy as a condition of groups’ inter-relations. Therefore, with the absence 
of the condition of anarchy, it would be difficult to explain the escalation of the 
“security dilemma” and its quality of spiralling to conflict.  
 
Second, Posen’s and Kaufman’s approaches to ethno-national 
conflict fail to spot the distinction between a “security dilemma” and a security 
problem.73 In the case of the Kosovo/a conflict, the abolition of the autonomy of 
Kosovo/a (1989) brought measures that aimed at leaving the Albanians out of 
the economic and social life of the province. Different accounts would testify 
that, from 1987 onwards, Serbian policies were aimed at ethnically cleansing the 
                                                                                             
 
72
 The argument is supported by the fact that the Albanians of Kosovo/a neglected the authority 
of Belgrade by establishing a separate and parallel political and economic life in the region. 
73
 For this distinction see, Wheeler and Booth (1992a). 
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Albanians from the province (Kohl Von and Libal, 1992; Caplan, 1999). In this 
context, threat has to be seen as “accurately perceived” (Wheeler and Booth 
1992a: 31). In this case “the situation cannot be perceived as a security 
'dilemma.' It is simply a security ‘problem’ albeit perhaps a difficult one” 
(Wheeler and Booth, 1992a: 31). This is because ethnic cleansing directly and 
explicitly involves an ethnic group’s extinction. Thus, the cause of conflict cannot 
be attributed to a “perceptual security dilemma” but to a “real security dilemma.” 
In this case, the “security dilemma” is to be understood as a by-product of 
conflict, which “redescribes” the escalation of violence rather than being the 
cause for it (Roe, 1999).  
 
Third, in the accounts that use the “security dilemma” to explain the 
causes of the Kosovo/a conflict, the role of power (defined in military and 
group’s cohesion terms) is overemphasised. This conceptual framework directs 
the attention away from understanding two important aspects of conflict. First, 
this approach fails to understand that the “anarchical environment” is the 
outcome of the “group differentiation” (identity), rather than lack of central 
government (Lapid and Kratochwil, 1996: 115; see, also, Wendt, 1992). This 
approach falls short of seeing identity as discursively constructed, practically 
and historically enacted and anarchy as what actors make of it (Wendt, 1999). 
Instead, Posen and Kaufman’s scholarships “end up reducing the national 
[identity] to some other ‘more basic’ factors” (Lapid and Kratochwil, 1996: 120).   
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Second, this approach is an hindrance to the understanding of the role 
of groups’ internal social processes in the conflict formation. Different accounts 
of the Kosovo/a conflict reveal the importance of domestic processes in the 
“securitisation” of ethnicity as the underlying cause of conflict. Power based 
explanations of the Kosovo/a conflict undermine these aspects. Alternative 
explanations that take into account the role of identity as social signifier and its 
"securitisation" to explore the Kosovo/a conflict are exposed and discussed in 
Chapter 6. 
 
 
5.2. Explaining the Kosovo/a Conflict as a “New War” 
 
The Kosovo/a case although a conflict fought locally would be defined in the 
“New Wars” approach as a “new" or a globalised war. The “New Wars” or the 
political economy approach considers globalisation as the underlying cause for 
the dissolution of Yugoslavia (Woodward, 1995; Kaldor, 1999), in general, and 
turmoil in Serbia, in particular (Kaldor, 1999). Thus, intra-state conflicts are 
studied in the context of globalisation, which is the main contribution of this 
approach. Globalisation is to be understood as the underlying cause of conflict 
because it is expected to contribute to the decline of the role of the Serbian state 
and its revenues and the emergence of rival actors to the state. In these 
circumstances, the conflict of economic interests (for private aggrandisement 
and/or access to resources) of different non-state actors interconnected at the 
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local, national and international levels are seen as the immediate causes of the 
Kosovo/a conflict. This interpretation of the conflict seems to be contrasting with 
the liberal interpretation that “identifies in ‘commerce’ a potential force to pacify 
the relations among the states” since it suggest that the “globalised liberal 
market forces are quite compatible with regional and local structures of violence” 
(Jung, 1993a: 1). 
 
Globalisation has to be seen as an important component of the 
political economy of the Kosovo/a conflict for two reasons. First, globalisation is 
seen contributing to the decline of Serbian state authority and legitimacy and the 
(re)emergence of criminality and identity politics in the created vacuum. Second, 
globalisation is seen as generating increased opportunities for economic 
motives to different protagonists that emerged after the retreat of the Serbian 
state. Considering the Kosovo/a conflict as a "new" or globalised war, the "New 
Wars" scholarship would suggest analysing different variables to approach the 
case. For example, first, the main protagonists and units of analysis; second, the 
primary motives of protagonists; third, resources that are used to finance the 
conflict; fourth, the strategy and the mode of warfare.  
 
The referent objects of analysis in this approach are distorted politico-
military formations, which have a horizontal rather than a hierarchical 
organisation. The erosion of the Serbian state’s legitimacy in Kosovo/a and 
globalisation would explain the emergence of both a growing informal economy 
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and different types of militia groups with trans, local and national links (Bougarel, 
1996: 103). 
 
Thus, the referent object of analysis is seen as being made of 
participants from local, national and transnational levels. Group’s loyalties are 
seen as being shaped by common economic interests. In the case of the 
Kosovo/a conflict, the Kosova Liberation Army (KLA) and the Serbian 
paramilitary forces such as Arkan’s Tigers in respectively Albanian and Serbian 
spectrum, are to be understood as examples of emerging horizontal cultures 
that transcend local and national loyalties. For Francesco Strazzari they have to 
be understood “as a function of the decomposition and re-composition of the 
state’s monopoly of force, and as a bridge towards new armies and new forms 
of political legitimacy” (2003: 143).  
 
Thus, the KLA and Arkan’s Tigers although being local organisations 
are seen as part of larger politico-military formations. Their composition is seen 
as being mixed, because they include in their composition mercenaries coming 
from the neighbouring countries such as Serbska Republic in Bosnia, Krajina in 
Croatia, Albania and Macedonia. Furthermore, the international presence in 
these politico-military formations includes Serbian and Albanian diaspora in the 
US and in the European countries, as well the “army” of international agencies 
and institutions including the NGOs, the OSCE’s observers and KFOR 
peacekeepers (see, also, Kaldor, 1999). So, the Arkan’s group is viewed as a 
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“skilled service provider” (Strazzari, 2003: 151; Vasovic, 2000) helping the 
Milosevic’s elite and other international actors to satisfy their interests for 
enrichment and domination. To cite Strazzari: 
[t]he criminal profile of Arkan–whose tigers are accused of the worst crimes in 
Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo/a–stood in striking contrast with the one of a blood – 
thirsty fanatic, and was more in line with the one of a skilled service provider. He 
was on the side of the Belgrade regime and could manage a good share of the pie 
of oil smuggling. Increasingly active in the importation to Serbia of German and 
Swedish-made fertilizers through Hungary, his Montenegrin acquaintances finally 
allowed him some involvement in the cigarette smuggling business.  Given the 
extent to which criminal gangs were in symbiotic relationship with the regime, it 
shows the way the central regime took care of its own perpetuation (2003: 151; see, 
also, Staletovic, 2000). 
 
As Arkan’s tigers the KLA is to be understood as a mafia type organisation in the 
control of drug running and arms trafficking and related to international mafia 
organisations looking after personal enrichment (Milivojevic, 1995: 68). 
According to Strazzari: 
The Kosovar Albanian [mafia] organizations were winning the underground war over 
the drug market against the Albanians from Albania, and they emancipated 
themselves from the role of being a mere connection ring between the Turkish Mafia 
and its allocation on Western market. Moreover, the strategic alliance with the 
Italians and even with Russian and Ukrainian groups rendered these organizations 
that became soon famous for the ferocity of their methods, an autonomous actor 
(2003: 154). 
  
In the "New Wars" scholarship it is argued that economic motives and greed are 
to be seen as primary driving forces of violent conflict. Hence, the conflict in 
Kosovo/a is to be assessed as fought to reproduce position of power and access 
to resources of predatory rent seekers, rather than resolve the issues worrying 
the communities they pretend to represent. These groups are expected to use 
conflict as a means to achieve their economic interests, while identity politics is 
only epiphenomenal. To cite Francesco Strazzari, the “[f]ormal and informal 
economic and administrative practices that took root in the late days of 
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Yugoslavia often happened to play a key role in the priming of war dynamics” 
(2003: 142).  
 
To discover the linkage between economic interests of Serbian and 
Albanian distorted politico-military formations and conflict this approach 
investigates informal economic and war activities of the KLA and Arkan’s tigers. 
The behaviour of the warring parties is seen as being motivated by economic 
profits, which is achieved only by single-handed political control over Kosovo/a. 
These explanations assume that the fast and prompt private aggrandizement 
interests of these political groups necessitated both maintaining economic 
connections at local, national and international level and use war to uphold them 
(Strazzari, 2003). Thus, the control over the Kosovo/a’s territory is seen as 
having an economic rather than ideological meaning, although ideology 
(nationalism) is utilised to justify the conflict and ethnic cleansing.  
 
Groups’ interests are seen as being defined in economic terms. For 
the scholars of this scholarship, the economic interests of different actors are the 
ones that shape group’s loyalties and behaviour. The case of “pax mafiosa” 
established between Zeljko Raznatovic, better known as Arkan, and Enver Hajin 
considered a prominent figure among the Albanian criminal bosses operating 
around the Shkodra lake are presented in the accounts of this approach as an 
example that demonstrate that economic interest are the ones that motivate 
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different actors’ behaviour and shape their identity loyalties (Strazzari, 2003: 
146).  
 
Most of the accounts of the "New Wars" scholarship argue that the 
main financing resources of the conflict beside the local “loot and plunder” are to 
be seen as mostly coming from various forms of illegal trading, support from 
neighbouring countries, diaspora groups and humanitarian assistance at 
international level. This argument is seen as holding true in the case of the 
Kosovo/a conflict, that why it is considered by many of these scholars as a “new 
war” (James, 1994, Block and Doyle, 1993, Milivojevic, 1998). Furthermore, 
Strazzari suggests that informal and criminal activities and illegal trafficking 
provided the resources to fight the Kosovo/a conflict, which, in turn, fuelled 
“rewarding forms of conflict and control over population and economic activities” 
to the KLA and the Arkan’s Tigers (2003: 148).  
 
According to Viviano (1994), “the Serbs have financed a part of the 
war in ex-Yugoslavia thanks to counterfeiting, and also through the laundering of 
the drug money deposited in more than 200 private banks or currency exchange 
offices.” Furthermore, James referring to a report published by a Paris-based 
narcotics-monitoring group states:  
Albanian groups in Macedonia and Kosovo province in Serbia are trading heroin 
for large quantities of weapons for use in a brewing conflict in Kosovo…Albanian 
traffickers were supplied with heroin and weapons by Mafia-like groups in Georgia 
and Armenia. The Albanians then pay for the supplies by reselling the heroin in 
the West. …the Albanian dealers also trade directly with Russian soldiers for 
weapons in exchange for heroin (1994; see, also, Block and Doyle, 1993: 14; 
Milivojevic, 1995: 68). 
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The international and local financing of the Kosovo/a conflict, emphasised here 
is conceptualised as a characteristic of “new wars,” since in the case of the “old 
wars” state holds the monopoly of the means to finance violence. 
 
As most of the post-Cold War approaches to conflict, the “New Wars” 
approach use identity or more precisely, identity politics to study conflict. Hence, 
for Kaldor, identity politics is used to legitimise groups’ self-defined political 
position. So, in the case of Kosovo/a, identity politics should be understood as a 
means used to legitimise the Serb or the Albanian distorted politico-military 
formations political claims. Strazzari suggests that identity politics is used by 
Arkan’s Tigers and the KLA to justify their illegal activities of private 
aggrandisement as assistance to respectively intimidated Serbs or Albanians of 
Kosovo/a and to present their ties with mafia networks as holding moral rather 
than economic value. In view of that, economic interests of groups are seen as 
becoming politically relevant through the politics of (ethnic) identity.  
 
Hence, this approach would suggest to explore the policies of 
Milosevic and Serbian elite to present an exclusive Serb identity on the eve of 
the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation as part of identity politics. Identity 
politics was used to encourage a victim mentality to the Serbs, which: 
[w]as nurtured with an electronic diet of tales of ‘genocide’ in Kosovo/a, first by 
Turks in 1389 and more recently by the Albanians…with clips of the Second World 
War interspersed with current developments. In effect, the Serbian public 
experienced a virtual war long before the real war was to take place-a virtual war 
that made it difficult to distinguish the truth from fiction so that war became a 
continuum in which the 1389 battle of Kosovo, the Second World War and the war 
 208 
in [Kosovo] were part of the same phenomenon (Kaldor, 1999: 39-40; see, also, 
Bieber, 2002).  
 
Serbian ethnic identity presented as such, provided a non-negotiable situation. 
Crawford and Lipschutz suggest that identity politics defined as such is used as 
a means for gathering political supremacy that in “its most extreme form 
increases the odds that conflict will escalate into repression and violence” rather 
than negotiations (1997: 168). Thus, identity politics has to be considered as a 
means for facilitating conflict. Identity is used in explaining conflict in 
instrumental terms, as in the case of post-Cold War neo-realist approach. 
 
The roots of the conflicts are suggested to be elsewhere. The causes 
of the conflict as it was argued above are to be founded on the distributional 
particularised enrichment interest of different political military formations and the 
generative “logic” of globalisation. So to sum up, in this approach the conflict is 
interpreted as arising from conflicting interests of enrichment of the Kosovo/a 
Albanians and the Serbian distorted politico-military formations that struggled for 
control of Kosovo/a’s market and resources in the condition of the erosion of the 
Serbian state authority and legitimacy.  
 
 
5.2.1. Explaining the Kosovo/a Conflict as a “New War:” A Critique 
 
Viewing Kosovo/a case as a “new war” is limiting one’s understanding of the 
causes of conflict. The Kosovo/a conflict is described in this approach as utterly 
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decentralised and uncontrolled, aggregating in a single process private and local 
conflicts, which involve different non-state actors motivated by greed and loot 
(Kalyvas, 2003: 475). Therefore, to use Kaldor’s words “both politically and 
militarily” the conflict between the Serbs and the Albanians “was not against 
each other” but “against the civilian population and against civil society” (1999: 
58). In this accounts “fear and hate” is not considered endemic to groups but 
manufactured during the course of the war. This conceptualisation limits our 
understanding of the Kosovo/a conflict. Three issues are discussed as follows.  
 
First, in the “New Wars” approach the Kosovo/a conflict is views as a 
by product of recent globalisation and as such it is named as a “new war.” This 
interpretation of the conflict neglects the historical relations between the Serbs 
and the Albanians as ethnic communities. From an historical perspective, the 
conflict between the Serbs and the Albanians in Kosovo/a is not new. The 
Kosovo/a conflict can be better seen as part of the continuous efforts for state-
creation and nation-building, a process that is considered violent and not yet 
completed in the Balkans.74 Therefore, the causes of conflict can be defined in 
terms of conflicting territorial claims, in view of the process of nation-building 
rather than a clash of economic interests of distorted politico-military formations. 
 
                                                                                             
 
74
 The states boundaries in the Balkans, which were established mainly after the 1912-1913 
Balkan Wars, were indifferent to ethnic, language and religious distribution of the population. As 
a consequence, the state of Serbia and Albania were created with two third of the population left 
outside their state borders (Danopoulos and Messas, 1997). Therefore, the control over 
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Second, the “New Wars” approach use identity in the explanation of 
the conflict as a means rather than an end. In this, the loyalties of non-state 
actors are not defined in terms of identity but in terms of economic interests. 
This is supposed to be the case because globalisation according to Kaldor has 
broken up the “vertically organized cultures” (1999: 71). This conceptualisation 
of identity undermines the substance of the conflict because what is held to fuel 
the ‘ancient hatred’ between the Serbs and the Albanians—is actually largely 
self-referential rather than instrumental.   
 
Hence, this approach fails to account for the Serbs and the Albanians 
groups’ historical grievances, which have been acquired in the process of 
historical interaction and can be a self-referential cause of the conflict. To 
account for the group’s grievances, the fault line between the Serbs and the 
Albanians as warring parties is to be defined in vertical rather than horizontal 
terms. In this case, behaviour has to be understood as a product of groups’ past 
and present inter-relations embedded in respective identities rather than instant 
economic interests.  
 
So, one would be justified in arguing that the war waged by the KLA 
and being financed internationally cannot be explained simply as a strategy to 
favour the KLA’s enrichment and its political control over the Kosovo/a market. 
Rather the emergence of the conflict is to be considered as an expression of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
Kosovo/a (currently inhabited by an Albanian majority) either by the Serbs or the Albanians 
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resistance of the Albanians against Milosevic’s policies of repression. In other 
terms, the conflict can be explained as a response to the societal threat to the 
existence of the Albanians of Kosovo/a. Different international and watchdog 
organisations have reported the violation of human rights in Kosovo/a. 
 
Third, in the “New Wars” approach, the non-state actors are 
considered as the referent object of analysis. However, this approach deep 
down offers a state-centric outlook of the conflict. Thus, this approach points to 
the erosion of Serbian state’s legitimacy and authority in the condition of 
globalisation as the underlying cause of conflict. The solution that this approach 
offers to settle the conflict is the restoration of the legitimacy of the Serbian 
state. The legitimacy should develop out of a cosmopolitan project. So, the “New 
Wars” approach cannot interpret “the conflict as the struggle of an oppressed 
national group against a colonial/imperial power in a demand for democratic 
citizenship” (Wilson, 2001: 367). Hence, this implicit state-centrism prevents this 
approach from properly defining the referent object of analysis.   
 
 
This chapter provided an interpretation of the Kosovo/a conflict based on two 
post-Cold War approaches: neo-Realism and the “New Wars” scholarship. From 
the post-Cold War neo-realist perspective, the emergence of anarchy after the 
dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation promised inevitable competition for 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
remains of importance as a major object of competitive claims of statehood.  
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security between the Serbs and the Albanians in Kosovo/a (viewed as unitary 
and reified ethnic groups), which intensification led to conflict. The “New Wars” 
approach view the erosion of Serbian state authority (linked to globalisation) and 
the emergence of different distorted politico-military formations in this vacuum as 
the underlying causes of conflict. The non-negotiable competition for economic 
gains between the emerging groups is to be seen as the immediate cause of the 
Kosovo/a conflict. Both approaches main contribution is to introduce the logic of 
anarchy (Posen, 1993) and globalisation (Kaldor, 1999) to the intra-state level 
and consider non-state actors as the referent object of analysis. 
 
Both approaches explain actors’ behaviours as shaped by material 
interest (power or economic gains) and depending on the structure of the 
system or globalisation that are viewed as exogenous to the actors’ interactions. 
This framework of analysis undermines our understanding of the Kosovo/a 
conflict, since it exaggerates the autonomy of the actor from its properties 
(identity and interest), while underdetermining the role of actor’s identity in its 
behaviour (Wendt, 1999: 228).  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
Constructivism and the Kosovo/a Conflict 
 
 
 
This chapter looks at what Alexander Wendt’s and the Copenhagen School’s 
approaches, whose theoretical foundations were presented in Chapter 3, can tell 
us about the Kosovo/a conflict. These approaches offer interesting contributions 
to our understanding of the social aspects of the Kosovo/a conflict, which is 
neglected in the traditional and the post-Cold War approaches discussed in 
Chapters 4 and 5. These constructivist approaches organise their explanations 
by focusing on the principle of identity. 
 
Both approaches agree on the constructed nature of actors’ identity. 
Hence, they would view the identities of the Serbs and Albanians as constructed 
in the process of interaction; however, treating them as constant and 
 214 
unchanging at the moment the conflict is happening. Furthermore, identity is 
assessed as a means of organising social differentiation between actors, being 
either states (Wendt’s approach) or societies (the Copenhagen School’s 
approach). In both perspectives, actors are assumed to be unitary units. Hence, 
in the case of the Kosovo/a conflict, the Serbs and the Albanians are viewed as 
unitary actors and the referent objects of analysis.  
 
Although both approaches refer to identity to study behaviour in 
international relations, they offer alternative interpretations of the conflict. 
Consequently, they are addressed within two separate sections in this chapter. 
The first section uses Wendt’s approach to study the Kosovo/a conflict. The 
basic argument of Wendt’s perspective is that negative collective memories of 
actors embedded on actors’ identity would help explain the occurrence of 
conflict. The process of past interactions by which the identities of the Serbs and 
the Albanians get formed as enemies would explain the occurrence of conflict 
and subsequently the nature of the relations with one another. In this approach, 
it is suggested that conflict is not a simple attempt to realise selfish ends, rather 
it is a site of reproduction and instantiation of both actors’ identities. Thus, the 
Serbs and the Albanians, for Wendt, learn to be enemies by treating each other 
in ways that do not recognise their right to life and liberty. Here, the identity of 
the Serbs is seen as a role related to the role-identity of the Albanians and vice 
versa.  
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The second section looks at the Copenhagen School’s approach and 
examines what it can tell us about the case study. This approach views the 
conflict emerging out of actors’ competition to strengthen their identities (Bilgin, 
2003). The third section provides an assessment of both approaches 
contribution in explaining the conflict. The fourth section looks at the causal 
effects of “securitisation” of different aspects of ethnic identity in the emergence 
of conflict. Here, attention is paid to “securitisation” seen as a social process or 
as a so called “speech act” (Buzan et al., 1998: 26) through which elites, by way 
of supporting their own interests, may come to frame ethnic identity in 
chauvinistic and exclusivist terms. It can be assumed that this process may lead 
to conflict in the case of an intensive and successful “securitisation” process 
(Buzan et al., 1998: 25). The chapter concludes by emphasising that both 
Wendt’s and the Copenhagen School’s approaches offer essential contributions 
to the study of the social aspects of the Kosovo/a conflict, but suffer certain 
weaknesses that are discussed in the last part of this section. 
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6.1. Wendt’s and the Copenhagen School’s Approaches to Identity and the 
Kosovo/a Conflict 
 
 
6.1.1. Wendt’s Approach to Identity and the Kosovo/a Conflict 
 
In this section Wendt’s approach is used to examine the Kosovo/a conflict. In 
this approach, the Serbian and the Albanian “conflicting identities” are to be 
understood as the underlying cause of conflict. The Serbs and the Albanians are 
seen as unitary actors and their identities are constituted in the process of 
mutual interaction. In the construction of Serbian social identity, the Albanians 
are viewed as different and this difference is perceived and represented as 
conflicting with the Serbian “self.” The same thing would be said for the Albanian 
social identity and its construction of the “other” (the Serb).  
 
Collective knowledge inscribed in the collective memory, myths, 
narratives and traditions are viewed as responsible for constituting who the 
Serbs or the Albanians are and how they relate to each other. Sabrina P. Ramet 
defines as such the background of relations between the two communities: “two 
ethnic communities with distinct languages and religious traditions lay claim to 
the same territory with competing arguments as evidence” (1992: 174; 1996). 
For this scholarship, it is in virtue of such pretensions that have shaped the 
relations between the two that the Serbs and the Albanians identities are 
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constituted in exclusivist terms, which at the same time can help explain actors’ 
patters of behaviour.  
 
The difference between the Serbs and the Albanians is related to the 
fact that both sides believe that Kosovo/a is an important constitutive element of 
their identity. For the Albanians, Kosovo/a represents an important part of the 
Albanian medieval state—the principality of Arber, since 1190 (Drancolli, 2001: 
70). The Albanian medieval state is argued to have integrated the early Illyrian 
tribes including the ones of Kosovo/a (Drancolli, 2001: 54-56; see, also, Buda, 
1990;) in the so-called medieval state of Scanderbeg (Pulaha, 1982; Xhufi, 
1993; Drancolli, 2001). This state is viewed to be bound by the distinct ethnic 
formation of the Albanians based on language and culture (Berisha, 1998; 
Malcolm, 1998; Misha, 2002; Blumi, 2002). In the nineteenth century, the 
League of Prizren (1878) was established as the culminating moment of the 
Albanian national movement. Different accounts assess that the League is 
represented in the memory of the Albanians as the moment of their national 
unity, as nationalist leaders declared: “We make no distinctions between creeds. 
We are all Albanians” (Skendi, 1967: 220). In this founding moment, Albanians 
are seen as representing themselves as “one of the oldest-established 
populations in Europe,” always existing and as such “no people could be less 
‘alien’ to the history of the Balkans” than them (Malcolm, 1998: 2; see, also, 
Misha, 2002). 
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On the other hand, different authors affirm that Serbs view Kosovo/a 
at the time of the Battle of Kosovo/a (1389) as the heartland of the Serbian 
people (Batakovic, 1992; Judah, 1997).  This is the case because it was in Pec 
[Peje in Albanian] where the Serbian Church (1346) was headquartered and the 
Serbian kings established the Nemanjic Empire (which began to crumble with 
the death of the King Stefan Dusan in 1355). The Battle of Kosovo/a is often 
viewed as an important event, which has shaped the identity of the Serbs. It is 
suggested that Serbs see themselves even today as heroes bound together and 
sustained by the “Kosovo Covenant” that in Batakovic terms: 
Is the choice of freedom in the Celestial Empires instead of humiliation and slavery 
in the temporal world…although irrational as a collective consciousness, is still the 
one permanent connective tissue that imbues the Serbs with the feeling of national 
entity and lends meaning to their joint efforts (1992: 58).  
 
Thus, an established and everlasting identity of Serbs is seen as bound to 
Kosovo/a, although at the moment of the conflict the province was 90 percent 
Albanian. 
 
This intersubjective understanding of Kosovo/a from both sides (the 
Serbs and the Albanians) is to be understood as part of what Wendt calls 
“freestanding” (1999: 167). In this “freestanding,” the Serbs and the Albanians 
are seen existing as independent self-organised entities. In Maja Zehfuss’s 
(2001) terms, this conceptualisation of the agency addresses the question of 
identity as a question of who is considered part of the “self.” In other words, 
Kosovo/a, as a territory and history, is to be understood as a constitutive 
element of the Serbian “self” and Albanian “self.” At the same time, although the 
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belief about Kosovo/a as part of the “self” refers to the events that happened in 
the past, in the definition of the “self” in the present, this belief is seen as 
unchanging.  
  
The interactions shaped by threats to either the Serbs or the 
Albanians identities would be, according to Wendt’s approach, embedded in the 
“collective knowledge.” The long historical struggle between the Serbs and the 
Albanians to own Kosovo/a territory is to be seen as having a special role in 
explaining how their identities are constituted in conflicting terms. The 
articulation of identity in terms of enmity presumes the exclusion of the “other’s” 
existence in Kosovo/a.  
 
In the examination of the Yugoslav wars, Wendt points out that the 
key resources that made war happen should be attributed to “a collective 
memory [culture] that throughout their history Serbs had been victimized” by the 
“others” (1999: 163). The narratives and myths of the past that Wendt refers to 
as the resources of the “collective knowledge” (1999: 143, 163), are utilised to 
explain the antagonism between the Serbs and the Albanians and the Kosovo/a 
conflict at the end of the 1999s. Considering that both the Serbs and the 
Albanians are committed and see themselves as bounded to these “collective 
memories,” Wendt would suggest seeing them as available resources to 
mobilise collective actions and “explain patterns in aggregate behaviour” (1999: 
163), which in the case of Kosovo/a is aggressive behaviour.  
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Historical events such as the Battle of Kosovo/a, the forced migration 
of the Serbs after the Battle of Kosovo/a (1389) and their extermination in the 
World War II by the SS Skenderbeg division of the Albanians are to be 
understood as events contributing to the construction of the negative collective 
memories of the Serbs towards the Albanians. These memories that portray the 
“other” as the enemy account for the atmosphere of hostility and suspicion that 
developed rapidly in Serbia on the eve of the Kosovo/a conflict. While these 
events are considered as the landmark of Serbs’ collective memories, the 
retaliation of Serb guerrilla bands against the Albanians considered as the 
perpetrators of these crimes with counter massacres is expected to function in a 
similar way for the collective memory of the Albanians. To give an example of 
the events that shape the negative collective knowledge of the Albanians 
towards the Serbs we can mentioned, the retaliation of the Serbs against the 
Albanians at the end of WWII and the re-imposition of Yugoslav rule over 
Kosovo/a. At that time martial law was declared and 48 000 Kosovo/a Albanians 
are reported as been killed in six months (Vickers, 1998: 142-143).  
 
In Wendt’s logic the recurrence of these events having as their subject 
the persecution by the “other,” is embedded in the deep structure of collective 
knowledge (culture) of both the Serbs and the Albanians. They represent what 
Wendt calls “macro-level regularities” (1999: 164). This negative collective 
knowledge about the “other,” which is homeostatic in being (at least at the 
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moment of the conflict) would explain also, if we refer to Wendt, the tendency for 
conflict to recur over time between the Serbs and the Albanians in Kosovo/a. 
 
By considering the victimisation of the Serbs or the Albanians as 
“macro-level regularities” (Wendt, 1999: 164) this approach would suggest that 
they are everlasting. Consequently, assuming that the Serbs and the Albanians 
learned to be enemies75 in their continuous struggle over Kosovo/a conflict, 
Wendt would suggest to see the enmity as transported from the past without 
variations. The indicators of tolerance76 (Hodson et al., 1994) and social 
distance estimated on the base of the cases of intermarriages between Serbs 
and Albanians77 (Botev, 1994) can be viewed as a fact of continuous 
antagonism between the two identities. To cite Hodson, these indicators reflect 
upon “along history of unresolved rivalries between nationalities” (Hodson et al. 
1994: 1552).78 These indicators are particularly revealing if analysed in the light 
of the claim that previous historical social interactions between the Serbs and 
                                                                                             
 
75
 Enmity in the case of extreme negative inter-group experiences or memories would be defined 
as ethnic hatred. 
76
 Hodson at al. (1994) uses different indicators such as the GDP per capita, infant mortality per 
thousands and the like to discuss the differences between the Serbs and the Albanians. These 
differences are assumed to affect the level of tolerance in Serb-Albanian inter-relations. 
77
 Botev (1994) uses the indicator of intermarriage to define the level of integration or distance 
between ethnic communities that live under the roof of a common state. His example refers to 
the case of former Yugoslavia. Botev concludes that intermarriages between the Serbs and the 
Albanians in Kosovo/a were at the lowest level in the framework of the Federation compared to 
the other national groups within Yugoslavia.  The author notices that the percentage of 
exogamous marriages in Kosovo/a decreased by 50 percent in the period 1987-1989 compared 
to 1962-1964 (1994: 469). 
78
 For example, the gross social product per capita in Kosovo/a was two times in 1955, three 
times in 1970 and four times in 1988 lower than in Serbia proper. In 1981, illiteracy rate in 
Kosovo/a was 21 percent of the population older than 15, while in Serbia proper was 11.5 
percent. In 1988, infant mortality in Kosovo/a was 2.65 times higher than that in Serbia proper. 
The data refer to Savezni Zavod Statistiki (1963, 1973, 1990), as cited by Botev (1994: 463). 
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the Albanians have not only shaped both communities’ identities and interests, 
but also sustain them as unchanged. 
 
To sum up, from this perspective point of view, the identity of the 
Serbs or the Albanians is to be viewed as socially constructed in the process of 
common interaction that is suggested to "mirror" (Wendt, 1992: 404) the 
“other’s” behaviour. The collective knowledge shaped by a sense of victimisation 
(that was constituted in the past but is taken as given in the 1990s), is to be 
understood as an available resource of information mobilising collective actions 
independent from individual beliefs. In this approach, identity is assessed as a 
motivational force, hiding an "unseen power" affecting egoistic behaviour 
through which both the Serbs and the Albanians attempt to come to term with 
the problem of their victimisation. The suggestion is that identity does not by 
itself lead to violence, but the processes of “othering” are the ones that prompt 
violent behaviour. 
 
 
6.1.2. The Copenhagen School’s Approach to Identity and the Kosovo/a 
Conflict 
 
The Copenhagen School perspective broadly agrees with Wendt’s claims about 
the constructed nature of identity. Building upon Wendt’s approach to identity, 
the Copenhagen School, by introducing the concept of societal security provides 
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an alternative referent object of analysis: society. Society can be used as a 
referent object in explaining the Kosovo/a conflict as well and this section tries to 
do that. The use of the concept of society in the interpretation of conflict, first 
helps to overcome the state-centrism of Wendt’s perspective; second, brings 
attention to previously neglected sources of conflict, such as the one emanating 
from resurgent nationalism; and last but not least, it introduces identity to the 
study of security.  
 
In this approach, the Serb and the Albanian societies have to be 
defined in terms of identity and assessed as unitary actors. At the same time, 
they are to be considered as the referent object of analysis. The conflict is 
examined as developing out of security and identity dynamics interactions. The 
dynamics of this process in Bilgin’s words:  
[R]esembles the security dilemma. The difference between this process and the 
classical security dilemma is that instead of threatening each other by building their 
militaries…societies…threatened each other through emphasising the dominance of 
their identities (2003: 211). 
 
Drawing upon this logic, the case of Kosovo/a conflict is to be understood as 
prompted by the Serbs’ and the Albanians’ competition on strengthening the 
boundaries of identity (Bilgin, 2003: 211). Thus, the efforts of both sides to seize 
control of the Kosovo/a territory explain only the instantiation of the Serbs and 
Albanians selves that view Kosovo as part of their identity (Wendt’s approach). 
The struggle for Kosovo/a, from a Copenhagen School’s perspective has to be 
seen as creating a dominating position to whom would possess it and a 
necessary condition for security vis-à-vis the other.  
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Following this logic, the demographic threats to Serbian identity in 
Kosovo/a (90 percent of the population of the region is Albanian) need to be 
seen as a shrinking of the boundaries of “self” (Serbs being pushed away from 
their homeland). In other words, if the boundaries of “self” are threatened with 
shrinkage, this is perceived as an attempt of strengthen the sense of being of the 
Albanians (seizing territory at the expenses of the Serbs). In this context, it can 
be argued that excessive efforts in strengthening the boundaries of “self” are 
comprehended as a threat to the “other’s” being, which explains the emergence 
of an ideational “security dilemma” of which escalation is expected to led to 
conflict.  
 
Thus, the demand of the Albanians for self-administration (1989) and 
later on for independence (1999) of Kosovo/a, is to be seen as a direct threat to 
the Serbian identity. In this situation, the response of Serbia has to be explained 
as being in compliance with the strategies of self-help that would serve to 
“strengthen the idea of nationhood (we feeling) among [the Serbs’] own 
populace” (Bilgin, 2003: 212).  
 
The logic of “security dilemma” justifies the answer on the side of 
Serbia to perceived threats, which was the dissolution of the Kosovo/a 
Assembly, the abrogation of the status of autonomy for the Kosovo/a region and 
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the taking over of all the institutions of the province.79 Together with the 
abolishment of the status of the autonomous province, the Albanian 
representatives were excluded from all political, economical and social 
institutions. 100,000 Albanians were fired from all major public and economic 
and social spheres of activity and replaced by Serbs or Montenegrins. 
Furthermore, all political organisations as well as cultural and sport associations 
of the Albanian majority in the province were forbidden together with the print 
and media houses (Schmidt, 1993: 21-29; Troebst, 1998). The Albanian workers 
were fired from their jobs and the Serbs of the province acquiesced in (Magas, 
1993: 262-263). All these “emergency measures” named differently as “planned 
starvation” (Kohl and Libal, 1992) explain Serbian willingness to counter the 
attempt of the Albanians for independence. The measures taken by the Serbs to 
strengthen their sense of being can be explained by an “altercasting” logic 
(Wendt, 1999: 329, 331). According to this logic, the Albanians are forced into a 
submissive alternative identity (stop seeing Kosovo/a as part of their identity) by 
using violence towards them.  
 
This imposition of the Serbian “self” is to be seen in competition with 
the “other” being it— the Albanians, which were the subject of pressure to 
accept a particular position in Kosovo/a. Albanians are should not have been 
expected to welcome these measures because they represented a threat to their 
                                                                                             
 
79
 On 13 September 1990, the Serbian parliament approved a new constitution, which 
definitively abolished the previous autonomy of Kosovo/a and Vojvodina. Both provinces 
became simple regions within the Serbian state.  
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very existence in Kosovo/a and identity. Accordingly, following the Copenhagen 
School logic, it is to be expected that in response to the removal of the status of 
autonomy, the Albanian majority in Kosovo/a, which held the same territorial 
claims as the Serbs, would react to these threats. The establishment by the 
Albanians of a parallel structure independent from the Serbian state is to be 
seen as part of the response and a threat to Serbian identity.  
 
The Albanians legitimised their ownership over Kosovo by declaring 
independence in a referendum organised in October 1991.  Within the same 
territory two separate political lives were organised with functioning 
presidencies, governments, legislatures and education and health structures. 
Both sides’ claims for ownership and legitimacy over Kosovo/a and their efforts 
are to be considered as actions aimed at strengthening the idea of nationhood.  
 
In this context, the emergence of the conflict in Kosovo/a is to be 
understood as the outcome of a radicalised societal “security dilemma,” which 
builds upon the actions of the “other” aiming at strengthening the boundaries of 
“self.” Thus, to sum up, the Serbs in Kosovo/a are viewed as feeling threatened 
by the demographic supremacy of the Albanians in the region. Furthermore, the 
actions of the Albanians that aimed at the separation from Serbia would explain 
the radicalisation of “security dilemma.” Milosevic’s words can account for the 
radicalisation of insecurity on the side of the Serbs: 
There is no time for sorrow. It is time for struggle…We shall win the Battle for 
Kosovo regardless of the obstacles facing us inside and outside the country…We 
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shall win despite the fact that Serbia’s enemies outside the country are plotting 
against it along with those in the country.  We tell them that we go into every Battle 
with the aim of winning it.80 
 
In this approach, the emergence of conflict would be explained by pointing to the 
“security dilemma” that intensified with the self-declaration of the independence 
by the Albanians and the actions of the KLA. These acts are to be assessed as 
an expression of strengthening Albanian identity domination. This explanation 
would justify the Serbs reaction with policies of ethnic cleansing, which, in turn, 
is to be seen as the moment when the “security dilemma” worsened and led the 
way to conflict. In Bartov’s (2000) arguments the use of genocide against the 
“other” is based on the belief that a society can be better off if the “other” is 
eliminated. At the same time, genocide helps make societal identity 
distinguishable by using the labels of the “victim” and the “perpetrator.” The 
measures that each side considered as necessary to strengthen Serbian and 
Albanian societies’ sense of identity (inextricably linked with the ownership of 
Kosovo/a) explain why the sides had to resort to conflict as the last resort. 
 
To sum up, from a Copenhagen School perspective the historical 
struggle between the Serbian and the Albanian societies for the ownership of 
Kosovo/a has to be seen as part of the process that shaped their identities in 
rivalry terms. Thus, the efforts on the side of the Serbs or the Albanians to 
strengthen their societal identity would create a “security dilemma,” spiralling of 
which would led to violent conflict. 
                                                                                             
 
80
 As cited by Ramet, 1992: 83. 
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6.1.3. Constructivist Approaches and the Kosovo/a Conflict: An 
Assessment 
 
Wendt’s and the Copenhagen School’s perspectives extensively rely on identity 
to establish a causal link between conflict and actors’ interactions. This 
framework was used to assess the contribution of this approach to our 
understanding of the Kosovo/a conflict. However, seeing the Serbian and the 
Albanian communities as unitary actor leads to a specific understanding of 
identity (as seen above), which is problematic in understanding the causes of 
the Kosovo conflict. An important weakness in both approaches accounts is that 
identity is viewed as having been going through a period of construction but is 
taken as being petrified at the moment of the analysis. This assumption has two 
implications.  
 
First, in the examination of the conflict, these approaches would 
suggest seeing the Serbian and the Albanian collective identities as fixed in 
egoistic terms at the moment of the analysis. Identity constituted in this way is 
considered as the cause for the reproduction of self-help behaviours and the 
possibility for the recurrence of the conflict in Kosovo/a. Concluding that the 
collective memories (culture) of either the Serbs or the Albanians are almost 
perpetual and transferred to the present without major changes than the 
reproduction of the possibility for the recurrence of conflict is to be expected.  
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This assumption presupposes a simple historical continuity of the past in the 
present.  
 
Contrarily to this assumption, the practice of interactions between the 
Serbs and the Albanians do not indicate a perpetual enmity. The historical 
records suggest that besides negative interactions that modelled collective 
imageries of the Serbs towards the Albanians and vice-versa, there is evidence 
of friendly interactions. Both approaches as explained cannot account for it. 
Even in the accounts of the Battle of Kosovo/a, (a landmark event that has 
shaped Serb victimization) different sources indicated that the Serbs and the 
Albanians did fight together against the Ottomans. The Turkish chronicles 
mention the participation of the Albanians of Shkodra in the Battle of Kosovo/a 
under the leadership of Tsar Dusan (Ducellier, 1994; Inalcik, 2000). Referring to 
the historical records Ducellier cites: “there is no reason to think that at this 
stage of their conquest (XIV-XV century) the Ottomans relied especially on the 
Albanians to oppose the Slavs” (1994:8). Even before the Battle of Kosovo/a, 
the same author claims that, “no mention is made of clashes between the 
Albanians and the Serbs at the time of Tsar Dusan, and the more so during the 
time of creation of the principality of Kastrioti” (1981: 9). As Christine von Kohl 
writes: 
It is first of all clear that the relations between the Albanians and Serbs were 
much multifaceted and subtle than either side describes them.  It is beyond all 
doubt that in certain areas and in certain social milieux quite normal and friendly 
relations prevailed, while in others defense mechanisms and hostility were the 
order of the day (1992: 12). 
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Wendt’s and the Copenhagen School’s approaches cannot explain these 
friendly interactions because they miss the link between identity change at the 
actors’ level to collective knowledge (culture) at the system level. This 
observation takes us to the other weakness of this perspective.  
 
Second, the domestic processes are “bracketed” from the articulation 
of actor’s identity in both approaches. In McSweeney’s terms the domestic 
processes of “state interaction with sub-state actors…influence the sense of 
community” (1999: 50), which although recognised by Wendt “as intrinsic 
qualities that constitute actor individuality” (1995: 50) are not developed as a 
determinant in the articulation of actors’ social identity and attendant behaviour.  
In a similar manner, the Copenhagen School’s approach also neglects the 
malleability of actors’ identity in domestic processes of negotiations and 
arrangements. In Zehfuss’s arguments, part of the problem with this assumption 
rests on:  
The exclusion of processes of the construction of the state as a bearer of identity 
and of domestic processes of articulation of state identity…This reduces identity to 
something negotiable between states… concerned with the boundaries rather 
than the content of theories about self  (2001: 335). 
 
Furthermore, different accounts show that the Serb identity has changed more 
often than it is expected by both approaches, due to the groups’ internal 
negotiations. These accounts argue that Serbian identity and collective 
memories have subsumed metamorphic adjustments in shaping the boundaries 
of “self” following group’s internal interaction dynamics. Florian accounts for the 
metamorphosis of the Battle of Kosovo/a myth in shaping Serb identity. Thus, 
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the myth of the Battle of Kosovo/a was presented in a written form only at the 
end of the 1700s and at the beginning of the 1800s— a period that corresponds 
to the birth of nationalism in the Balkans. Only in 1892, was the Battle of 
Kosovo/a recognised by the Serbian Orthodox Church as a religious holiday 
(Locke, 1997: 167-201; Bieber, 2002).  
 
In 1938, the myth was revised as a part of Pan-Slavism aiming to 
include the Slovens and Croats as peoples bound by the myth of the Battle of 
Kosovo/a. However, the other nations of the first Yugoslavia did not share the 
same enthusiasm. Following the birth of the communist Yugoslavia, the myth of 
the Battle of Kosovo/a was replaced by the myth of partisan heroism during 
WWII for the liberation of Yugoslavia from the Nazis and the Fascists. This myth 
was supposed to replace the individual national myths of the Yugoslav 
constituent nations and contribute to the forging of Yugoslavism, the new identity 
of the Yugoslav peoples. Nevertheless, these efforts were considered as a 
camouflage of the project for a Greater Serbia and its effects did not last long 
(Caratan, 1997; Pavkovic, 2000).  
 
The myth of the Battle of Kosovo/a was rearticulated on the eve of the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia portraying Serbs as being always the victims of the 
“others.” The victimisation of Serbs established the idea that all Serbs living in 
Yugoslavia should be included in one single state, to be safe from 
discrimination. This was considered as a move that would strengthen Serb 
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statehood and identity and deal with the issues of insecurity that Serbs faced 
with the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation (Wiberg, 1993).  
 
These changes in the content of the Serb identity suggest that identity 
constructed in relation to difference with the “other”—the Albanians—cannot 
alone explain the Kosovo/a conflict. The facts show that the Serbian 
understanding of “self” has shifted from cooperation (Yugoslavism), to self-
assertion (communist centralisation) and finally egoism (Serbianhood) according 
to internal elites’ negotiations. Consequently, an important part of the Serbian 
leadership’s behaviour and their engagement in the conflict can be explained as 
a function of these interests and the way they were interpreted and presented as 
a security issue (securitised), rather that conflicting identities. The issue is dealt 
in the next section of this chapter.  
 
In McSweeney’s terms, it is “[t]he range of interests available to us 
[that] can cause us to reinvent the social identity appropriate to them,” thus 
“interests can play the decisive role in triggering the process of identity 
transformation” (1999: 127). Therefore, enmity becomes visible in the context of 
the contemporary political processes as defined by the representation of the 
“discourses of danger” (Campbell, 1992). Without understanding these 
communicative processes, it is difficult to explain the dynamics of the Kosovo/a 
conflict. 
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Another problem with Wendt’s and the Copenhagen School’s 
interpretations of the Kosovo/a conflict relates to the fact that the way these 
approaches look at conflict do not allow us to “decide who is the aggressor and 
who is the victim” (Bilgin, 2003: 213).  Thus, as it was argued above, both the 
Serbs and the Albanians are considered to be equally responsible for the 
emergence of the conflict. Both parties are viewed as victims looking to mediate 
their historical victimisation with the Kosovo/a conflict. This interpretation has 
political implications. The inability to assign responsibility makes the 
reconciliation process difficult. This situation has important implications for the 
post-conflict reconstructing process since it could be difficult for the parties to 
gain the confidence of the “other,” if nobody accepts the guilt.  
 
The plausibility of these counterarguments suggests that the historical 
victimisation of either the Serbs or the Albanians is not a sufficient argument to 
explain the causes of the Kosovo/a conflict. In the context of the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia, uncertainty and the construction of threats through the discourses of 
danger, rather than a response to historical old grievances would better explain 
the materialisation of the conflict. The threat motivating both actors’ behaviour 
emerged from the discourses of danger with relation to societal existence 
(identity), which explains why ethnic identity rather than other possible political 
identities was chosen to define the dimension and the scope of threat. In the 
process of framing a threat to identity, consensus is expected to emerge via a 
“securitisation” process. Thus, the explanation of the conflict would require the 
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understanding of this “securitisation” process, which is discussed in the following 
section.  
 
 
6.2. The Securitisation of Identity and the Kosovo/a Conflict 
 
Unlike the traditional power based explanations of the Kosovo/a conflict (dealt 
within Chapter 4 and 5), the Copenhagen School emphasises the ideational 
power of the “speech act” on actors’ behaviour. Referring to the concept of 
“successful securitisation,” the Copenhagen School scholars would suggest that 
the Kosovo/a conflict emerged out of the “securitisation” of the ethnic aspects of 
identity. Identity is assessed as resonating upon the historical relations between 
the Serbs and the Albanians as shaped by the perceived feelings of 
victimisation. Explaining the conflict in Kosovo/a as shaped by a successful 
“speech act” this approach would assess Milosevic and the Serbian elite as the 
“securitising actors.” 
 
Once the concept of the “speech act” is explicitly introduced to conflict 
analysis, it would help to explore the impetus of many events in the emergence 
of the conflict. On the six hundredth Anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo/a 
Milosevic is seen as conveying the message that the Serbs were threatened by 
the separatist activities of the Albanians. In his speech, Milosevic presented the 
separatism and discrimination as existential threats to the Serbian society. So, 
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the Serbian enmity toward the Albanians was emphasised thought a 
“securitisation” process, which established a consensus around a Serbian 
collective identity defined by victimisation.  
 
Presenting and getting consensus about the fact that the Serbs are 
being victimised by the Albanians in the course of the history is seen as the 
result of a “securitisation” process, which at the same time was used to justify 
the subsequent policies of Milosevic. Hence, the application of extraordinary 
measures towards the Albanians can be and was justified as needed to cope 
with these threats to identity. Although these threats resonate upon the 
collective memories of the Serbs, the emergence of the conflicts was not the 
simple result of the fact that the Serbs and the Albanian has learned to see each 
other as enemies as assumed in Wendt’s approach. However, the negative 
collective knowledge that the Serbs and the Albanian share for each other can 
be seen as offering background to the claims, which Milosevic and the Serbian 
leadership could use successfully in the “speech act” and get the necessary 
approval of the Serbian people. 
 
The economic crisis of the 1980s, in many accounts, is seen as 
challenging the position and interests of the Serbian elite within the Yugoslav 
Federation. Thus, explanations that point to the “securitisation” process view the 
conflict in Yugoslavia as the consequence of the purposeful and rational 
strategies of the Serbian leadership policies, which were threatened by changes 
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in the economic and political structures at the Federal level. It follows that the 
Serbian elite securitised ethnic aspects of identity to gain political support in the 
struggle with the other elites for wealth, power or legitimacy (Gagnon, 1994-95; 
Wiberg, 1993; Woodward, 1995; Ramet, 1996; Crawford and Lipschutz, 1997; 
Caratan, 1997; Isakovic, 2000). In this period of crisis, the Serb elite produced 
convincing interpretations of the Serbs’ interests, defined in terms of ethnic 
identity that the community accepted and acted upon them. In fact, 
“securitisation” does not have an autonomous power in shaping actors’ 
behaviour. However, once the ethnic dimension of identity was successfully 
securitised, it proved to be successful in mobilising the Serbs. 
 
The “securitisation process” in the case of Kosovo/a was initiated by 
Milosevic to gain political support in his pursuit of power. In January 1986, 
Milosevic was elected head of the Serbian Party’s Central Committee, by 
playing the alleged genocide card against the Serbs in Kosovo/a. By 1987, 
Milosevic is seen as consolidating control over the Serbian Communist Party’s 
structures.  Reformists were purged from the party under the label of tolerance 
toward the Albanians and disrespectfulness toward the suffering of the Serbs in 
the province of Kosovo/a (Magas, 1993: 109). After that, few voices questioned 
Milosevic’s claims about the victimisation of the Serbs in Kosovo/a and 
elsewhere.  
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Different accounts demonstrate that after consolidating his dominating 
position at the party level, Milosevic aimed at extending control over Kosovo/a 
that had enjoyed the status of the autonomous province within the Republic of 
Serbia. In order to achieve that the autonomy status was removed and other 
measures that excluded Albanians from the political, economic and social 
institutions in the province and at the Federal level were taken. To legitimise 
these actions Serbian elite presented them as being done with the purpose of 
serving the interests and security of Serbs in the province and Serbia proper. 
However, these developments seem to have served to ensure the interests of 
the Serbian elite rather than those of the simple Serbs, whose lives were not 
improved. On the contrary, the migration of the Serbs from the province toward 
Serbia proper continued as the economic situation in Kosovo/a deteriorated 
(Gagnon, 1994-95; Caratan, 1997).  
 
The “securitisation” of the ethnic aspects of identity, is used by the 
Serbian elite to get the support of the Serbs throughout the republic in the 
support of centralising policies. The use of “securitisation” as a strategy for 
gathering supremacy in its most extreme form, according to Crawford and 
Lipschutz “increases the odds that the political conflict will escalate into 
repression and violence” (1997: 168). That is what happened ultimately in 
Kosovo/a. This scholarship would suggest that the choice of ethnic identity as a 
subject for “securitisation” is not coincidental. In Gagnon’s terms, the choice of 
ethnicity as the referent subject for “securitisation” is justified by the fact that:  
 238 
Serbian conservatives relied on the particular idea of ethnicity in their conflictual 
strategy because political participation and legitimization in the [Balkans] historically 
was constructed in such terms…Those elites who could make the best case for 
representing the interests of an ethnic group could increase their power vis-à-vis the 
domestic arena by being internationally recognized as the representative of their 
ethnic or national group (1994-5: 140).  
 
The process of securitising the ethnic aspects of identity emphasised in the case 
of Kosovo/a suggests that the intolerance rooted in the ethnic culture of both the 
Serbs and the Albanians is not by itself a cause for conflict. The conflict can be 
seen as emerging because of a successful “securitisation” process by the 
Serbian elite, who used the idea of victimisation of the Serbs in Kosovo/a and 
the Albanian separatist threat to maintain its dominant position. The conflict over 
Kosovo/a can be seen as a reinterpretation of the inherent animosity between 
the Serbs and the Albanians in a securitisation process, which at the same time 
is viewed as an underlying causes of conflict.  
 
In the “securitisation” process the Serbian leadership presented 
Albanian separatism as an existential threat to society and identity. In doing that 
the Serbian leadership first redefined Serb identity in ethnic terms emphasising 
victimisation and the history of long-term discrimination by the Albanians. In 
presenting the threats that were endangering the Serbs, the Serbian Academy of 
Arts and Science contributed with its authority to make the threats believable. 
Thus, the Academy formulated the discriminations that the Serbs were facing 
and provided “scientific” guidelines for solving “the Serbian Question” 
(Anastasijevic, 2000). This political platform served at the same time to justify 
and legitimise Milosevic’s actions.  
 239 
However, the Serbian Academy of Arts and Science was not alone in 
this endeavour. Other intellectuals re-fashioned their writings in nationalistic 
terms and the media and even the Orthodox Church joined the discourse 
(Bieber, 2002: 99; see, also, Dragovic-Soso, 2000). Looking at the “mediatic 
war” as part of the “securitisation” process, Renaud de la Brosse would define it 
as follows: 
The action of propaganda on the population aiming to guide them toward war prone 
nationalistic policies did develop in the form of a real public opinion campaign. 
Meanwhile it is used to justify the conquest of anciently owned territories now 
occupied by the enemy—an enemy that needed to be ‘chased,’ at the same time 
denigrate an ethnic group or an nation to better justify the violence used to face it, 
which means to present the self as the victim of other nationalisms in order to better 
feed its proper nationalism (2000: 3). 
 
In this “securitisation” process, Milosevic is seen as deliberately reviving through 
the media and all other instruments of propaganda, the idea of the “Greater 
Serbia,” which was presented as an important dimension of Serbian identity and 
security.81 In the “securitisation” process, the myth of the Battle of Kosovo/a and 
its divine nature were used as events that marked the victimisation of the Serbs. 
The parallelism between the situations of the Serbs after the Battle of Kosovo/a 
in 1389 with that of the Serbs in the 1990s emphasised the frustration of the 
Serbs. The myth of the battle of Kosovo/a was used to create a sense of 
continuity of events that were taking place between the Serbs and Albanians of 
Kosovo/a in the 1980s and 1990s. This sense of continuity can be traced in the 
writings of the Serb nationalist author Bogdanovic,82 who wrote: “Kosovo is not 
                                                                                             
 
81
 For the role of the political propaganda and the plan for creating a state for all Serbs and the 
consequences of using media for ultra-nationalist ends see, De la Brosse (2003). 
82
 As cited by Bieber (2002: 100). 
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some imaginary legend of the past, but a real historical destiny that continues 
today” (1986: 286).  
 
Drawing parallels between the situation of the Serbs in 1389 and the 
Serbs in Kosovo/a in 1989, the process of “securitisation” is expected to create 
the impression of everlasting persecution. To create this impression the current 
suffering of the Serbs were compared with that of the 1389 aftermath of the 
battle; and the migration of the Serbs from Kosovo/a as a result of the fear of 
persecutions by the Ottomans was compared with the Serbs migration of the 
1980s towards Serbia and other republics of the Federation. WWII is another 
event that was recalled to encourage ethnic competition by emphasising the 
policies of ethnic cleansing claimed to have happened during the Fascist and 
Nazi occupation of the Balkans, where ethnic based states such as “Greater 
Croatia”, “Greater Albania” and “Greater Bulgaria” were created by the Axis 
forces. 
 
In the “securitisation” process, the accounts of the Serbian collective 
memory the distinction between the past and the present are erased. Thereby, 
in contrast to objectivist approaches, for the Copenhagen School scholars the 
accuracy of the historical facts is not important in the process of “securitisation” 
(Anzulovic, 1999). Hence, “securitisation” would function as a means of 
mobilising attributes of identity (which can be “imaginary” but do make political 
and personal choices to identify within a community) for political effects. That is 
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why, the techniques of “securitisation” utilised by Milosevic included the use of 
unifying national symbols with which the Serbs identified themselves. In 
Thomas’s words “by adopting such symbols, and particularly the Kosovo ‘master 
symbol’…Milosevic was able to transcend the normal, profane considerations of 
politics” (1999: 425). The “securitisation” can be considered successful and the 
role of the media, which kept the “nation in danger” rhetoric at a high-level 
should be seen as contributing to the success (De la Brosse, 2003). 
 
The “securitisation” process led to conflict because the myth 
construction about the Kosovo/a battle was fomented in such way as to exclude 
any possibility of compromise between the Albanians and the Serbs and it 
encouraged resentment among the Serbs. Such resentment83 offered powerful 
stimulus for collective action (Pesic, 1995, Bieber, 2002). Media increasing the 
Serbs’ resentment to the loss of Kosovo/a encouraged the view of the secession 
of Kosovo/a and the creation of “Greater Albania” as threats.  
 
As a result of the “securitisation” the question of the Albanian 
separatism went beyond routine politics. The securitisation of the issue allowed 
the Serbian leadership to take repressive actions that in “normal” political 
circumstances would be very difficult to be legitimised. Examples include the 
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 For a more theoretical understanding of resentment see, Liah Greenfeld (1992). She claims 
“resentment not only makes the nation more aggressive, but represents an unusually powerful 
stimulus of national sentiment and collective action, which makes it easer to mobilize 
collectivistic nations for aggressive warfare, than to mobilize individualistic nations, in which 
national commitment is normally dependent on rational calculations” (Greenfeld, 1992: 488). 
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establishment in Kosovo/a of the state of high alert in 1981 after the students 
and workers’ demonstration that asked for the republic status of the region 
within the Yugoslav Federation (Malcom, 1998: 74-77; see, also, Troebst, 1998); 
dismissal of all Albanians from public sector employment (Libal and Khol, 1993; 
see, also, Troebst, 1998; Clark, 2000: 74-77); closing down of the University of 
Prishtina and all printing houses in the Albanian language (Troebst, 1998; Clark, 
2000).  
 
The “securitisation” of the Serbian ethnic identity, supported a Greater 
Serbian state solution and a refusal to share Kosovo/a with the Albanians, thus 
a zero-sum identity politics. Once the consensus had been achieved, few voices 
questioned the reasons that pushed the Serbian elite to support the idea of 
“Greater Serbia.” The achievement of this consensus demonstrates the power of 
the securitising process. 
 
To sum up, to examine conflict the Copenhagen School approach 
would point to the “securitisation” process that established an important 
communicative process, which in a way or another reflected the interests of 
Serbian elite. To cite Gagnon, “conflict is caused not by ethnic sentiments, nor 
by external security concerns, but rather by the dynamics of within-group 
conflict” (1994-95: 131). These dynamics are mainly underdetermined by the 
traditional and Wendt’s approaches that do not consider the role of immediate 
communicative processes as determinant of actors’ behaviour. 
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6.2.1. The “Securitisation” of Identity and the Kosovo/a Conflict: An 
Assessment 
 
In analysing the Kosovo/a conflict, the Copenhagen School’s approach would 
suggest to scrutinize “securitisation” processes to explain the dynamics of the 
Kosovo/a conflict. Thus, the claim of Milosevic that Albanian separatism in 
Kosovo/a was a threat to the Serbian identity and state and its acceptance by 
the Serbian people can make sense only through the understanding of the 
“securitisation” process that started to take place in Serbia in the mid 1980s. The 
“securitisation” process was “successful” since Milosevic—the securitising 
actor—managed to convince the Serbs in Serbia proper and in Kosovo/a that 
Serbian identity was in danger. In this interpretation of the conflict, identity is 
presented as a security issue. Threats to identity are viewed as intersubjectively 
created.  
 
For this scholarship, the “securitisation” of the ethnic aspects of 
identity was successful because it resonated upon almost stable antagonising 
identities of the Serbs and the Albanians, which served as the background to the 
Milosevic’s claims. This understanding of identity is problematic. It was 
explained in the previous section that seeing identity as petrified at the moment 
of the analysis and transported from the past without major changes is a 
weakness of this approach to conflict. The implications of this conceptualisation 
of identity into the interpretation of the Kosovo/a conflict were discussed in the 
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previous section. Here, only the problems related with the conceptualisation of 
the “securitisation” process are discussed. Pointing to the “securitisation” 
process would help the understanding of the dynamics of the Kosovo/a conflict. 
However, the way securitisation is conceptualised is of little help in making the 
right policy choices to settle the conflict. This impasse is due to two weaknesses 
of this approach. 
 
First, the claims waged by Milosevic as the securitising actor are not 
questioned. That is because, in the understanding of the “securitisation” 
process, what matters is the collective memories of the Serbs and the message 
of victimisation that is conveyed from them. So, the validity of the Serbs’ claims 
are not scrutinized for their accuracy. This validation, however, seems to be 
susceptible to critique on the grounds of accuracy, normative rightness and 
sincerity (Wyn Jones, 1999: 111).  
 
Hence, from the Copenhagen School’s perspective what matters in a 
“securitisation” process is that Milosevic’s claims have been successful in 
securitising the issue of Serbs’ victimisation. This approach not necessarily 
looks for the accuracy of Milosevic’s claims. Historical evidence that is used to 
claim the victimisation of Serbs is questionable and challenged by counter-
arguments grounded in the findings of archaeology, linguistic sources, 
toponomastic data and historical records. Referring to the Battle of Kosovo/a, 
the Serb’s claims on the ownership of the army that fought against the Ottomans 
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and Serb victimisation and exploitation aftermath the battle, seems questionable 
by alternative historical sources. Accordingly, historical sources84 other than 
Serbian ones, define the combatant forces at the battle of Kosovo/a as 
Christians lead by King Lazar, who was joined by Hungarians, Albanians, 
Bosniaks, Wlachia, Czechs and Kifchaks (Inalcik, 2000: 25). The defeat at the 
Field of Kosovo/a in 1389 was not only a Serb defeat since Albanians were part 
of the army led by King Lazar as well.  
 
Therefore, the accuracy of the claim about the Albanian separatism 
presented as a constant threat to Serbian identity is questioned. This suggests 
that contrary to the opinion of Wæver the implications of “securitisation” - the 
meaning of security - is not necessarily fixed but it should be open to 
argumentation and debate. If Milosevic’s claims were compared with 
historiography and other sources than maybe the “securitisation” would not have 
been successful. If the Serbian public and international community would have 
questioned the rightness of the policies of Milosevic against the Albanian in 
Kosovo/a from the beginning than the conflict could have been avoided.  
 
Second, another problem with Wæver’s conceptualisation of 
“securitisation” as Wyn Jones states is to believe “that the implications of calling 
an issue a  ‘security problem’  cannot  be challenged,  only the objects  to which  
                                                                                             
 
84
 For a comprehensive review of different sources that define the battle of Kosovo, see, also, 
Bojovic (2000). 
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that label is applied” can be questioned (1999: 110). The empirical evidence of 
the Kosovo/a case challenges the notion that the implications of “securitisation” 
are fixed. In particular, the strategy of non-resistance or civil resistance (Maliqi, 
1993; Clark, 2000), which was endorsed by the Albanians to face Serb 
repression during the first part of the 1990s was based on the belief that 
Albanians will gain the international attention and be awarded for not using 
military means in making present the issue of their rights.  
 
This can be assumed as an approach that can hope to ameliorate 
threats. So, although this action was not a securitising move in the way the 
Copenhagen School conceived it, it had profound effects on the Kosovo/a 
politics, facilitating the establishment of a separate political life parallel to the 
one of the Serbs in Kosovo/a. The emergence of the KLA, which followed with 
the radicalisation of the demands of the Albanians for independence, can be 
understood as deteriorating threats. These demonstrate that the meaning of 
security is not necessarily fixed but it is opened to argumentation and dispute 
and subject to actor’s interests.  
 
 
Wendt’s and the Copenhagen School’s approaches offer interesting 
explanations of the Kosovo/a conflict. Different from the previous approaches, 
they offer an explanation of the social aspects of the conflict. Both approaches 
examine the Kosovo/a conflict by referring to the concept of identity and the 
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collective shared memories (culture) of the actors (state in Wendt’s and society 
in the Copenhagen School’s approaches). Identity and culture are viewed as 
constructed in the process of the Serbs-Albanian historical interactions and 
transported in the 1990s without major changes.  
 
Based on these assumptions the conflict of Kosovo/a is interpreted as 
either merging from “conflicting identities” (Wendt’s approach) or “competing 
identities” (the Copenhagen School approach). Thus, the enmity between the 
Serbs and Albanians is viewed as everlasting. At the same time, this enmity 
indicates the possibility for the recurrence of conflict between the Serbs and the 
Albanians in time.  
 
Differently from the approach of Wendt, the Copenhagen School 
introduced the concept of “securitisation,” which brings the concept of identity to 
the study of security issues and conflict. Furthermore, this approach emphasises 
the importance of communicative processes in shaping actors’ behaviour. So, in 
the case of the Kosovo/a conflict, this approach would suggest that the 
emergence of the conflict should not be simply understood as emerging out of 
historical ethnic hatred.   
 
Thus, the conflict is to be seen as being interubjectively created. As 
the domestic consensus is reached on the existence of threats to ethnic 
existence through the securitising process, it can be suggested that Serbian 
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leadership gained the support to get engaged in conflict. The main problem of 
these two approaches in the interpretation of the Kosovo/a conflict is their 
assumption about identity that reflect upon frozen historical situations. This 
assumption would presuppose the possibility of recurrence of conflict because 
conflicting identities of the Serbs and the Albanians in Kosovo/a would 
potentially remain subjects for “securitisation.” 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The aim of this dissertation was to evaluate the contribution of different 
International Relations approaches to our understanding of the ethno-national 
conflict in general and the Kosovo/a conflict in particular. Part I of this 
dissertation presented three major International Relations scholarships to war, 
namely, traditional International Relations theory (namely, Realism, Rationalism 
and Revolutionism), the post-Cold War approaches (neo-Realism and “New 
Wars”) and Constructivism (Wendt’s and the Copenhagen School’s 
approaches). The aim of this part was to account for the relevance of these 
theoretical approaches to the study of ethno-national conflict by pointing to their 
strengths and weaknesses. Part II used the insights gathered from Part I to 
assess what different International Relations theories can tell us about the 
Kosovo/a conflict. In what follows a summary of this dissertation is presented.   
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In Chapter 1, it was explained that the competing principles of the 
traditional International Relations theories (Realism, Rationalism and 
Revolutionism), namely, power, order and emancipation offer guidance in the 
study of the causes of war, which can be used to study the case of ethno-
national conflict as well. These principles can be used to organise the 
explanations of the permissive conditions under which ethno-national conflict 
take place. The main problem with these approaches is that they focus 
exclusively on narrow understandings of power, order and emancipation.  
 
It was argued that the explanatory power of these principles is basic 
and too general.  Realism points to power and anarchy as the underlying causes 
of ethno-national conflict. However, power, while important, does not alone 
determine the outcome of conflict. Rationalism by looking at order assumes a 
shared consensus about the definition of ethno-national conflict. However, this 
consensus refers not to outcomes, but to a set of established rules, norms and 
institutions concerned for the continuation and maintenance of order in the 
society of states. Revolutionism accounts for the necessary prerequisites, which 
would make war obsolete in international relations. Nevertheless, no one can 
prove with certainty that democracy would keep ethno-national conflict away. 
 
Another weakness of the traditional approaches, which limit our 
understanding of ethno-national conflict, is their tendency to neglect the social 
relations that shape the conflict. Instead, these approaches make a series of 
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fixed assumptions about the underlying causes of conflict, such as the one 
concerning the role and the value of the state. This remark lays the ground for 
the next criticism. 
 
The other weakness of with these traditions is their state-centric 
ontology. All three traditional approaches, by marginalising the importance of 
other actors in the understanding of war, present a distorted reality of war in 
contemporary politics. The practice of ethno-national conflict, which has become 
the predominant form of violence in contemporary politics, seems to challenges 
our traditional understanding of war in international relations. Other International 
Relations approaches try to ameliorate the deficiencies of traditional approaches 
to war by moving the attention to sub—and—trans state level of analysis (the 
post-Cold War approaches) and identity as a social signifier (Constructivism).  
 
In Chapter 2, it was discussed that the post-Cold War approaches, 
namely, neo-Realism and “New Wars” adopt power and cosmopolitanism to 
sub—and—trans state level of analyses. This framework of analysis allows us to 
look at the immediate causes of ethno-national conflict. Post-Cold War neo-
Realism uses the same neo-realist logic of anarchy and power to non-state 
level. This approach looks at the “security dilemma” between ethnic groups, in 
the condition of the emergence of anarchy in a decaying state, to explain the 
emergence of ethno-national conflict. In the “New Wars” approach the causes of 
“new wars” are viewed as being of socio-economic nature. This approach points 
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to the erosion of state authority resulting from the process of globalisation and 
the emergence of distorted politico-military formations as the underlying causes 
of the “new wars.” These approaches provide a better contribution to our 
understanding of ethno-national conflict since this conflict is the explicit subject 
of analysis. 
 
Both approaches take as referent object of analysis actors other than 
states in an effort to correct the state-centrism of the traditional International 
Relations approaches. Besides their contribution to the study of ethno-national 
conflict, the arguments of both approaches’ contain a number of weaknesses 
that affect our understanding of the causes of ethno-national conflict. These 
approaches over-emphasise the role of international structures shaped by 
anarchy (for neo-Realism) or globalisation (for the “New Wars” approach) in 
shaping actors’ behaviour (the ethno-national groups for neo-Realism and 
distorted politico-military formations for the “New Wars” approach).  
 
At the same time, both approaches use nationalism and identity in 
their explanations in an effort to move traditional approaches beyond their 
concerns with power and cosmopolitanism. However, these approaches look at 
identity as a means rather than an end. Hence, national identity (for neo-
Realism) and political identity (for the “New Wars” approach) are considered in 
instrumental terms serving either to support the offensive capabilities or to 
legitimise the illegal and mafia activities of groups. These approaches do not 
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consider identity as constructed in the process of interaction and an organising 
principle of actors’ behaviour. 
 
The traditional International Relations theory and the post-Cold War 
approaches neglect or take identity as a fixed or pre-given concept in their 
explanation of ethno-national conflict. The lack of attention to culture and identity 
in these approaches prevent them from accounting for the dynamics and social 
context of conflict. However, the ethno-national conflict rendered visible the role 
of identity as a social signifier. Constructivism looks at identity as an organising 
principle of international behaviour, including war. 
 
Two constructivist variants were discussed in Chapter 3, namely, 
Wendt’s and the Copenhagen School’s approaches. In these approaches 
identity is viewed as a key link both to the mutual constitution of actors and 
structure and the way actors relate to each other. Following Wendt’s logic, the 
underlying cause of the ethno-national conflict is to be seen in the conflict of 
social identities claims constituted in the process of mutual interaction. Wendt’s 
approach to war remains state-centric and as such it is vulnerable on this issue 
to the same criticisms as the traditional approaches.  
 
 Different from Wendt, the Copenhagen School’s approach looked at 
“society” as a referent object of analysis, offering as such a better theoretical 
base for the understanding of ethno-national conflict. In this approach, society is 
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about identity, which refers to ethnic and religious loyalties constituted in the 
process of interaction. By introducing the concept of “societal security,” the 
Copenhagen School offers an understanding of identity that makes it operational 
and applicable to study the dynamics of ethno-national conflict.  
 
 Like Wendt, the Copenhagen School offers a constructivist approach 
to international relations and war. Hence, “shared meanings” are viewed as 
created in the process of interaction. To use the logic of this approach, war-
prone behaviour of an actor is seen as a factor in the calculations of the “other.” 
Thus, conflict is to be understood as resulting from competing identity claims of 
different actors. Identity in this approach represents an independent constitutive 
factor of behaviour.  
 
The Copenhagen School’s approach also uses the concept of 
“securitisation” to analyse the dynamics of a particular conflict. “Securitisation” in 
this scholarship represents a discursive process. “Securitisation” as presented in 
this approach relies on arguments that make reference to the survival of the 
actor (state or society) that is defined in terms of identity. Through introducing 
the concept of “securitisation” the Copenhagen School scholars offer the tool 
that can be used to analyse the process that leads to conflict. Hence, the logic of 
“securitisation” can be applied to understand the outbreak of ethno-national 
conflict as well. 
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The insights gleaned from main International Relations scholarships to 
war in Part I, were used to study the Kosovo/a conflict in Part II. In a way Part I 
offered answers to the question raised in the introduction of this dissertation: 
Can the insights gleaned from the analyses of different International Relations 
scholarships to war be used to study a concrete ethno-national conflict? Part II, 
answered this question by looking at the case of the Kosovo/a conflict. 
 
Chapter 4 looked at what traditional International Relations theories 
can tell us about the Kosovo/a conflict. Realist accounts explain the conflict as 
either caused by Serbia’s interest to build a state of all Serbs as a function of its 
power-maximisation motive (classical Realism) or resulting from the end of Cold 
War and Communism that released nationalist antagonisms (neo-Realism). In 
rationalist accounts the definition of the Kosovo/a conflict is viewed as 
conditioned by the shared consent among states that see the case as either 
internal violence or as a violation of individual human rights within the Serbian 
state. In the revolutionist accounts, the Kosovo/a conflict is assessed as caused 
by the distorted nature of democracy in Serbia, autocratic policies of Milosevic 
and manipulation of information in a nationalistic manner. 
  
The state-centric outlook of the traditional approaches allows scholars 
to concentrate their attention solely to the Serbian state, which is taken as the 
referent object of analysis. These approaches do not seem to be helpful in 
understanding the actions of the Serbian state towards the Albanians, which are 
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its own citizens. What is missing from the traditional accounts are explanations 
about identity as a social signifier. Traditional approaches work on the basis of 
prior, unacknowledged assumptions about identity. These approaches, by 
considering actors with pre-established and fixed identities, do not seem to be 
telling us much about the dynamics and social context of conflict.  
 
Different from the traditional approaches, the post-Cold War 
approaches to the Kosovo/a conflict consider in their explanations the Serbs and 
the Albanians as ethno-national groups (neo-Realism) or part of distorted 
politico-military formations (the “New Wars” approach). The conflict between the 
Serbs and the Albanians is explained as emerging out of their conflicting 
material interest. These approaches consider the emergence of anarchy after 
the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation or the loss of state authority due to 
the globalisation process as the underlying cause of the Kosovo/a conflict. This 
framework is the source of the problem in the interpretation of the Kosovo/a 
conflict for both approaches. In this framework, the Albanians and the Serbs as 
ethno-national groups are treated as proto-states, which behaviour is shaped by 
anarchy or globalisation.  
 
Differently from the previous approaches, Constructivism looked at the 
Kosovo/a conflict by referring to identity and collective shared memories 
(culture) of the actors, viewed as social constructs. In Chapter 6, following a 
constructivist logic, identity and culture in the case of Kosovo/a conflict are 
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regarded as constructed in the process of the Serbs’ and the Albanians’ 
historical interactions. Based on these assumptions, the conflict of Kosovo/a is 
interpreted as either emerging from “conflicting identity” (Wendt’s approach) or 
“competing identity” (the Copenhagen School’s approach) claims. Thus, the 
enmity between the Serbs and the Albanians is seen as embedded in their 
identities. At the same time, this enmity indicates the possibility for the 
recurrence of conflict between the Serbs and the Albanians in time.  
 
Chapter 6 argued that the Kosovo/a conflict can be better explained 
by using the concept of “securitisation”. Following the logic of “securitisation,” 
the Serbs and the Albanians are seen as an integral unified whole, which were 
induced to believe that their ethnic identity was in danger. Thus, “securitisation” 
is seen as a process and essential component in the emergence of the conflict.  
 
The increasing in importance of ethno-national conflict in world politics 
has encouraged International Relations theories to move beyond their exclusive 
preoccupation with inter-state wars. This dissertation’s aim was to account for 
the contribution of various International Relations approaches to our 
understanding of ethno-national conflict in general and the Kosovo/a conflict in 
particular. Different International Relations scholarships offer alternative 
explanations to this conflict. 
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The traditional theories and post-Cold War approaches allow us to 
examine factors that play the role of the “catalyst” in the initiation of conflict. This 
category of causes can be classified as the necessary conditions for the 
occurrence of conflict. These approaches look at conflict as a means to an end 
being it either power, order or emancipation. However, these explanations are 
not sufficient to understand the intrinsic causes of conflict. Constructivism put 
emphasis to the processes that lead to conflict. To explain conflict it explores 
interactions both as processes of construction (rather than a means to transmit 
information) and as relational processes in which actor co-construct each other. 
Interactionist hypothesis about actors’ identity address both the construction of 
the actors and the causes of their conflictual relations. Thus, for constructivists 
actors learn to be enemies, which at the same time should be seen as creating 
the parameters within which selection of conflictual behaviour depends. 
However, formulating ethno-national identity in enmity terms in a securitising 
process would better explain the immediate causes of a conflict.  
 
By comparing the main International Relations approaches to ethno-
national conflict, pointing to their weaknesses and strengths; and applying 
gleaned insights to study the Kosovo/a conflict this dissertation demonstrated 
what these approaches can tell us about this conflict and the case study. No 
International Relations approaches to conflict is complete neither do they have 
all the answers about its causes. Constructivism has more things to say about 
conflict. In this approach the ontology of conflict is seen to be social in the sense 
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that is through ideas that actors ultimately relate to one another. Thus, actors 
learn to see each other as enemies. Furthermore, this approach is 
“constructionist” in the sense that in the interaction process the ideas help 
defines who and what the actors are. Thus, actors construct each other as 
enemies in the process of interaction. To conclude, in this approach conflict is 
seen as a socially constructed practice.  
 
Drawing from what different International Relations theories did tell us 
about the ethno-national conflict, we can conclude that in the understanding of 
ethno-national conflict, analysis should first be focused on depicting changes in 
the discursive field, then looking for moments of crisis when social meaning is 
contestable (change in the distribution of power, economic collapse or 
establishment of authoritative regimes) to conclude by finding key events when 
the struggle can be manifested.  
 
A comprehensive understanding of conflict is important because it 
helps preventing it, by assisting in making the right political choices when 
settling conflictual disputes. The inadequacy of international community in the 
definition of the events in the Kosovo/a case and concomitant responses 
witnessed at the same time that the causes of the conflict were not well 
understood. 
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